1. FWeinert, Bradford University (UK)1 Friedel Weinert: Philosophy of the Social Sciences Year II: Semester II Three Models, Continued Lecture V

2. FWeinert, Bradford University (UK)2 Interpretative Model  general opposition to unity of method  categories to conceptualise social events (purpose, value, development, ideal as aspects of meaning) are logically incompatible with categories belonging to scientific explanation (law, causality)  Reason:  categories to describe social life enter into social life itself, not merely into the observer’s description of it (‘war’ versus ‘gravity’)  Thesis: If you do not understand the meaning of social life, you do not understand social life À social phenomena must not be regarded as external objects; social relations are internal relations

3. FWeinert, Bradford University (UK)3 ‡Distinguish between external relations and internal relations Interpretative Model External Relations: Cause-Effect ‰ natural process ‰ causal link is contingent, i.e. it is empirical relation ‰ cause and effect can be analysed separately Internal Relations: Reason-Action ‰ intentional actions ‰ there must be a logical relation between reason and action : the intention to do X and doing X are logically related ‰‘explanation’ of human behaviour as re-description ‰ reason and action cannot be analysed separately: Logical Connection Argument Naturalism Interpretative Model

4. FWeinert, Bradford University (UK)4 îSome differences between reasons and causes îreasons can be good or bad; there is no good or bad cause îappeal to reasons in decision-making îcauses seem to be generalisable, reasons non-generalisable  Principle: Same cause, same effect, also: Same reason, same action? Interpretative Model: Reasons and Causes

5. FWeinert, Bradford University (UK)5 ëLogical Connection Argument ëLevel of Society 1State cluster of sufficient conditions as candidates for causal antecedents (examples) ëLevel of Individual 1Logical Connection Argument links reasons and actions: giving a reason is a re-description of the action 1 but even if the description of an action cannot be separated from the reason, reasons may still have a causal component 1Example: a jogger Interpretative Model: Reasons and Causes

6. FWeinert, Bradford University (UK)6 Reconstruct as logical argument: Premise I (belief): If you want to stay healthy, jog Premise II (desire): You want to stay healthy Conclusion: JOG Belief and desire justify the action, but the reason may also be the cause of the action. Reasons, as causes, can be logically separate from action: +intention to do ‘x’ and not do ‘x’ +the reason for doing ‘x’ is not the cause for doing ‘x’ Interpretative Model: Reasons and Causes

7. FWeinert, Bradford University (UK)7  Normal intentional action: Êthere must be a logical relation between the reason and the action Ëthe reason must play a causal role in the occurrence of the action There is a causal component in reason-explanations. There are also disanalogies between causal explanations in the social and natural sciences Êthere are neither strictly deterministic nor probabilistic laws connection reasons and actions Ëwe cannot state necessary and sufficient conditions for acting on a reason ÌSocial sciences can achieve ‘adequate causation’ - Ideal Types Interpretative Model: Reasons and Causes

8. FWeinert, Bradford University (UK)8  Prejudices on the part of the social actors cannot be excluded from the analysis. Instead of completely objective terms social science researcher must speak the participants’ language  social relations are context-dependent; there are no universal, cross-cultural social entities Relativism  interpret social life in terms of social rules, norms and conventions (cultural variability of human meanings) Examples  Balinese cockfighting  religious practices  emergence of English working class  Freud’s theory of hidden meaning Interpretation of Social Life

9. FWeinert, Bradford University (UK)9  Understanding a social phenomenon is understanding a form of life {Wittgenstein}  Human behaviour is governed by reasons, not causes [recall ‘cause/reason’ distinction] Is the understanding of social phenomena to be grounded in the individual actors or in social institutions?  Weber: social action as sum of meaningful actions of individuals  Individualism  Winch: meaningful action is social, since it is governed by rules  Holism Interpretation of Social Life

10. FWeinert, Bradford University (UK)10  Is there a compromise?  A modified view of the social sciences  Weber: social sciences work with ideal types: they deliver understanding and explanation  Elster: shift from laws to psychological ‘mechanisms’ (ex. Cognitive dissonance)  advantage: mechanisms make no claim to exceptionless generality Weber

11. FWeinert, Bradford University (UK)11 ëThe Ideal Types Model (Weber) íSocial action manifests regularities íSocial regularities have meaning íAscribing meaning to human action (  understanding) does not show that the ascription has empirical validity íTwo identical types of actions may be based on quite different intentions ímethod of understanding to be counterbalanced by method of causal explanation = ascription of rational motives to action írational constructions or ideal types (rational-purposive action) Weber and Ideal Types

12. FWeinert, Bradford University (UK)12  Ideal types checked against empirical reality oExample: rational economic behaviour oCeteris paribus statements Weber and Ideal Types