1. Unifying Equivalence-Based Definitions of Protocol Security A. Datta, R. Küsters, J. C. Mitchell, A. Ramanathan, V. Shmatikov Stanford University SRI International WITS April 4, 2004

2. Main Result uUniversal composability, black box simulatability and process equivalence express the same properties of a protocol (with asynchronous communication) Result holds for any computational model satisfying standard process calculus equational principles

3. Outline uEquivalence-Based Specification Main Idea, Examples, Advantages u3 Approaches Models: Turing Machines, IO Automata, Process Calculus Security Notions: UC, BB, PE uComparative Study Relating Security Notions Relating models (WIP)

4. General approach uReal protocol The protocol we want to use Expressed precisely in some formalism uIdeal protocol Defines the behavior we want from real protocol May use unrealistic mechanisms (e.g., private channels) Expressed precisely in same formalism uSpecification Real protocol indistinguishable from ideal protocol Beaver ‘91, Goldwasser-Levin ‘90, Micali-Rogaway ’91 Depends on some characterization of observability uAchieves compositionality

5. Secrecy for Challenge-Response uReal Protocol P A  B: { i } K B  A: { f(i) } K uIdeal Protocol Q A  B: { random_number } K B  A: { random_number } K

6. Specification with Authentication uReal Protocol P A  B: { random i } K B  A: { f(i) } K A  B: “OK” if f(i) received uIdeal Protocol Q A  B: { random i } K B  A: { random j } K i, j A  B: “OK” if private i, j match public msgs public channel private channel public channel private channel

7. Pseudo-random number generators uSequence from random seed (Real protocol) P n : let b = n k -bit sequence generated from n random bits in PUBLIC  b  end uTruly random sequence (Ideal protocol) Q n : let b = sequence of n k random bits in PUBLIC  b  end uP is crypto strong pseudo-random number generator P  Q Equivalence is asymptotic in security parameter n

8. Many more… uCommitment Schemes uSignature Schemes uKey Exchange uSecure channels uSecure Multiparty Computation

9. Compositionality uCrypto primitives Cipher text indistinguishable from noise  encryption secure in all protocols uProtocols Protocol indistinguishable from ideal key distribution  protocol secure in all systems that rely on secure key distributions

10. Outline uEquivalence-Based Specification u3 Schools of Thought Models: Turing Machines, IO Automata, Process Calculus Security Notions: UC, BB, PE uComparative Study

11. Three technical settings uCan, …: Universal composability Condition: two adversaries and environment Computation: Communicating Turing machines uPW, … : Black-box simulatability Condition: one adversary, simulator, environment Computation: I/O automata uAG,LMMRST, …: Process equivalence Condition: observational equivalence Computation: ppoly or nondet process calculus

12. More Background Universal Compos. Black-box Simulat. Observ. Equiv. Communicating Turing Machines Canetti I/O AutomataPfitz-W Nondet. Process Calculus Spi, Applied  Prob Poly Process Calculus LMMRST

13. This study Universal Compos. Black-box Simulat. Observ. Equiv. Communicating Turing Machines Canetti I/O AutomataPfitz-W Nondet. Process Calculus Spi, Applied  Prob Poly Process Calculus LMMRST Axiomatic Calculus UC BB PE Compare conditions over uniform computation model

14. Ideal functionality (UC,BB) uWhat is the ideal key exchange protocol? Clients ask server for key, receive response? Server chooses keys and sends secretly? uIssue Easy to distinguish number of messages No “canonical” key exchange protocol is equivalent to all secure key exchange protocols uIdeal functionality Not a protocol with number of messages, etc. A functionality that can be used to create ideal protocols

15. Adversary vs. Environment (UC,BB) uAdversary Interacts with protocol over network Sees and delivers messages from A to B uEnvironment Represents the configuration of honest users who are trying to use the protocol Provides input to and observes output of protocol uExample - Using SSL protocol through IE: –Input(start session), output(key) of SSL (environment) –actual SSL messages on network (adversary) Separation of net and io channels of a protocol

16. Universal composability (UC) uGiven Protocol P Ideal functionality F uRequire For every adversary A 1 for P, there exists an adversary A 2 for F revealing same information in any environment E PA1A1 A2A2 F  io net E E   

17. Black-box simulatability uGiven Protocol P Ideal functionality F uRequire There exists a simulator S such that for any adversary A, protocols P and S  F reveal same information in any environment E PAA  io net E E FS sim    

18. Observational Equivalence uGiven Protocol P Ideal protocol Q (not functionality F) uRequire Protocols P and Q reveal same information in any context C[] Context = attacker + environment PQ  C[]= E + A  ionetionet

19. Comparison uUC and BB + ideal functionality: allows single specification, regardless of communication pattern of protocol - Separate adversary and environment :Not clear if useful, except in exposition uObservational equivalence + Standard relation, well-known properties + Bisimulation technique + Proof system - No ideal functionality

20. Process Equivalence uGiven Protocol P Ideal functionality F uRequire There exists a simulator S such that protocols P and S  F reveal same information in any context C[] Context = attacker + environment PF  C[]= E + A  ionetionet S sim 

21. Outline uEquivalence-Based Specification u3 Schools of Thought uComparative Study Process calculus syntax Equational Principles Security Definitions Results

22. Process Calculus uSyntax P :: = 0 | out(c,T). P send | in(c,x). P receive |  c. (P) private channel | [T=T] P test | P | P parallel composition | ! q(|n|). P bounded replication

23. Equational principles uP | Q  Q | P uP | (Q | R)  (P | Q) | R u  c. P   d. [d/c]P u  c. C[P]  C[  c.P] c  channels( C[0] ) uP  Q  Q  P uP  Q, Q  R  P  R uP  Q  C[P]  C[Q] Prove results using these properties of process calculus

24. Formal definitions uUniversal composability  A 1  A 2.  net (P | A 1 )   net (F | A 2 ) uBlack-box simulatability  S  A.  net (P | A)   net (  sim (F|S)|A) uProcess equivalence  S. P   sim (F | S) Notes Relation  includes quantifying over environments Scoping restricts access to channels, e.g., environment does not see network

25. Results uUC and BB Equivalent w/synchronous communication Equivalent w/asynchronous communication uBB and Process Equivalence (PE) PE implies BB in synch communication PE equivalent BB with asynch communication Results hold for any computational framework satisfying standard equational principles (PPC, spi,…)

26. Proof sketch (also have nice pictures) uPE  BB  UC : Easy. Congruence and quantifier order. uUC  BB uBB  PE

27. Key Lemmas uDouble buffering One asynchronous buffer is indistinguishable from the composition of two uDummy adversary and buffer Composing a dummy adversary (that just sends network information to the environment) with asynchronous buffer is indistinguishable from a buffer alone

28. Synchronous communication uBuffering fails (BB does not imply PE) With synchronous communication, adding a buffer or dummy adversary can change the observable order of actions PAAS F net sim  PFS  io net

29. Conclusions and Future Work uUC, BB, PE: equivalent notions of security. So, use PE (simplest) uComplete this study Relate computational models Do results transfer?

30. Questions?