1. Security Chapter 9 9.1 The security environment 9.2 Basics of cryptography 9.3 User authentication 9.4 Attacks from inside the system 9.5 Attacks from outside the system 9.6 Protection mechanisms 9.7 Trusted systems

2. The Security Environment Threats Security goals and threats

3. Basics of Cryptography Relationship between the plaintext and the ciphertext

4. Monoalphabetic substitution –each letter replaced by different letter Given the encryption key, –easy to find decryption key Secret-key crypto called symmetric-key crypto Secret-Key Cryptography

5. Public-Key Cryptography All users pick a public key/private key pair –publish the public key –private key not published Public key is the encryption key –private key is the decryption key

6. RSA Encryption To find a key pair e, d: 1. Choose two large prime numbers, P and Q (each greater than 10100), and form: N = P x Q Z = (P–1) x (Q–1) 2. For d choose any number that is relatively prime with Z (that is, such that d has no common factors with Z). We illustrate the computations involved using small integer values for P and Q: P = 13, Q = 17 –> N = 221, Z = 192 d = 5 3.To find e solve the equation: e x d = 1 mod Z That is, e x d is the smallest element divisible by d in the series Z+1, 2Z+1, 3Z+1,.... e x d = 1 mod 192 = 1, 193, 385,... 385 is divisible by d e = 385/5 = 77

7. RSA Encryption (contd.) To encrypt text using the RSA method, the plaintext is divided into equal blocks of length k bits where 2 k < N (that is, such that the numerical value of a block is always less than N; in practical applications, k is usually in the range 512 to 1024). k = 7, since 2 7 = 128 The function for encrypting a single block of plaintext M is: (N = P X Q = 13X17 = 221), e = 77, d = 5: E'(e,N,M) = M e mod N for a message M, the ciphertext is M 77 mod 221 The function for decrypting a block of encrypted text c to produce the original plaintext block is: D'(d,N,c) = c d mod N The two parameters e,N can be regarded as a key for the encryption function, and similarly d,N represent a key for the decryption function. So we can write K e = and K d =, and we get the encryption function: E(K e, M) ={M} K (the notation here indicating that the encrypted message can be decrypted only by the holder of the private key K d ) and D(K d, ={M} K ) = M. - public key, d – private key for a station

8. Application of RSA Lets say a person in Atlanta wants to send a message M to a person in Buffalo: Atlanta encrypts message using Buffalo’s public key B  E(M,B) Only Buffalo can read it using it private key b: E(b, E(M,B))  M In other words for any public/private key pair determined as previously shown, the encrypting function holds two properties: –E(p, E(M,P))  M –E(P, E(M,p))  M

9. How can you authenticate “sender”? In real life you will use signatures: we will look at concept of digital signatures next. Instead of sending just a simple message, Atlanta will send a signed message signed by Atlanta’s private key: –E(B,E(M,a)) Buffalo will first decrypt using its private key and use Atlanta’s public key to decrypt the signed message: –E(b, E(B,E(M,a))  E(M,a) –E(A,E(M,a))  M

10. Digital Signatures Strong digital signatures are essential requirements of a secure system. These are needed to verify that a document is: Authentic : source Not forged : not fake Non-repudiable : The signer cannot credibly deny that the document was signed by them.

11. Digest Functions Are functions generated to serve a signatures. Also called secure hash functions. It is message dependent. Only the Digest is encrypted using the private key.

12. Alice’s bank account certificate 1.Certificate type:Account number 2.Name:Alice 3.Account:6262626 4.Certifying authority:Bob’s Bank 5.Signature:{Digest(field 2 + field 3)} K Bpriv

13. Digital signatures with public keys

14. Low-cost signatures with a shared secret key

15. One-Way Functions Function such that given formula for f(x) –easy to evaluate y = f(x) But given y –computationally infeasible to find x

16. Digital Signatures Computing a signature block What the receiver gets (b)

17. Buffer Overflow (a) Situation when main program is running (b) After program A called (c) Buffer overflow shown in gray

18. Covert Channels (1) Client, server and collaborator processes Encapsulated server can still leak to collaborator via covert channels

19. Covert Channels (2) A covert channel using file locking

20. Covert Channels (3) Pictures appear the same Picture on right has text of 5 Shakespeare plays –encrypted, inserted into low order bits of color values Zebras Hamlet, Macbeth, Julius Caesar Merchant of Venice, King Lear

21. Generic Security Attacks Typical attacks Request memory, disk space, tapes and just read Try illegal system calls Start a login and hit DEL, RUBOUT, or BREAK Try modifying complex OS structures Try to do specified DO NOTs Convince a system programmer to add a trap door Beg admin's sec’y to help a poor user who forgot password

22. Famous Security Flaws The TENEX – password problem (a)(b)(c)

23. Design Principles for Security 1.System design should be public 2.Default should be n access 3.Check for current authority 4.Give each process least privilege possible 5.Protection mechanism should be -simple -uniform -in lowest layers of system 6.Scheme should be psychologically acceptable And … keep it simple

24. Network Security External threat –code transmitted to target machine –code executed there, doing damage Goals of virus writer –quickly spreading virus –difficult to detect –hard to get rid of Virus = program can reproduce itself –attach its code to another program –additionally, do harm

25. Virus Damage Scenarios Blackmail Denial of service as long as virus runs Permanently damage hardware Target a competitor's computer –do harm –espionage Intra-corporate dirty tricks –sabotage another corporate officer's files

26. How Viruses Work (1) Virus written in assembly language Inserted into another program –use tool called a “dropper” Virus dormant until program executed –then infects other programs –eventually executes its “payload”

27. How Viruses Work (2) Recursive procedure that finds executable files on a UNIX system Virus could infect them all

28. How Viruses Work (3) An executable program With a virus at the front With the virus at the end With a virus spread over free space within program

29. How Viruses Work (4) After virus has captured interrupt, trap vectors After OS has retaken printer interrupt vector After virus has noticed loss of printer interrupt vector and recaptured it

30. How Viruses Spread Virus placed where likely to be copied When copied –infects programs on hard drive, floppy –may try to spread over LAN Attach to innocent looking email –when it runs, use mailing list to replicate

31. Antivirus and Anti-Antivirus Techniques (a) A program (b) Infected program (c) Compressed infected program (d) Encrypted virus (e) Compressed virus with encrypted compression code

32. Antivirus and Anti-Antivirus Techniques Examples of a polymorphic virus All of these examples do the same thing

33. Antivirus and Anti-Antivirus Techniques Integrity checkers Behavioral checkers Virus avoidance –good OS –install only shrink-wrapped software –use antivirus software –do not click on attachments to email –frequent backups Recovery from virus attack –halt computer, reboot from safe disk, run antivirus

34. The Internet Worm Consisted of two programs –bootstrap to upload worm –the worm itself Worm first hid its existence Next replicated itself on new machines

35. Mobile Code (1) Sandboxing (a) Memory divided into 1-MB sandboxes (b) One way of checking an instruction for validity

36. Mobile Code (2) Applets can be interpreted by a Web browser

37. Mobile Code (3) How code signing works

38. Java Security (1) A type safe language –compiler rejects attempts to misuse variable Checks include … 1.Attempts to forge pointers 2.Violation of access restrictions on private class members 3.Misuse of variables by type 4.Generation of stack over/underflows 5.Illegal conversion of variables to another type

39. Java Security (2) Examples of specified protection with JDK 1.2

40. Protection Mechanisms Protection Domains (1) Examples of three protection domains

41. Protection Domains (2) A protection matrix

42. Protection Domains (3) A protection matrix with domains as objects

43. Access Control Lists (1) Use of access control lists of manage file access

44. Access Control Lists (2) Two access control lists

45. Capabilities (1) Each process has a capability list

46. Cryptographically-protected capability Generic Rights 1.Copy capability 2.Copy object 3.Remove capability 4.Destroy object Capabilities (2) ServerObjectRightsf(Objects, Rights, Check)

47. Trusted Systems Trusted Computing Base A reference monitor

48. Formal Models of Secure Systems (a) An authorized state (b) An unauthorized state

49. Multilevel Security (1) The Bell-La Padula multilevel security model

50. Multilevel Security (2) The Biba Model Principles to guarantee integrity of data 1.Simple integrity principle process can write only objects at its security level or lower 2.The integrity * property process can read only objects at its security level or higher

51. Orange Book Security (1) Symbol X means new requirements Symbol -> requirements from next lower category apply here also

52. Orange Book Security (2)