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1 Civil Systems Planning Benefit/Cost Analysis Scott Matthews 12-706/19-702 / 73-359 Lecture 10
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12-706 and 73-3592 Sorta Timely Analysis zHow sensitive is gasoline demand to price changes? zHistorically, we have seen relatively little change in demand. Recently? zNew AAA report: higher gasoline prices have caused a 3 percent reduction in demand from a year ago. What was p? q? ? zWhat does that tell us about gasoline?
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12-706 and 73-3593 Distorted Market - Vouchers Example: rodent control vouchers Give residents vouchers worth $v of cost Producers subtract $v - and gov’t pays them Likely have spillover effects Neighbors receive benefits since less rodents nearby means less for them too Thus ‘social demand’ for rodent control is higher than ‘market demand’
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12-706 and 73-3594 Distortion : p0,q0 too low Q P Q0 P0 S-v DMDM S D S: represents higher WTP for rodent control P1 Q1 What is NSB? What are CS, PS? Social WTP
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12-706 and 73-3595 Social Surplus - locals Q P Q0 P0 S-v DMDM S DSDS P1 Q1 B P E P1+v A C Make decisions based on S-v, Dm What about others in society, e.g. neighbors? Because of vouchers, Residents buy Q1
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12-706 and 73-3596 Nearby Residents Q P Q0 P0 S-v DMDM S DSDS P1 Q1 B P E P1+v A C Added benefits are area between demand above consumption increase What is cost voucher program? F G
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12-706 and 73-3597 Voucher Market Benefits Program cost (vouchers):A+B+C+G+E ---- Gain (CS) from target pop: B+E Gain (CS) in nearby: C+G+F Producers (PS): A+C --------- Net: C+F
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12-706 and 73-3598 Opportunity Cost: Land Q P D b Price Case of inelastic supply Government decides to buy Q acres of land, pays P per acre Alternative is parceling of land to private homebuyers What is total cost of project? S Can assume quantity of land is fixed (Q)
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12-706 and 73-3599 Opportunity Cost: Land Q P D b Price Government pays PbQ0, but society ‘loses’ CS that they would have had if government had not bought land. This lost CS is the ‘opportunity cost’ of other people using/buying land. Total cost is entire area under demand up to Q (colored) S 0
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12-706 and 73-35910 Example: Change in Demand for Concrete Dam Project If Q high enough, could effect market Shifts demand -> price higher for all buyers Moves from (P0,Q0) to (P1,Q1).. Then?? Q0 P0 D a Price Quantity D+q’ S P1 Q1
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12-706 and 73-35911 Another Example: Change in Demand Original buyers: look at D, buy Q2 Total purchases still increase by q’ What is net cost/benefit to society? Q0 P0 D a Price Quantity D+q’ S P1 Q1 Q2
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12-706 and 73-35912 Another Example: Change in Demand Project spends B+C+E+F+G on q’ units Project causes change in social surplus! Rule: consider expenditure and social surplus change Q0 P0 D Price Quantity D+q’ S P1 Q1 Q2 E B C FA G G G
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12-706 and 73-35913 Dam Example: Change in Demand Decrease in CS: A+B (negative) Increase in PS: A+B+C (positive) Net social benefit of project is B+G+E+F Q0 P0 D Price Quantity D+q’ S P1 Q1 Q2 E B C FA G G G
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12-706 and 73-35914 Final Thoughts: Change in Demand When prices change, budgetary outlay does not equal the total social cost Unless rise in prices high, C negligible So project outlays ~ social cost usually Opp. Cost equals direct expenditures adjusted by social surplus changes Quantity
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12-706 and 73-35915 Secondary Markets When secondary markets affected Can and should ignore impacts as long as primary effects measured and undistorted secondary market prices unchanged Measuring both usually leads to double counting (since primary markets tend to show all effects) Don’t forget that benefit changes are a function of price changes (Campbell pp. 167)
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16 Decision Analysis Clemen - Chapter 3 (and a little reminder from Chapter 2)
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12-706 and 73-35917 Structuring Decisions All about the objectives (what you want to achieve) Decision context: setting for the decision Decision: choice between options (there is always an option, including status quo) Waiting for more information also an option Uncertainty: as we’ve seen, always exists Outcomes: possible results of uncertain events Many uncertain events lead to complexity Next week we’ll play with models for that
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12-706 and 73-35918 Structuring Decisions (2) But this week, we’ll start simple Steps: Identifying objectives Structuring elements into framework Refining/precisely defining all elements
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12-706 and 73-35919 Example: Who to Nominate as a Supreme Court Justice Objectives? Categories? Means/fundamentals? Hierarchy?
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12-706 and 73-35920 Influence Diagrams /Decision Trees Probably cause confusion. If one confuses you, do the other. Important parts: Decisions Chance Events Consequence/payoff Calculation/constant
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12-706 and 73-35921 Other Notes Chance node branches need to be mutually exclusive/exhaustive Only one can happen, all covered “One and only one can occur” Timing of decisions along the way influences how trees are drawn (left to right) As with NPV, sensitivity analysis, etc, should be able to do these by hand before resorting to software tools.
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12-706 and 73-35922 Solving Decision Trees We read/write them left to right, but “solve” them right to left. Because we need to know expected values of options before choosing. Calculate values for chance nodes Picking best option at decision nodes We typically make trees with “expected value” or NPV or profit as our consequence Thus, as with BCA, we choose highest value.
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12-706 and 73-35923 For Next Class Be able to solve by hand the Texaco decision tree (Figure 4.2) Ideally also the same one with PrecisionTree (@RISK) or Treeplan (on course website)
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