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Deterrence and the Death Penalty Llad Phillips
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2 Outline n The Death Penalty u Arguments F Philosophical and moral (lexicographic ordering) F Practical: Is it a deterrent? Impact on the criminal justice system: Detention (prison building era) dominatesImpact on the criminal justice system: Detention (prison building era) dominates n Operation of the Death Penalty n Homicide and Executions
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Llad Phillips3 VI. Lecture Six: “Deterrence and the Death Penalty”, Professor Phillips Ch. 10 (P&V) "Isolating Deterrence Using the Simultaneous Equation System" References: Gary Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach" Journal of Political Economy, March/April 1968 (RBR)
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Llad Phillips4 n http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=- 7532034279766935521 http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=- 7532034279766935521 http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=- 7532034279766935521
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Llad Phillips5 What purpose did the execution serve? n Deterrence? Other Saddams? (The Hague) n Detention? No n Rehabilitation? No n Retribution?
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7 1976 Supreme Court Reinstates Death Penalty
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Llad Phillips8 Economic Conditions and Crime n California Crime Index Levels Off in the New Millenium
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10 1980
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Llad Phillips11 California
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Llad Phillips12 California
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Llad Phillips13 Damages: US Violence, 1993 Source: National Institute of Justice, Victim Costs and Consequences (1996)
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Llad Phillips14 Increase in CA Homicides n 2002 to 2003: at least 10 more homicides u @$1,191,000, increased damages of $11.9 million, minimum n 2003: 2402 homicides, 6.7/100,000 u @$1,191,000, total damages of $ 2.86 billion n 2004: 2392 homicides, 6.5/100,000 n 2005: 2503 homicides, 6.8/100,000 http://caag.state.ca.us/
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Llad Phillips17 Crime Generation Crime Control Offense Rate Per Capita Expected Cost of Punishment Schematic of the Criminal Justice System Causes ? (detention, deterrence) Expenditures Weak Link
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Llad Phillips19 Questions About Crime n Does the Expected Severity of Punishment Deter Crime? u expected severity = probability of punishment * severity of punishment F e.g. in LA County: 0.005*death penalty n Why Do We Keep Building Prisons at Great Expense to Warehouse Convicts? u Doesn’t deterrence work? u Do we have to rely on detention?
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Llad Phillips20 Controversy About the Death Penalty n Death penalty is the most severe sentence. u Does it deter crime? F Opponents of the death penalty say no. Their evidence? Critiques of studies that indicate the death penalty is a deterrent.Their evidence? Critiques of studies that indicate the death penalty is a deterrent. n Why are so few murderers who receive the death sentence executed in California? u Death sentence appeases the proponents. u Few executions appeases the opponents.
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Llad Phillips22 France was the last Western European Country to abandon the death Penalty in 1977
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Llad Phillips24 http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook
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Llad Phillips25 http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/
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Llad Phillips26 Executions in the US 1930-2007 http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs Peak to Peak: About 65 years
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Llad Phillips27 Bureau of Justice Statistics Peak to Peak: 50 years
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Llad Phillips28 Nikolai Kondratieff (1892-1938) Brought to attention in Joseph Schumpeter’s Business Cycles (1939)
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Llad Phillips29 2008-2014: Hard Winter
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Llad Phillips30 Policy Impact of Opponents to the Death Penalty n As an instrument for crime control, deterrence has been a casualty of the argument about the death penalty. u The argument: if the death penalty does not deter murderers, then deterrence must not work as a control. n As a consequence, society relies more and more on detention for crime control. u Society builds more and more prisons.
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Llad Phillips31 Homicide in Los Angeles County n 1990-1994: 9442 homicides n Increasing number of gang murders u > 40 % of the total n Only 1 in 3 murders leads to punishment u gang killings are harder to solve
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Llad Phillips32 Clearance Ratio, CA 1997-2004
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Llad Phillips33 Clearance Ratio, US 1976-2005
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Llad Phillips35 US Homicides by Circumstance: 76-05
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Llad Phillips36 9442 homicides in LA County 46% unsolved 54% solved 13% 87% arrest and prosecution (47%) 32% other dismissed or not guilty 68% guilty (32%) Branching Diagram
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Llad Phillips37 Branching Diagram, Continued Guilty (32%) dismissed or not guilty Manslaughter 1st & 2nd degree murder (16%) 50% 15 years to life (7.0%) 25 years to life (5.0%) life without parole (3.5%) death sentence ( 0.5%) 3.1%
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Llad Phillips39 Up Down Stable
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Who has benefited the most from the decline in the homicide rate in the nineties?
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Who is the victim, family, friend or stranger? http://caag.state.ca.us/ Homicide in California, 1998
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Llad Phillips43 U.S.
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Llad Phillips44 Death Sentences Commuted:US
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Llad Phillips45 Executions in the United States
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Llad Phillips46 Inflow Sentenced to Death Stock Prisoners on Death Row Outflow Sentences Commuted, Executions Administration of Capital Sentences in the US
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Llad Phillips47 Prisoners on Death Row: US
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Llad Phillips48 The Death Penalty in California n Fourteen persons were executed between 1978 and 2009 n In January 2009, there were 677 convicts on death row
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Llad Phillips58 Execution Witness Area
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Llad Phillips59 Execution Chamber
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Llad Phillips60 Gas Chamber
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Llad Phillips61 Split Personality Behaviors Jack Hirshleifer: “The Expanding Domain of Economics” Choice Work and no violence Work and brawl in bars Economic Man motive: self-interest Economic Man motive: self-interest with episodes of antagonism
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Assaulter’s Income Victim’s Income Total or Social Income Motivation for Violence: Antagonism Assaulters Iso-preference Lines High Low
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choice Work and no violence Work and brawl in bars expect $24,000/yr Apprehended: lose 1 month in court and jail, $22,000 0.1 0.9 Not apprehended $24,000 Expected income: 0.1*$22,000 + 0.9*$24,000 = $23,800
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Llad Phillips64 Questions About Statistical Studies of Deterrence n Do we know enough about the factors that cause crime? u Can we find variables that will control for variation in crime generation? n We have better measures for the factors that control crime than for the factors that cause crime. u Unknown variation in crime generation may mask the effects of crime control.
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Llad Phillips65 Crime Generation Crime Control Offense Rate Per Capita Expected Cost of Punishment Schematic of the Criminal Justice System Causes ? (detention, deterrence) Expenditures Weak Link
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Crime Generation 1. variation of offense rate per capita with expected cost of punishment 2. Shift in the relationship with a change in causal factors Offense rate per capita Expected cost(severity) of punishment crime generation function OF = f($CR*SV, SE, MC)
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Crime Generation 1. variation of offense rate per capita with expected cost of punishment 2. Shift in the relationship with a change in causal factors Offense rate per capita Expected cost(severity) of punishment crime generation function High causal conditions Low causal conditions OF = f($CR*SV, SE, MC)
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Production Function for the Criminal Justice System (CJS) 1. Variation in expected costs of punishment with criminal justice system expenditure per capita Expected costs of punishment Criminal Justice System expenditures per capita production function $CR*SV =g($EX)
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per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control
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per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function
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per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0
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per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0 1 1
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per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0 1 1
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per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0 1 1
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per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0 1 1
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per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0 1 1 2 2
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per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0 1 1 2 2 3
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per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control 1 2 3
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Source: Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice
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Llad Phillips80 Source: Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice Expect Get
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per capita expenditures on CJS offense rate per capita expected cost of punishment Crime Generation Four-Way Diagram: Crime Generation & Crime Control per capita expenditures on CJS Production Function square 45 0 1 1 2 2 3
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Llad Phillips82 Source: Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice Causal conditions account for more variation than control
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Llad Phillips83 Crime Generation Crime Control Offense Rate Per Capita Expected Cost of Punishment Schematic of the Criminal Justice System Causes ? (detention, deterrence) Expenditures Weak Link
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Llad Phillips84 Summary n The death penalty stirs strong emotions. n To attack the death penalty, opponents have attacked the concept of deterrence. n Proponents of deterrence have lost the argument to proponents of detention. u Weakness: not understanding causes of crime. n Detention is the principal instrument of crime control policy today in the U.S. and it costs big bucks
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Llad Phillips88 Prisoners Sentenced to Death:US
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Llad Phillips89 Executions in the US
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Llad Phillips94 California Department of Corrections: http//www.cdc.state.ca.us/
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California Executions Since 1978 NameDate ReceivedDate ExecutedTime on Death Row Robert Alton Harris3/14/794/21/9213 years, 1 month David Edwin Mason1/27/84 8/24/93 9 years, 7 months William George Bonin3/22/82 2/23/96 13 years, 1 month Keith Daniel Williams4/13/79 5/3/96 17 years Thomas M. Thompson8/23/84 7/14/98 14 years, 1 month Kelvin Malone6/22/81 1/13/99 (Missouri) 15 years, 6 months Jaturun Siripongs5/2/83 2/9/99 15 years, 9 months Manuel Babbitt7/15/82 5/4/99 16 years, 10 months Darrell Keith Rich1/23/81 3/15/00 19 years, 1 month Robert Lee Massie5/28/79 3/27/01 21 years, 10 months Stephen Wayne Anderson7/30/81 1/29/02 20 years, 6 months
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