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A Measurement Framework for Pin-Pointing Routing Changes Renata Teixeira (UC San Diego) http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/~teixeira with Jennifer Rexford (AT&T) NetTs’04 – Portland, OR
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NetTs’04 2 Why understand routing changes? Routing changes cause service disruptions Convergence delay Traffic shift Change in path properties RTT, available bandwidth, or lost connectivity Operators need to know Why: For diagnosing and fixing problems Where: For accountability Need to guarantee service-level agreements
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NetTs’04 3 What can be done with active measurements? Active measurements: traceroute-like tools Can’t probe in the past Shows the effect, not the cause User (s) Web Server (d) AS 1 AS 2 AS 3 AS 4
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NetTs’04 4 Can we use passive measurements? Passive measurements: public BGP data Data Correlation BGP update feeds root cause Data Collection (RouteViews, RIPE)
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NetTs’04 5 Why Public BGP Data is Not Enough? Myth: The BGP updates from a single router accurately represent the AS C AB D BGP data collection dst 6 12 10 7 AS 1 AS 2 No change The measurement system needs to capture the BGP routing changes from all border routers
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NetTs’04 6 Why Public BGP Data is Not Enough? C AB D BGP data collection dst 6 12 10 5 7 AS 1 AS 2 Myth:Routing changes visible in eBGP have greater impact end-to-end impact than changes with local scope. The measurement system needs to capture internal changes inside an AS
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NetTs’04 7 Why Public BGP Data is Not Enough? A BGP data collection Myth:BGP data from a router accurately represents changes on that router. 12.1.1.0/24 12.1.0.0/16 The measurement system needs to know all routes the router knows.
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NetTs’04 8 Misleading BGP Changes BGP data collection Myth:The AS responsible for the change appears in the old or the new AS path. 1 4 5 6 23 7 8 9 10 11 Accurate troubleshooting may require measurement data from each AS old: 1,2,8,9,10 new: 1,4,5,6,7,10
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NetTs’04 9 Misleading BGP Changes Myth:Looking at routing changes across prefixes resolves AB C BGP data collection 10 7 AS 1 AS 2 AS 3 d1d1 d2d2 d3d3 12 ASes involved in the change need to cooperate to pin-point the reason for the change Changes for d 2, but not for d 1 and d 3
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NetTs’04 10 Strawman Proposal: Omni Server Creating an AS-level view BGP feeds from all border routers Inject all routes known in each router Internal routing data Archive log of routing changes Responding to queries Local cause: responds directly No local change: query neighbor AS Local change from downstream cause: query old and/or new neighbor AS
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NetTs’04 11 Diagnosis with Omnis i j Omni 1 Omni 3 Omni 2 Omni 4 User (s) Web Server (d) (i,s,d,t) (j,s,d,t’) failure link (3,4) AS 1 AS 2 AS 3 AS 4
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NetTs’04 12 Conclusion Passive data AS-level view History (answers in the past) Distributed Active querying Servers, not routers See cause, not effect
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NetTs’04 13 Future Directions How often are the myths violated? Measurement studies of ISP networks Doesn’t Omni require lots of data? ISPs already collect this kind of data Routing protocols extensions to reveal reasons of routing changes Will ASes really cooperate? Pressure to provide service-level agreements Small group of ASes that choose to cooperate Won’t ASes cheat? Need techniques to detect persistent lying
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