1. Geographic Objects and Their Categories Barry Smith & David M. Mark University at Buffalo

2. Outline zWhat is Ontology? zWhere Do Geographic Categories Come From? zThe Truth About Earth zObjects and Fields: The Individuation Problem zData Standards and Cultural/Linguistic Relativism zSome Empirical Results zSummary

3. Ontology z Ontology studies the constituents of reality z An ontology of a given domain describes in formal terms the constituents of reality within that domain z The ontology also describes the relations between these constituents, and also the relations between constituents of one domain and others z (Smith)

4. Ontology of Geographic Things zGeographic things are not merely located in space, they typically are tied intrinsically to space in such a way that they inherit from space many of its structural (mereological, topological, geometrical) properties zThe role and nature of boundaries is especially important

5. Geographic Things, continued zIndividuation criteria are much more likely to be ambiguous, and to vary across individuals and cultures, and zClassification (categorization) and individuation probably are not independent

6. Where do Categories Come From? zNature? zBargains within speech communities? zAffordances?

7. Are Categories in the World? zNatural Kinds y“Cut nature at its joints” zThis seems clearly to be the case for the biological world, including human artifacts and constructions zBut does the inorganic world have these natural ‘joints’ between categories?

8. Benjamin Lee Whorf zSapir-Whorf and linguistic relativism y“We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significance as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way—an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language. (Whorf, 1940, pp. 213-214.)

9. Affordances z J. J. Gibson has provided a valuable account of the perceived world, which he presented as a prelude to his accounts of human visual perception z A key part of his model is the concept of affordances

10. Affordances z “The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or evil.” z James J. Gibson, “The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception.”

11. Geographic Affordances z Conjecture: Parts of the environment gain meaning, become things, mainly according to the activities that they afford. z Parts of the Earth's surface that afford more or less the same activities may be considered to belong to the same category.

12. Geographic Affordances z Mountains afford climbing z Mountains also afford navigation when they serve as landmarks z Lakes afford fishing, the obtaining of drinking water, swimming, travel by boat z Forests afford wood gathering, hunting, hiding from enemies z Etc.

13. Some Truths: Water and Life z Some 70 percent of the surface of Earth is covered by liquid water, and the planet is surrounded by a gaseous envelope called the atmosphere. z Plants cover most parts of the land surface, and animals (including humans) move about among those plants.

14. Ontology for Science? z A complete ontology of geographic phenomena will have to incorporate all of these scientific facts and more, but are they relevant to our current effort to describe primary geographic theory, Naive geography, geography relevant to action?

15. Land Forms z Forces from above and below have shaped the form of the surface of Earth and other rock planets. z The influence of gravity is a dominant factor—loose material tends to move away from high areas toward lower ones in a process generally termed erosion.

16. Land Forms z Steeper slopes are less stable than gentle ones and so over time there is a tendency toward leveling unless other forces act against that. z Overhanging cliffs are extremely rare, so the elevation of the Earth's surface can be conceptualized as a single-valued function of horizontal position, that is, as a continuous field.

17. Land Forms z Generally speaking, this is how science has modeled the geometry of the Earth's surface. z Scientists who attempt to account for or model hydrology and sediment transport conceptualize the Earth's surface as composed of slope gradients and orientations over a field of elevations.

18. Land Forms z This idea of the single-valued field of elevations as a representation of the form of the Earth's surface has been incorporated implicitly or explicitly into representations of earth form developed for computers in the 1950s and since.

19. Topography Experienced z The topographic environment as experienced by people is very different from this z It is the same environment, of course, but experienced through human senses in the context of human activities and needs.

20. Topography Experienced z When viewed from the surface of the Earth by a creature between 1 and 2 meters tall, variations of surface elevation of tens, hundreds, or thousands of meters dominate the experienced landscape, while at the same time, the curvature of the geoid, of the horizontal, is almost imperceptible.

21. Topography Experienced z When people see, learn, and describe a landscape, they do not think of it as a field or surface. z Rather, they consider it to be composed of objects or things, presumably based on some combination of gestalt visual perception and the perception of affordances.

22. Topography Experienced z Visual perception tends to identify convex surfaces are forming objects, and Gibson wrote of detached objects as having completely closed surfaces making them moveable, or as attached objects that forms parts of the surfaces of larger things.

23. Topography Experienced z The perceived surface of the Earth appears to follow this principle and to be dominated by convex rather than concave parts.

24. Topography Experienced z In an experiment to be detailed later, in which subjects were asked to list examples of geographic features, objects, or things, mountain was the most frequent example, listed by 151 of 263 subjects. z A secondary form of land convexity, hill, was listed somewhat more often (by 43 subjects) than was the most frequent concave form, valley (39 subjects).

25. Topography Experienced z Evidently, mountains are the quintessential geographic things to everyday people, yet they hardly appear in the scientific models. Nor do they appear as objects in our geographic databases.

26. Topography Experienced z Mountains and the like also have been neglected in philosophers' ontologies (e.g. Aristotle), which have taken as their paradigm for objects complete moveable things with their own boundaries (such as people, or atoms, or planets), what Gibson called "detatched objects".

27. Objects and Fields: The Individuation Problem zDo mountains really exist?

29. Do mountains really exist? zMont Blanc

31. Do mountains really exist? zYes, obviously! zBut what does “exist” mean here? zDo things (objects? entities?) exist that are members of the category “mountain”? zPerhaps “mountains” are just convex parts of the elevation fields

32. Which part is Mount Everest?

33. Data Exchange Standards and Linguistic Relativism zStandard Facilitate Data Exchange zCommon Ontology facilitates Semantic Interoperability zBut what about cultural or linguistic differences in categories? zAn Example: Étangs

34. Semantics for Geospatial Data Exchange An Example from the DIGEST standard (Digital Geographic Information Working Group, DGIWG)

35. Semantics for Geospatial Data Exchange Are “ponds” in English the same as “étangs” en Français?

36. Étang de Berre zAvec ses 75 km de périphérie et une profondeur ne dépassant pas 9 mètres, cet étang gigantesque est relié à la Méditerrannée par un canal à l'ouest, et par un souterrain à l'est, en direction de Marseille

37. Things are not always what they say they are...

38. Étang de Berre  Ceci n’est pas un «pond»!

39. Étang de Berre zSo, is it a lake?

40. Étang de Berre zNo! In English it would be called a “lagoon”!

41. Another Kind of Water Body: Lagoon

42. Conceptual Model for Water Bodies x“A body of water surrounded by land” x“Open body of water separated from the sea by a sand bank or coral reef” zKinds of water bodies may be distinguished by ySize yOrigin yWater quality y...

43. }- Conceptual Model for Water Bodies

44. Different Languages zDifferent languages may give different weights to these factors zConsider English and French

48. Geographic Categories zSome Empirical Results

49. Category Norms (following Battig and Montague, 1969) z“For each of the following categories, please write down as many items included in that category as you can in 30 seconds, in whatever order they happen to occur to you” zSubjects were then given a series of category labels

50. Subjects z263 students from the “World Civilization” general education course at UB, Fall 2000 zAdditional subjects in Finland, Croatia, Poland, Guatemala, and England

51. What Difference Does the Exact Question Make? z a kind of geographic feature z a kind of geographic object z something that could be portrayed on a map z (concept, entity, phenomenon)

52. English Norms, ‘feature’ highest

53. English Norms, ‘object’ highest

54. English Norms, ‘mappable’ highest

55. zinformation systems zdatabases zorganizations zlanguage-communities zsciences zreligions zmaps

56. = a system of concepts pertaining to a given domain... concepts that are more or less coherently specified Each involves a certain conceptualization

57. z – a common system of concepts in terms of which different information communities can talk to each other and exchange data Why make ontologies? To provide a stable forum for translation and interoperability as between different conceptualizations

58. KR Ontology zdeals with the generated correlates of both good and bad conceptualizations z – with surrogate created worlds z z – with ‘universes of discourse’

59. Not all conceptualizations are equal zBad conceptualizations: story-telling, myth-making, legacy information systems based on insecure foundations... zGood conceptualizations: zscience (mostly) zwhat else?

60. Two sorts of conceptualizations zbad conceptualizations = relate merely to a created, surrogate world zgood conceptualizations = transparent to some independent reality beyond

61. A transparent conceptualization is a partition of reality

62. Ontology should foster transparent conceptualizations (veridical perspectives on reality) zIt should provide a constraint on conceptualizations (Guarino)

63. Transparent conceptualizations zThe sciences provide us with a good first clue as to what these are

64. Scientific conceptualizations z= those based on theories which have survived rigorous empirical tests

65. Science and prediction z The perspectival cuts through reality yielded by the different sciences capture dimensions of reality in relation to which we can develop predictive theories

66. Scientific conceptualizations are transparent they illuminate some features of the underlying reality and trace over others

67. Objects vs. fields form matter

68. scientific reality = (roughly) fields (matter + energy) zcommon-sense reality = objects plus attributes and processes quantitative qualitative

69. The opposition objects vs. fields in the realm of accidents too

70. Objects vs. fields in the realm of accidents too form matter R=175, G=54, B=24 ‘red’

71. Two different perspectives on reality: zthe qualitative (objects, attributes, processes) zthe quantitative (fields: matter, energy) z zboth transparent to the reality beyond

72. (one is cruder, coarser than the other)

73. Two different perspectives: zAristotle helps us with the qualitative perspective (of objects, attributes, processes) zScience helps us with the quantitative perspective (of fields)

74. How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1.theory of vagueness 2.mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3.the theory of fiat boundaries 4.qualitative geometry and qualitative topology

75. How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1.theory of vagueness 2.mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3.the theory of fiat boundaries 4.qualitative geometry and qualitative topology

76. Theory of vagueness zHow can -based zconceptualizations be transparent, zif the world is shaped like this z ?

77. via some sort of distortion ? z(so that common-sense concepts would be like cookie-cutters, cleaving reality at non-existing joints) ?

78. No: common sense does not lie z... our common-sense concepts are soft at the edges z zand are employed by us accordingly

79. they have a built-in sensitivity to the difference between focal and borderline instances focus penumbra

80. Fuzzy logic zillegitimately transforms this qualitative space into a quantitative field of precise probability assignments zx is red with probability 93.748 %

81. How to produce a qualitative theory of vagueness ? z– a theory of the way in which our common-sense concepts apply to reality in such a way as to comprehend an opposition between focal and penumbral instances ?

82. How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1.theory of vagueness 2.mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3.the theory of fiat boundaries 4.qualitative geometry and qualitative topology

83. How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1.theory of vagueness 2.mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3.the theory of fiat boundaries 4.qualitative geometry and qualitative topology

84. Negative parts (holes): not made of matter zAristotle neglects features of the common-sense world not made of matter Examples:property rights obligations institutions spatial regions spatial boundaries

85. How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1.theory of vagueness 2.mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3.the theory of fiat boundaries 4.qualitative geometry and qualitative topology

86. How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1.theory of vagueness 2.mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3.the theory of fiat boundaries 4.qualitative geometry and qualitative topology

87. In the realm of table-top space boundaries are not ontologically problematic: ztable-top objects have clear boundaries zthey never share boundaries zthey never overlap zthey do not flow, merge, split zthey do not change their genus as they grow zthey do not change their genus from season to season

88. zthey do not change their genus according to what they abut zcontrast: mountain – valley

89. Bona Fide Objects zThe objects of table-top space have bona fide boundaries z= boundaries which exist independently of our cognition

90. Fiat Boundaries z= boundaries which exist only in virtue of our demarcations zFiat objects = objects with fiat boundaries

91. Examples of fiat objects z Two-dimensional fiat objects: z zcensus tracts zpostal districts zWyoming

92. Three-dimensional fiat objects z the Northern hemisphere zthe 3-dimensional parcels to which mineral rights are assigned zthe Klingon Empire

93. Controlled Airspace

94. How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1.theory of vagueness 2.mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3.the theory of fiat boundaries 4.qualitative geometry and qualitative topology

95. How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1.theory of vagueness 2.mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3.the theory of fiat boundaries 4.qualitative geometry and qualitative topology

96. Holes in the ground zBone fide boundaries at the floor and walls z with a fiat lid

97. What is a valley ?

98. Grand Canyon

99. zmountain is the most prominent kind of geographic object in the common- sense ontology. But it is absent from the scientific ontology as a kind of thing z... the latter includes slope steepness and direction at every point, but represented as fields What is a mountain ?

100. Mountain zbona fide upper boundaries zwith fiat base:

101. Basic Formal Ontology Concrete Entity [Exists in Space and Time] Entity in 3-D Ontology [Endure. No Temporal Parts] Spatial Region of Dimension 0,1,2,3 Dependent Entity Quality (Your Redness, My Tallness) [Form Quality Regions/Scales] Quasi-Quality Prices, Values, Obligations Role, Function, Power Have realizations (called: Processes) Quasi-Role/Function/Power The Functions of the President Independent Entity Substance [maximally connected causal unity] Aggregate of Substances * (includes masses of stuff? liquids?) Fiat Part of Substance * Nose, Ear, Mountain Boundary of Substance * Fiat or Bona Fide or Mixed Quasi-Substance Church, College, Corporation Entity in 4-D Ontology [Perdure. Unfold in Time] Processual Entity Process [Has Unity] Clinical trial; exercise of role Aggregate of Processes* Fiat Part of Process* Instantaneous Temporal Boundary of Process (= Ingarden’s 'Event’)* Quasi-Process John’s Youth. John’s Life Spatio-Temporal Region Dim = T, T+0, T+1, T+2, T+3

102. Basic Formal Ontology Concrete Entity [Exists in Space and Time] Entity in 3-D Ontology [Endure. No Temporal Parts] Spatial Region of Dimension 0,1,2,3 Dependent Entity Quality (Your Redness, My Tallness) [Form Quality Regions/Scales] Quasi-Quality Prices, Values, Obligations Role, Function, Power Have realizations (called: Processes) Quasi-Role/Function/Power The Functions of the President Independent Entity Substance [maximally connected causal unity] Aggregate of Substances * (includes masses of stuff? liquids?) Fiat Part of Substance * Nose, Ear, Mountain Boundary of Substance * Fiat or Bona Fide or Mixed Quasi-Substance Church, College, Corporation Entity in 4-D Ontology [Perdure. Unfold in Time] Processual Entity Process [Has Unity] Clinical trial; exercise of role Aggregate of Processes* Fiat Part of Process* Instantaneous Temporal Boundary of Process (= Ingarden’s 'Event’)* Quasi-Process John’s Youth. John’s Life Spatio-Temporal Region Dim = T, T+0, T+1, T+2, T+3

103. Basic Formal Ontology Concrete Entity [Exists in Space and Time] Entity in 3-D Ontology [Endure. No Temporal Parts] Independent Entity Substance [maximally connected causal unity] Aggregate of Substances * (includes masses of stuff? liquids?) Fiat Part of Substance * Nose, Ear, Mountain

104. where does the mountain start ?

105. Everest Mount Everest

106. Mont Blanc from Chatel

107. Question: z Are mountains bona fide or fiat objects? zDid mountains exist before human cognitive agents came along?

108. Bona fide mountain (tops) Miquelon_and_Saint_Pierre_Island

109. Are all holes fiat objects ? zhollows ztunnels zcavities

110. Did hollows and tunnels exist before human cognitive agents came along? zRabbit holes, worm holes zGeospatial forms as precursors of evolution

111. What is a lake ?

112. A filled hole ?

113. What is a lake ? z 1. a three-dimensional body of water ? z2. a two-dimensional sheet of water ? z3. a depression (hole) in the Earth’s surface (possibly) filled with water ? z are dry lakes lakes? or merely places where lakes used to be?

114. Each of these has problems: z If we take : z1. a lake is three-dimensional body of water z then a lake can never be half full z Open problem: ontology of liquids

115. What’s the point ?

116. Common-Sense Reality zWhy is it important that we get the ontology of common-sense reality right?

117. Science is important for engineering z Well, z... it’s important that we get the ontology of physics right because physics is a basis for engineering: z z... bridges and airplanes are engineering products in which physical reality is embedded

118. Many biological sciences relate to the common-sense world of qualitative forms: zEcology (need for ontology of niches or habitats) zBiogeography zPalaeontology = science of common- sense reality as it existed before human beings evolved

119. Why is naive ontology important? zIt’s important that we get the ontology of common-sense reality right...... because it is common-sense ontology which underlies medicine

120. where does the mountain start ?