1. 1 31 st International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 10-16 August 2008 The Modal Supervenience of the Concept of Time Kasia Jaszczolt University of Cambridge, U.K. http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21 http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21

2. 2 Outline Real time and internal time Real time and internal time The modal foundation of the concept of time The modal foundation of the concept of time The semantics of temporal expressions: Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, forthcoming a, b) The semantics of temporal expressions: Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, forthcoming a, b)

3. 3 A series and B series ‘…I shall speak of the series of positions running from the far past through the near past to the present, and then from the present to the near future and the far future, as the A series. The series of positions which runs from earlier to later I shall call the B series.’ McTaggart (1908: 111).

4. 4 A series: tensed tensed time belongs to events time belongs to events there is real change there is real change A. Prior, P. Ludlow, J. Parsons, Q. Smith A. Prior, P. Ludlow, J. Parsons, Q. Smith

5. 5 B series: untensed untensed earlier-than/later-than relations earlier-than/later-than relations time is psychological and belongs to the observer time is psychological and belongs to the observer there is no change there is no change B. Russell, H. Reichenbach, A. Einstein, D. H. Mellor, T. Sattig B. Russell, H. Reichenbach, A. Einstein, D. H. Mellor, T. Sattig

6. Fig. 1: A series

7. Fig. 2: B series

8. 8 B series: ‘real’ time of space-time A series: internal time, the concept of time

9. 9 Supervenience (i)The concept of time supervenes on the concept of modal possibility, epistemic detachment. (ii) ‘Real time’ of space-time supervenes on probabilities of states of affairs – possibilities concerning real, alternative histories of the universe. (iii) The concept of time supervenes on real time, the properties of space-time, in the sense of being founded on, and restricted to, experiences, memories and anticipations.

10. 10 ( i)The concept of time supervenes on the concept of modal possibility, epistemic detachment.  ACC of Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, forthcoming a)

11. 11 (ii) ‘Real time’ of space-time supervenes on probabilities of states of affairs – possibilities concerning real, alternative histories and predictions for the universe.  special and general relativity

12. 12 (iii) The concept of time supervenes on real time, the properties of time-space, in the sense of being founded on, and restricted to, experiences, memories and anticipations.  supervenience of the mental on the physical  the anthropic principle  Sattig (2006), Le Poidevin (2007), Mellor (1998)  B-theoretic definitions of Priorean (A-theoretic) operators F, P in truth-conditional semantics

13. 13 ‘Internal time’ The ‘flow of consciousness’ constitutes time (Husserl 1928)  events, states and processes appear to us as temporal objects, as past, present, or future (the temporal objects, as past, present, or future (the past, present and future are properties of consciousness). the present: primal impression, perception the past: retention, memory of perceptions the future: protention, expectation of perceptions

14. 14  Heidegger’s (1953) ‘vulgar’ concepts of the past, the present, and the future.

15. 15 ‘Why do we believe that events are to be distinguished as past, present, and future? I conceive that the belief arises from distinctions in our own experience. At any moment I have certain perceptions, I have also the memory of certain other perceptions, and the anticipation of others again. The direct perception itself is a mental state qualitatively different from the memory or the anticipation of perceptions.’ McTaggart (1908: 127)

16. 16 Time as a derived concept? Moens and Steedman 1988; Steedman 1997: temporality is supervenient on perspective and contingency; tense and aspect systems are founded on the same conceptual primitives as evidentiality Moens and Steedman 1988; Steedman 1997: temporality is supervenient on perspective and contingency; tense and aspect systems are founded on the same conceptual primitives as evidentiality van Lambalgen and Hamm 2005: goals, planning, causation link the past with the present and the future. ‘[T]he linguistic coding of time is (…) driven by the future-oriented nature of our cognitive makeup’ (p. 13) van Lambalgen and Hamm 2005: goals, planning, causation link the past with the present and the future. ‘[T]he linguistic coding of time is (…) driven by the future-oriented nature of our cognitive makeup’ (p. 13)

17. 17 Parsons (2002, 2003): counterfactual theory of tense: truth-at-a-time replaced with truth-at-a-world. Parsons (2002, 2003): counterfactual theory of tense: truth-at-a-time replaced with truth-at-a-world. ‘M was wholly future and will be wholly past.’ ‘There is some past time such that, were it that time, M would be wholly future.’ ‘There is some future time such that, were it that time, M would be wholly past.’

18. 18 Time as degree of detachment from the content: proposition, sentence, event…

19. 19 Futurity as modality Ludlow (1999): the future is modality understood as predictability or potentiality (‘disposition of the world’) Ludlow (1999): the future is modality understood as predictability or potentiality (‘disposition of the world’) Fleischman (1982): future is closely related to irrealis or nonfactive modality and deontic modality (bidirectional semantic shift: modals  tense  modals Fleischman (1982): future is closely related to irrealis or nonfactive modality and deontic modality (bidirectional semantic shift: modals  tense  modals remodalization cycle (van der Auwera and Plungian 1998): participant-external necessity  the future  epistemic necessity remodalization cycle (van der Auwera and Plungian 1998): participant-external necessity  the future  epistemic necessity

20. 20 Pastness as modality Ludlow (1999): ‘past-tense morphology’ is an evidential marker – an assumption compatible with A-theory Ludlow (1999): ‘past-tense morphology’ is an evidential marker – an assumption compatible with A-theory Thomason (2002): pastness as historical necessity: if w 1  t w 2, then w 1 and w 2 share the same past up to and including t. Historical possibilities diminish monotonically with the passage of time. Thomason (2002): pastness as historical necessity: if w 1  t w 2, then w 1 and w 2 share the same past up to and including t. Historical possibilities diminish monotonically with the passage of time.

21. 21 Realis/irrealis Caddo (Native American): future as a realis category: cííbáw- ʔ a ʔ cíyibahw ʔ a ʔ realis1SgseeFut ‘I will look at it’ Central Pomo: future is referred to by realis or irrealis.

22. 22 Proto-Uto-Aztecan: reconstructed irrealis morpheme = past tense morpheme, both founded on the feature ‘dissociative’ (de Haan 2006) ‘dissociative’ (de Haan 2006)

23. 23 Thai: optional temporality (1)m 3 ae:r 3 i: I kh 2 iann 3 iy 3 ai: Marywritenovel

24. 24 (1) (a) Mary wrote a novel. (b) Mary was writing a novel. (c) Mary started writing a novel but did not finish it. (d) Mary has written a novel. (e) Mary has been writing a novel. (f) Mary writes novels. / Mary is a novelist. (g) Mary is writing a novel. (h) Mary will write a novel. (i) Mary will be writing a novel. Srioutai (2006: 45)

25. 25 (2) f 3 ont 1 ok rain fall (a) It is raining. (default meaning) (b) It was raining. (possible intended meaning)

26. 26 Future-time reference (3) Lidia will play in a concert tomorrow evening. (4) Lidia will be playing in a concert tomorrow evening.(regular future) (5) Lidia is going to play in a concert tomorrow evening.(periphrastic future) (6) Lidia is playing in a concert tomorrow evening. (futurative progressive) (7) Lidia plays in a concert tomorrow evening. (‘tenseless’ future)

27. 27 (8) Lidia must be playing in a concert tomorrow evening. (9) Lidia ought to/should be playing in a concert tomorrow evening. (epistemic necessity future) (10) Lidia may play/be playing in a concert tomorrow evening. (11) Lidia might play/be playing in a concert tomorrow evening.(epistemic possibility future)

28. Fig. 3: Degrees of epistemic commitment for expressions with future-time reference

29. 29 Present-time reference in English (12) Lidia is playing in a concert now. (regular present) (13) Lidia must be playing in a concert now. Lidia will be playing in a concert now. (epistemic necessity present) (14) Lidia may be playing in a concert now. (15) Lidia might be playing in a concert now. (epistemic possibility present) (16) Lidia will always play the piano when she is upset.(dispositional necessity present) upset.(dispositional necessity present)

30. 30 Past-time reference in English (17) Lidia played in a concert yesterday evening. (18) Lidia was playing in a concert yesterday evening. (regular past) (19) This is what happened yesterday. Lidia goes to Vienna, meets Mary at the station, and says… (past of narration) (20) Lidia would have been playing in a concert then. (21) Lidia must have been playing in a concert yesterday evening. (epistemic necessity past/inferential evidentiality) (22) Lidia may have been playing in a concert yesterday evening. (23) Lidia might have been playing in a concert yesterday evening. (epistemic possibility past)

31. Fig. 4: Degrees of epistemic commitment for expressions with past-time reference

32. 32 Grice’s (2001) Equivocality Thesis: Modals are univocal across the practical/alethic divide. [ → deontic/epistemic] Acc – modal operator, ‘it is (rationally) acceptable that’

33. 33 Acc ￂ p‘it is acceptable that it is the case that p’ that let it be that p’ Acc ! p‘it is acceptable that let it be that p’ Operator on propositions or other abstract objects?

34. 34 Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, forthcoming a, b) ACC Δ ├ Σ ‘it is acceptable to the degree Δ that Σ is true’

36. 36 Events: granularity, ontology, temporal status Ramsey 1927; Davidson 1967; Montague 1969; Chisholm 1970; Kim 1976; Parsons 1990; Asher 2000; Landman 2000; Schein 2002; van Lambalgen & Hamm 2005

37. 37 Events and the A series How many events took place in the last hour? ‘It is not part of linguistics to decide whether all matter is atomic or all happenings are reducible to little granules of process. Indeed, if contemporary physical theories are to be believed, such ultimate questions are basically incoherent.’ Bach (1986: 68)

38. 38 Merger representations  of Default Semantics: cf. finely-grained, linguistically differentiated events (Kim)

39. 

40. 

41. 

42. Ʃ Fig. 9: Ʃ for ‘Lidia played in a concert yesterday evening (regular past)

43. 43 (1) m 3 ae:r 3 i: I kh 2 iann 3 iy 3 ai: Marywritenovel

44. Fig. 10: Ʃ for ‘Mary wrote a novel’ (regular past, CPI) 

45. 45 Conclusion The modal supervenience of the concept of time is supported by the arguments supported by the arguments (i) from the modal character of temporal expressions and (ii) from the explanatory adequacy of the formal semantic representation in terms of Gricean ACC operator.

46. 46 It is consistent with (i) the theory of space-time in special and general relativity (as probability, alternative real histories of the universe) – B-theoretic ‘real’ time and (ii) the phenomenological account of internal time – A-theoretic concept of time. ? Modality as an explanans in three domains: ontological, psychological, and linguistic.

47. 47 Supervenience, dependence, or identity? Strong and metaphysical (a fortiori also nomological) supervenience? Strong and metaphysical (a fortiori also nomological) supervenience? Ontological dependence? Ontological dependence? or: temporality is modality? or: temporality is modality? Kim 1987; McLaughlin & Bennett 2005

48. 48 Spatial conceptualization of time as a side-effect of modal supervenience (i) ‘looking back into the future and ahead into the past’: Maori, Aymara, Hausa, Ancient Greek (relative conceptualization) ‘looking back into the past and forward into the future’: English etc. (absolute conceptualization) (ii) Experimental psychology: people think about time using spatial representations (Casasanto & Boroditsky 2008; Vallesi, Binns & Shallice (2008)

49. 49 Select references Asher, N. 2000. ‘Events, facts, propositions, and evolutive anaphora’. In: J. Higginbotham, F. Pianesi & A. C. Varzi (eds). Speaking of Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 123-150. Van der Auwera, J. & V.A. Plungian. 1998. ‘Modality’s semantic map’. Linguistic Typology 2. 79-124. Bach, E. 1986. ‘The algebra of events’. Linguistics and Philosophy 9. Reprinted in: I. Mani et al. (eds). 2005. The Language of Time: A Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 61-69. Casasanto, D. & L. Boroditsky. 2008. ‘Time in the mind: Using space to think about time’. Cognition 106. 579-593. Chisholm, R. M. (1970). ‘Events and propositions’. Noûs 4: 15-24. Davidson, D. 1967. ‘The logical form of action sentences’. In: N. Rescher (ed.). The Logic of Decision and Action. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Reprinted in: D. Davidson. 1980. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 105-122. Dummett, M. 2004. Truth and the Past. New York: Columbia University Press.

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