1. The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

2. “Men respond to their fear of other men by increasing their own ability to control and dominate, gradually making this a central focus of social life.” Allan Johnson, The Gender Knot: Unraveling our Patriarchal Legacy “Men are more inclined to take risks, more oriented towards attainment of status and resources, and more single-minded in achieving these goals. Women, on the other hand, are more nurturing and empathic, and more centered on maintaining a 'web' of relationships than on being at the top of a hierarchy.” Kingsley Brown.

3. Efficiency, Bargaining, and Patriarchy The efficiency of household sexual division of labor varies by economic system of production. The efficiency of household sexual division of labor varies by economic system of production. High levels of household division of labor weaken women’s bargaining power in the family by reducing her outside options. High levels of household division of labor weaken women’s bargaining power in the family by reducing her outside options. Patriarchy, or general the subordination of women in the private and public spheres, is the result of weak female bargaining power. Patriarchy, or general the subordination of women in the private and public spheres, is the result of weak female bargaining power.

5. Modes of Production and Intra-Family Bargaining Women in hunter gatherer societies could survive on their own, giving women outside options to “marriage.” Women in hunter gatherer societies could survive on their own, giving women outside options to “marriage.” –Scholarly opinion differs as to the importance of male-supplied protein to female and child survival, but females supplied ¾ of the community’s caloric intake. –Female economic viability removes the logic of hard wired desire for males with resources.

6. Agrarian Economies and Patriarchy The premium on male brawn in agricultural production and protection increased the efficient level of household division of labor. The premium on male brawn in agricultural production and protection increased the efficient level of household division of labor. Females’ lost role in food production made her less viable outside the marriage. Females’ lost role in food production made her less viable outside the marriage. Patriarchal values are strongest when families raise their daughters to play the marriage market. Patriarchal values are strongest when families raise their daughters to play the marriage market.

7. Industrialization Labor saving devices in food and material production created a demand for female labor outside the home. Labor saving devices in food and material production created a demand for female labor outside the home. Outside options to marriage gave females bargaining power in the home. Outside options to marriage gave females bargaining power in the home. Female bargaining power undermines patriarchal values by altering families’ strategies for socializing their daughters. Female bargaining power undermines patriarchal values by altering families’ strategies for socializing their daughters.

8. Service Sector Economies Demand for female labor further expands in service sector economies because of the proliferation of general skills jobs that do not penalize career interruption. Demand for female labor further expands in service sector economies because of the proliferation of general skills jobs that do not penalize career interruption. We expect value change to accelerate in service economies, with the increase in female labor force participation. We expect value change to accelerate in service economies, with the increase in female labor force participation.

11. Demand for non-manual labor LowHigh Demand for hard physical labor (“brawn”) and household -specific skills Low Hunter-gatherer: High equality between the sexes (P≈1/2) Postindustrial society: High equality in bargaining power (P≈1/2). Modest division of labor, and equitable gender norms High Agricultural society: Male dominance (high P). Sharp division of labor, and patriarchal norms. Industrial society: Sharp division of labor, but emerging opportunities for women outside the family (intermediate P)

12. Bargaining Power and Mate Selection We expect mate preferences to change with female labor force participation We expect mate preferences to change with female labor force participation –As females gain stronger bargaining power, males have weaker expectations of a strict sexual division of labor. –The importance of a virgin bride diminishes as families place less pressure on their daughters to play to the marriage market.

13. Mate preferences as a function of economic sector Dependent variable Good cook and housekeeper Desire for home and children Chastity Industrial employment Service employment Western culture Fertility rate Constant -0.003 (0.005) -0.014** (0.004) - 2.293** (0.160) 0.002 (0.008) -0.014 (0.004) 0.084 (0.170) 0.085 (0.054) 1.858 (0.332) -0.004 (0.009) -0.016* (0.006) - 3.006** (0.259) 0.013 (0.013) -0.011* (0.007) -0.348 (0.278) 0.100 (0.089) 2.325** * (0.544) -0.018 (0.010) - 0.027*** (0.007) - 2.823** (0.289) -0.001 (0.013) -0.017** (0.007) - 0.923*** (0.280) -0.069 (0.089) 2.584*** (0.547) Adj R-Squared N.451 31.481 31.262 31.297 31.576 31.651 31

15. Female Labor Force Participation and Political Preferences All else equal, females prefer government policies, such as child care and other services, that enable them to supply their labor. In specific skills economies, the public sector is a crucial source of female employment that enables women to maintain outside options. All else equal, females prefer government policies, such as child care and other services, that enable them to supply their labor. In specific skills economies, the public sector is a crucial source of female employment that enables women to maintain outside options.

16. The Gender Gap in Support for Public Employment and Left Parties Married woman with no labor market participation in a general skills or low divorce country Married woman with full-time job in a general skills or low divorce country Unmarried woman with full-time job in a general skills or low divorce country Unmarried woman with full-time job in a specific skills country with high divorce rates

17. Asset Specificity LowHigh Skills Low High BankingBanking Many females in transactional banking, law; nursing. Few females in client-based banking, law, politics Many females in transactional retail Few females in client-based retail Where is Female Labor?

18. Skills LowHigh Productivity Low High Some retail and banking Nursing, teaching Where is Female Labor? Retail and clerical work Some professional occupations

19. Skills and occupational gender segregation

20. Female Labor Force Participation LowLow Low High Asset Specificity LowHigh LMEs: Substantial gender voting gap over public daycare, etc. Scandinavia: Gender voting gap follows public sector vs. private sector employment Christian Democratic CMEs: Relatively small gender voting gap; household as unit Consequences for Political Preferences

21. Public-Private Sector in Scandinavia Pierson (2000) argues that because Scandinavian men in the private sector tend to be married to women in the public sector, the disputes over wage differentials will be muted. Pierson (2000) argues that because Scandinavian men in the private sector tend to be married to women in the public sector, the disputes over wage differentials will be muted. Relaxing the assumption that the family is a single utility maximizing unit shows why this conclusion does not follow. Relaxing the assumption that the family is a single utility maximizing unit shows why this conclusion does not follow.

22. Gender Gap on Trade Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) suggest that the gender gap on trade will attenuate as females gain more economic literacy. Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) suggest that the gender gap on trade will attenuate as females gain more economic literacy. We think it is more likely that the gender gap on trade reflects the fact that more females are employed in the public sector, and therefore have a greater fear of government downsizing. We think it is more likely that the gender gap on trade reflects the fact that more females are employed in the public sector, and therefore have a greater fear of government downsizing.

23. Consequences for Political Coalitions The gender voting gap in Scandinavia is mediated by the willingness and ability of governments on the left to protect male jobs and wages. The gender voting gap in Scandinavia is mediated by the willingness and ability of governments on the left to protect male jobs and wages. Center-left parties are less able to woo women for fear of making male workers less secure. Center-left parties are less able to woo women for fear of making male workers less secure. In LMEs, the growth in FLFP pulls the center of gravity towards more public spending. In LMEs, the growth in FLFP pulls the center of gravity towards more public spending.

24. Gender, Inequality, and Political Preferences Women in low labor-productivity industries are more likely to vote on the left because of limited opportunities. Women in low labor-productivity industries are more likely to vote on the left because of limited opportunities. If there is a tendency for LMEs to use low-wage labor as a way to economize on capital, the gender wage gap in LMEs may exceed that in CMEs. If there is a tendency for LMEs to use low-wage labor as a way to economize on capital, the gender wage gap in LMEs may exceed that in CMEs.

25. Conclusions The demand for female labor in service sector economies should undermine patriarchal norms. The demand for female labor in service sector economies should undermine patriarchal norms. The gender gap in political preferences reflects an attempt to make opportunities more equal still. The gender gap in political preferences reflects an attempt to make opportunities more equal still.