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Metaphysics Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey.

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1 Metaphysics Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

2 The Origins of Knowledge Sense-perception is the first requirement for knowledge, and is found in animals Memory with sense-preception allows for a single experience Experience gives rise to science and craft Craft arises through induction: “many thoughts that arise from experience result in one universal judgment about similar things”

3 Knowledge of Causes Experience concerns particulars, while craft gives a rational account, using universals If one does not know particulars, rational accounts may be misapplied Craft is superior to mere experience because it knows the cause, the reason why Knowing the reason why makes the master craftsman superior to the manual craftsman The theoretical scientist is more superior still

4 Wisdom Wisdom is a science of causes and principles The highest wisdom is the study of the most universal causes and principles We know subordinate things through the most universal things Wisdom is motivated by wonder The highest wisdom is divine –The gods themselves are the highest causes –The gods would have this wisdom Wisdom removes wonder

5 Early Attempts at Science Most early philosophers thought the only causes of things are material This does not explain why things happen, so philosophers turned to a source of motion The best such source is mind, because it also explains why things turn out well But all the early attempts were clumsy and overlooked the form and the end as causes

6 Platonic Forms Plato recognized the need to describe the form as cause The common formula of things (“one over many”) is the Form, which exists apart The particular (e.g., Socrates) is said to “participate” in the Form (Man-itself) Forms are said to be causes of the “what-it- is” of a thing

7 Some Criticisms of the Forms Extravagance: there is a Form for whatever something has in common with another –Some things (e.g., relatives), do not have forms –A Form has something in common with a particular thing participating in it, so there would be a Form for the Form/particular (the “third man”) Inefficacy: Forms cannot be causes if they are not in the world of caused things Unknowability: knowledge comes from perception, and “itself” adds only a word Unintelligibility: “Participation” is a metaphor

8 Substance Substance is separable while the other ways of being (attributes) are not Sitting implies a sitting thing, but a sitting thing need not sit There are several candidates for substance –Animals, plants, and their parts –The elements: fire, water, earth, air –What is composed of elements –Geometrical limits of bodies –The Platonic Forms

9 What is Substance? There are three kinds of thing that might be substance: –The primary subject –The essence –The universal Each of these will be considered in turn Substance will be shown to be the essence

10 The Primary Subject Substance is a subject that has other things said of it but is not said of anything This primary subject may be: –The matter (the bronze) –The form (the shape of the bronze) –The compound (the statue) Which is most fundamental?

11 Matter When all that is said of a thing is taken away, only the matter remains Matter is “in its own right” something indeterminate, and not what is predicated of it But matter cannot be substance –It is not separable from its form –It is not a “this,” a particular thing The composite of form and matter is derivative and cannot be substance

12 The Essence Form will be studied through essence The essence is what a thing is in its own right It is given in a definition, not a mere account of the thing A definition is an account given by something is not in another (hence, not by an attribute) So the definition will be the species of a genus For example, the essence of Socrates is man Attributes have definitions, but these are only secondarily essences (there is a definition of pale)

13 Coming to Be Things come to be something in three ways –By nature –By craft –By chance In each case, an agent is responsible for their coming to be There is also a matter, which is potentially what the thing comes to be

14 Form and Production What comes to be from craft has its form in the soul We think of the end we desire and build a chain back to something we can produce Healthy body  heated body  rubbing One does not produce form or matter, but form in matter (bronze sphere, not sphere) Separate forms cannot explain production

15 Agency and Production Some things can be moved by their own agency in some circumstances but only by other things in others (a stone) If a thing attains an end when moved by another agent, the end is attained by chance Non-substances come to be through existing form and matter (a table from shaped wood) Substance comes to be only through another substance (animal from animal)

16 The Universal Some think that the universal is the most basic cause and principle, and hence that substance is the universal But substance is not the universal –The universal is common, but the substance is what is distinctive of a thing –The universal is said of a subject, but substance is not said of a subject –The same substance would be in different things –The universal is not a “this”

17 The Unity of Substance Some substances are composed of parts that are thought to be substances Animals are composed of parts that have their own principles of motion But because they are united in one substance, they are substances only in potentiality There are no substances composed of substances

18 Final Account of Substance The substance of a thing is the primary cause of its being what it is Things that are substances are unities by nature What unifies a number of elements is not an element itself It is a form, which explains why a thing is what it is This form is the essence of the thing, so substance is essence


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