1. www.sungard.com Lessons for Financial Risk Management from the Great Recession David M. Rowe, Ph.D. EVP for Risk Management – SunGard Adaptiv Nykerdit Symposium 2009 Copenhagen, Denmark October 26, 2009

2. Sage Advice Learn from the mistakes of others, you'll never live long enough to make them all yourself. It’s also less painful than learning from your own mistakes.

3. The Lessons 1.Statistical Entropy 2.Structural Imagination 3.Self-Referential Feedback 4.Complexity and Second Order Uncertainty 5.Alternate Means of Valuation

4. 1. Statistical Entropy Statistical analysis can extract information from data, it cannot create information not already contained in the data. Stated more casually: Like water, information cannot rise higher than its source. Data Information

5. I n f o r m a i t o n Data o I n f o r m a i t n This is extraction of information, NOT creation of information 1. Statistical Entropy

6. Extreme Confidence Estimates AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC  1 annual default every 10,000 years! Alternately  1 annual default every century Super-senior tranches of subprime mortgage- backed securities were rated AAA (or BETTER!!) What was the empirical basis for these ratings?

7. Mortgage Default Experience SOURCE: Mortgage Bankers Association - National Delinquency Survey

8. Hypothetical Detachment Point Log-Normal Distribution: Mean = 5.97; StDev = 2.16

9. Hypothetical Detachment Point Hypothetical Subprime Default Probability Density - 0.0500 0.1000 0.1500 0.2000 0.2500 0510152025 Defaults (%) Probability Density.01% = AAA

10. Hypothetical Detachment Point Hypothetical Subprime Default Probability Density - 0.0500 0.1000 0.1500 0.2000 0.2500 0510152025 Defaults (%) Probability Density.01% = AAA Largest Sample Observation = 9.6% Behavior in the Tail is Based on What Distribution is Assumed

11. 2. Structural Imagination Broad Geographic Distribution

12. 2. Structural Imagination Through mid-2006 What unobserved contingency could upset this pattern? Idiosyncratic Causes for Default

13. 2. Structural Imagination Threats to Diversification One candidate was fairly obvious. Falling housing prices would hurt ALL borrowers Defaults would no longer be statistically independent $ $$ $

14. 2. Structural Imagination 12-month % change 10 City Composite U.S. Home Price Index 12-month % change S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices Strongly Positive: 1995-2006 Jan-95

15. 2. Structural Imagination 10 City Composite U.S. Home Price Index Aug 1990 Mar 1994 12-month % change S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices 12-month % change Negative for 3-1/2 years in early 1990s

16. 2. Structural Imagination 10 City Composite U.S. Home Price Index 12-month % change Monthly % Change (annual rate) September 2005 Month-to-Month % Change Peaked in September 2005 : Turned Negative in mid-2006 Aug 1990 Mar 1994 S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices

17. 2. Structural Imagination The Lesson 1)Look for significant unrepresented variables. 2)Track these variables carefully as early warning indicators of emerging problems.

18. 3. Self-Referential Feedback The Seeds of Self-Destruction The huge expansion of subprime mortgage debt set the stage for a more serious crisis when conditions began to worsen.

19. An Explosion in Subprime Mortgage Originations Subprime Mortgage Originations 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 2001200220032004200520062007 $ Billions Per year Percent $150-$200 billion and 6% to 7% of originations Over $600 billion and Over 20% of originations By one estimate in late 2007, 14% of all outstanding mortgages were subprime Source: Inside Mortgage Finance

20. 3. Beware Self-Referential Feedback - 1 Achieving Greater Volume Required Relaxing Underwriting Standards  Risk Estimates Based on Historical Data Become Progressively Less Reliable  Further Innovations (e.g. Compound Repackaging, CDO 2 ) Increased Complexity      DARK RISK A Unique Innovation Generated Attractive Returns Growth in Volume 

21. 3. Beware Self-Referential Feedback - 2 Defaults are Magnified by the Inflated Volume of Poorly Collateralized Mortgages  More Stringent Credit Conditions and Increased Liquidation Sales  Credit Losses Hurt Bank Earnings      Compound Economic Impact An Initial Economic Shock Home Price Declines 

22. 4. Complexity and Dark Risk + ComplexityLimited Data  Dark Risk

23. 5. Alternate Means of Valuation Old Credit Risk Mantra What is the second means of repayment? Proposed Capital Markets Mantra What is the second means of valuation?

24. 5. Alternate Means of Valuation  

25.   ?

26. Subprime CDOs (2006) Corporate CDOs (2006) CDS IRS Ease of Current Valuation Level 1 Observable prices in active markets Observable prices in inactive markets or observable inputs to accepted pricing models Few or no observable market prices and models requiring significant unobservable inputs Level 2 Level 3

27. 5. Alternate Means of Valuation Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Ease of Current Valuation Effectiveness of Alternate Means of Valuation Level 2 Level 3 IRS CDS (2006) Corporate CDOs (2006) Subprime CDOs (2006) Level ? Corporate CDOs (2008) Subprime CDOs (2008) CDS (2008)

28. Estimated US Banks Balance Sheet (2008 Q2) $11,950 Bill L i a b i l i t i e s Equity $1,351 Bill Subprime Related A l l O t h e r A s s e t s $540 Bill $12,761 Bill Subprime Related Assets Equity ?

29. A Question Was this crisis a Black Swan? ?

30. Product Complexity Pace of Innovation Volume Growth Commodity Prices Geopolitical Risk Information Security Extreme Events Model Risk Liquidity Technological Change Emerging Markets Operational Risk Regulatory Uncertainty Effective Portfolio Mgt. External Linkages ???? Unknown Unknowns ???? Miscellaneous Elements of the Risk Puzzle (Original: May 2006)

31. Product Complexity Pace of Innovation Volume Growth Commodity Prices Geopolitical Risk Information Security Extreme Events Model Risk Liquidity Technological Change Emerging Markets Operational Risk Regulatory Uncertainty Effective Portfolio Mgt. External Linkages ???? Unknown Unknowns ???? Miscellaneous Elements of the Risk Puzzle (Rev: October 2008) Pace of Innovation Product Complexity Model Risk Volume Growth External Linkages Liquidity Commodity Prices Effective Portfolio Mgt.

32. Use structural imagination to define significant unrepresented variables in existing risk analysis Track these variables as early warning indicators 2. Structural Imagination Summary 1. Statistical Entropy Data Information

33.     Compound Economic Impact     Recognize that success of an innovation can alter the environment in ways that jeopardize continued success 3. Self-Referential Feedback Summary

34. Limited data and untested complexity make risk estimates inherently uncertain 4. Complexity  Dark Risk  Summary

35. Limit holdings of assets with no reasonably objective second means of valuation even if they are highly liquid today 5. Second Means of Valuation  ?  Summary

36. A Final Thought – Strategic Risk “Give me 15% more than last year. Don’t give me excuses, give me the numbers.” ≠ sound aggressive management = recipe for disaster Where the buck stops CEO Board of Directors