0. Computer-Mediated Communication
Collective Action and Public Goods

1. Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Public Good
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

2. Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
The Tragedy of the “Commons”
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

3. Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Cornucopia of the Commons?
(Bricklin 2001)
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

4. Private versus Public Good
The Free-Rider Problem
Individual interests tend to make non-contribution tempting, especially if other people will do the work.
In collective action, we can view this as an n-person prisoner’s dilemma (more on that in a moment…)
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

5. Free-Riding and the Logic of Collective Action
“If all individuals refrained from doing A, every individual as a member of the community would derive a certain advantage. But now if all individuals less one continue refraining from doing A, the community loss is very slight, whereas the one individual doing A makes a personal gain far greater than the loss that he incurs as a member of the community.”
(Pareto 1935, vol. 3, sect. 1496, pp )
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

6. Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Public Goods
Non-Rival Goods (Jointness of Supply)
Non-Excludability
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

7. Fallacy of Individuals and Collectives
See: Mancur Olson (1965) “The Logic of Collective Action”
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

8. N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma
The situation:
1) Each person has 2 options: cooperate or defect.
2) defection is the dominant strategy.
3) The dominant strategies (defection) intersect at a deficient equilibrium point.
Coop
Defect
3,3
(R)
0,5
(S)
5,0
(T)
1,1
(P)
T > R > P > S
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

9. Explaining Collective Action
Selective Incentives
Self-Interest
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

10. Self-Interest in Small versus Large Groups
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

11. Repeated Interactions in Public Goods and Collective Action
Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?
Respect my authoritaah!
Life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes 1651)
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

12. The Emergence of Cooperation
Consider two individuals who interact repeatedly over time
No mechanisms for enforceable commitments.
No way to be sure what the other will do on each ‘turn’.
No way to eliminate the other player or leave the interaction.
No way to change the other player’s payoffs.
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

13. Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Strategizing 101
Always defect!
Always cooperate!
Randomly cooperate!
Do whatever your partner just did!
Mostly cooperate, randomly defect!
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

14. Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Can cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

15. Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
For Thursday…
No reading, but please try to show up on time so that we can get started ~ 12:40
Problem Statements and Advising
4/17/2017
Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore