1. Norm Enforcement, Dependence Networks and the International Criminal Court Jay Goodliffe Brigham Young University Darren Hawkins Brigham Young University Christine Horne Washington State University Daniel Nielson Brigham Young University

2. Research Puzzle Why would any state commit to enforce international human rights norms? Signing and Ratifying Statute of the International Criminal Court is a Commitment

3. International Criminal Court Commitments Delegate Authority to an Independent Prosecutor Accept Court’s Binding Jurisdiction upon Ratification Allow Court to Act in Relatively Permissive Conditions: Territorial State or State of the Nationality of Accused has Accepted Court’s Jurisdiction

4. Norms Our definition: Rules that are socially enforced In IR, enforcement of norms is generally decentralized ICC: Centralized norm enforcement mechanism

5. Why Commit to the ICC? Dependence Networks Benefits: –Cutting Transaction Costs –Lock-in Costs: –Policy –Unintended Consequences –Flexibility Imitation and Principles: –Regional and Global Trends –Principled Commitments

6. Dependence Sociology Network Literature: Horne (2001, 2004) Dependence: the value that states place on goods (can be anything) available from an exchange partner and the number of alternative sources they have available.

7. Dependence Networks Well-known forms of dependence in IR: –Bilateral/Dyadic Interdependence (relying on a particular partner) –Global Dependence (relying on all) Dependence within a Network: –A set of partners on whom a state relies for goods

8. Consequences of Dependence Networks The more dependent A is on B, the more power (ability to reward and punish) B has over A. Dependence increases the extent to which actors engage in behavior that is pleasing to their network partners. One such behavior is norm enforcement.

9. Diffuse Reciprocity Actors want to please their network partners Rewards and punishments from those network partners are not explicitly contingent or equivalent Actors undertake behavior anticipating some payoff down the road (or fearing punishment for failure to do so)

10. Dependence Network Hypothesis The more dependent a state is on states who sign or ratify (do not sign or ratify) the ICC, the more (less) likely that state will also sign or ratify the ICC

11. Measuring Dependence Networks States value many types of goods Some providers are more important than others Dependence Index –Trade Partners weighted by value of trade –Alliance Partners weighted by capabilities –IO Partners with shared memberships in significant IOs

12. Important Clarification Not Arguing that states will cut off trade, security or IO ties due to a state’s position on the ICC Rather, they will use those relationships to reward or punish states appropriately –Example: greater or lesser cooperation on alliance policies or on bilateral trade issues States anticipate such rewards and punishments whether they occur or not: Rarely explicit or equivalent

13. Benefits: Reduced Transaction Costs Theoretically well-established Conventional Wisdom in ICC case Security Council created Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals Became increasingly costly over 1990s Measure: UN-mandated contribution to budgets of these tribunals

14. Benefits: Lock-in Moravcsik (2000) New and unstable democracies create human rights regimes to “lock in” democratic principles in the face of domestic uncertainty (backsliding). Established democracies and autocracies do not.

15. Measuring Lock-in New Democracy –New Democracy if Polity ≥ 7 & <10 yrs Unstable Democracy × Polity Score –Unstable if Polity > 0 & drops 3 points Regime Volatility × Polity Score –Regime Volatility = standard deviation of Polity Score (1975-2003)

16. Costs Goodliffe and Hawkins (2006): Convention Against Torture Policy Change: How hard is compliance? Unintended Consequences: How likely will this be used in an unintended way? Flexibility: When would human rights abuse be helpful?

17. Measuring Costs: Policy Change How hard is compliance? Polity Score –−10 to +10, where +10 is the most democratic Empowerment Rights Index (lagged) –0-10 scale, with 10 as the most respectful Physical Integrity Rights Index (lagged) –0-8 scale, with 8 as the least abusive

18. Measuring Costs: Unintended Consequences How likely will this be used in an unintended way? Legal System –Common Law Power –ln(GDP) Exposure: Forces abroad

19. Measuring Costs: Flexibility When would human rights abuse be helpful? Military Disputes (external) 0-5, 5 = war Threat of Violence (World Bank’s “Political Stability”) ~N(0,1)

20. Imitation and Principle Imitation: Regional or Global Trends –More countries who support a strong ICC in your region or globally Principled Commitments –Voluntary contributions to the international tribunals established by the Security Council

21. Method Duration Model (discrete-time in months) –No restrictions on hazard shape Missing Data multiply imputed via Amelia

22. Dependent Variable Examine Signing and Ratifying/Acceding Separately Duration begins in July 1998 –(or when country comes into existence) Censoring date –December 2000 for Signing –December 2004 for Ratifying

23. Network Dependence Variable

24. Benefits Variables

25. Cost: Policy Change Variables

26. Cost: Unintended Consequences

27. Cost: Flexibility Variables

28. Imitation and Principle

29. Analysis Statistics

30. What Influences ICC Commitment? Network Dependence Level of Democracy (Policy Cost) Not Lock-in Not Region Not Principled Commitments Not Transaction Costs

31. Limitations Dependence cannot explain initial committers, only subsequent committers Measurement of independent variables Generalizability to other treaties, other international commitments