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PPA 573 – Emergency Management and Homeland Security Lecture 3c – The Intergovernmental Relations of Emergency Management.

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Presentation on theme: "PPA 573 – Emergency Management and Homeland Security Lecture 3c – The Intergovernmental Relations of Emergency Management."— Presentation transcript:

1 PPA 573 – Emergency Management and Homeland Security Lecture 3c – The Intergovernmental Relations of Emergency Management

2 Source W. L. Waugh & R. T. Sylves. (1996). The intergovernmental relations of emergency management. In R. T. Sylves, & W. L. Waugh, Jr., (Eds.), Disaster management in the U.S. and Canada, 2 nd. Ed. (pp. 46- 68). Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas. W. L. Waugh & R. T. Sylves. (1996). The intergovernmental relations of emergency management. In R. T. Sylves, & W. L. Waugh, Jr., (Eds.), Disaster management in the U.S. and Canada, 2 nd. Ed. (pp. 46- 68). Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.

3 Introduction Over the last fifteen years, catastrophic disasters have drawn public and governmental attention to major flaws in the web of the nation’s emergency management system. Over the last fifteen years, catastrophic disasters have drawn public and governmental attention to major flaws in the web of the nation’s emergency management system. –In the wake of Hurricane Hugo, South Carolina had major problems with communication and the state’s regulation of building standards and land-use was woefully inadequate. U.S. FEMA failed to mobilize soon enough and was shown to have done little to help prepare the state. –In the wake of Loma Prieta, California was better prepared but did not coordinate well with FEMA. –After Hurricane Andrew, the local, state, and federal authorities were simply overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster. –After 9/11, New York City first responders had severe problems with communication and coordination.

4 Introduction Two key forces motivating change are money and politics. Two key forces motivating change are money and politics. –Disasters are expensive; mitigation may reduce both before- and after-costs from disaster. –Disasters carry political costs and benefits. For better or for worse, disasters are political theater.

5 Reform of Federal Emergency Management Built on the material in the previous two lectures, Director Witt refocused FEMA on mitigation. Built on the material in the previous two lectures, Director Witt refocused FEMA on mitigation. The focus on mitigation can increase focus on the improving intergovernmental relations. The focus on mitigation can increase focus on the improving intergovernmental relations.

6 Clientele Relations State and local governments are FEMA’s most important ongoing constituencies. State and local governments are FEMA’s most important ongoing constituencies. State emergency managers are represented by the National Emergency Management Association which articulates state emergency management interests and lobbies for federal benefits (http://www.nemaweb.org/). State emergency managers are represented by the National Emergency Management Association which articulates state emergency management interests and lobbies for federal benefits (http://www.nemaweb.org/).http://www.nemaweb.org/ Local emergency management organizations are represented by the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM). (http://www.iaem.com/). Local emergency management organizations are represented by the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM). (http://www.iaem.com/).http://www.iaem.com/

7 Reform of State and Local Emergency Management Regardless of what is happening at the federal level, the most important changes are those happening at the state and local level. Regardless of what is happening at the federal level, the most important changes are those happening at the state and local level. The effectiveness of the entire system will be judged by the disaster response and hazard management capabilities of thousands of local governments. The effectiveness of the entire system will be judged by the disaster response and hazard management capabilities of thousands of local governments. Initial response is always by local governments. Local and state governments must call the calvary. Thirty percent of the time the cavalry does not arrive. Initial response is always by local governments. Local and state governments must call the calvary. Thirty percent of the time the cavalry does not arrive.

8 The State of State Emergency Management Each of the 50 states and each American trust or commonwealth territory has an emergency management agency of some kind. Each of the 50 states and each American trust or commonwealth territory has an emergency management agency of some kind. These agencies are expected to organized efficiently and must manage a state emergency management program that complements local programs. These agencies are expected to organized efficiently and must manage a state emergency management program that complements local programs. In practice, there is a wide variation in capabilities. In practice, there is a wide variation in capabilities.

9 The State of State Emergency Management Some of the flaws are in policy design, some are in organization. Some of the flaws are in policy design, some are in organization. There are also disparities and disjunctive behavior between state and local emergency managers. There are also disparities and disjunctive behavior between state and local emergency managers. The intergovernmental nature of the system allows blame to be passed to another level. The intergovernmental nature of the system allows blame to be passed to another level.

10 The State of State Emergency Management The professionalization of emergency management has had an impact, shifting from civil defense to disaster preparedness to homeland security has placed an enormous strain on the training of state and local personnel. The professionalization of emergency management has had an impact, shifting from civil defense to disaster preparedness to homeland security has placed an enormous strain on the training of state and local personnel. A second question is whether state agencies should be command-and-control or coordinative. A second question is whether state agencies should be command-and-control or coordinative.

11 The State of State Emergency Management The chief administrative problems are: The chief administrative problems are: –How to assure that state resources are effectively distributed when local agencies need assistance; and –How to assess damage reasonably accurately and very quickly. Structural problems include: Structural problems include: –Proximity to and dependence on the governor. –The tendency has been for agencies to structure themselves like FEMA.

12 New Federal-State Agreements FEMA evaluators have long stressed the need for FEMA to initiate more and better pre-disaster agreements with state authorities and emergency officials, perhaps through “model plans”. FEMA evaluators have long stressed the need for FEMA to initiate more and better pre-disaster agreements with state authorities and emergency officials, perhaps through “model plans”. Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) the primary basis. Based on intergovernmental agreements. Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) the primary basis. Based on intergovernmental agreements. Professionalization has probably had more impact. Professionalization has probably had more impact. Witt innovations: interstate compacts (model) and use of bloc grants. Witt innovations: interstate compacts (model) and use of bloc grants.

13 Federal Cost Sharing Stafford Act continues the tradition of 75% federal and 25% state and local (100% in first 72 hours). Stafford Act continues the tradition of 75% federal and 25% state and local (100% in first 72 hours). Some states split the state and local share 75- 25; other states (California, e.g.) assume the entire 25% share. Some states split the state and local share 75- 25; other states (California, e.g.) assume the entire 25% share. The federal government can increase the federal percentage in individual cases (Hurricane Andrew, 9/11). The federal government can increase the federal percentage in individual cases (Hurricane Andrew, 9/11). The feds have struggled for years with reducing the federal costs of disaster. The feds have struggled for years with reducing the federal costs of disaster.

14 Training and Preparedness FEMA sets training programs but does not monitor state performance. GAO has criticized. FEMA often fails to participate in the drills it requires states and local governments to conduct. FEMA sets training programs but does not monitor state performance. GAO has criticized. FEMA often fails to participate in the drills it requires states and local governments to conduct. FEMA must insure professionalization of state and local emergency management operations, but must allow independence to achieve flexibility in the context of disaster. FEMA must insure professionalization of state and local emergency management operations, but must allow independence to achieve flexibility in the context of disaster.

15 The State of Local Emergency Management Officials at all levels agree that local governments are “the first responders” to disaster. Officials at all levels agree that local governments are “the first responders” to disaster. The key level is often county government which often work with municipal officials during an emergency. The key level is often county government which often work with municipal officials during an emergency. However, FEMA lacks strong clientele support and must confront wide variability in local capabilities. However, FEMA lacks strong clientele support and must confront wide variability in local capabilities.

16 The State of Local Emergency Management Major obstacles to designing, implementing, maintaining, and operating effective emergency management agencies: Major obstacles to designing, implementing, maintaining, and operating effective emergency management agencies: –The diversity of hazards in many communities; –The technical complexity of some regulatory, planning, and response efforts; –The low salience of emergency management as a public issue; –The historic and culturally ingrained resistance in regulation and planning at the local level; –The lack of strong political and administrative advocates for emergency management; –The uncertainty of risk, i.e., doubts about whether the program will ever be needed; –The jurisdictional confusion of a complex federal system and an even more complex division of authority and responsibility within and among state and local governments; and –The economic and political milieu that is inhospitable to government in general and new public programs in particular.

17 The State of Local Emergency Management Some communities are more successful than others (California), but even successful agencies have trouble keeping the issue on the front burner. Some communities are more successful than others (California), but even successful agencies have trouble keeping the issue on the front burner. Ostrich model of decision-making may prevail; feds will bail us out. Ostrich model of decision-making may prevail; feds will bail us out. –Economic development concerns often drive out other concerns. Many localities only confront a few identifiable hazard; few incentives to plan. Many localities only confront a few identifiable hazard; few incentives to plan.

18 The State of Local Emergency Management Conflicting incentives: Conflicting incentives: –On the one hand, much sentiment for not rewarding lack of planning. –On the other hand, political incentives for rescuing disaster-burdened communities.

19 Counties and Emergency Management Counties may serve as the effective centers for emergency management coordination because they are agents of state administration, traditional governments, local governments, and regional governments. Counties may serve as the effective centers for emergency management coordination because they are agents of state administration, traditional governments, local governments, and regional governments. But states vary in their delegation of power to counties. But states vary in their delegation of power to counties. Reality may require much more complex coordinating bodies. Reality may require much more complex coordinating bodies.

20 State-Local Interchange The resource bases of local governments are affected by state constitutions and statutes. The resource bases of local governments are affected by state constitutions and statutes. State mandates can run up against local resource limitations. State mandates can run up against local resource limitations.

21 Federal-Local Interchange FEMA needs to work toward a broader integration of federal, state, and local functions. FEMA needs to work toward a broader integration of federal, state, and local functions.

22 Disaster Victims and the Private Sector FEMA not supposed to duplicate private coverage; but private coverage often slow. FEMA not supposed to duplicate private coverage; but private coverage often slow. Gradual trend has been the integration of federal assistance to avoid duplicated coverage. Gradual trend has been the integration of federal assistance to avoid duplicated coverage.


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