1. Mechanisms and the Metaphysics of Causation Peter Fazekas Peter Fazekas School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, The University of Edinburgh School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, The University of Edinburgh Gergely Kertész Gergely Kertész Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Budapest University of Technology and Economics Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Budapest University of Technology and Economics

2. Intro Mechanistic approach Mechanistic approach Ontological aspect Ontological aspect Epistemological (explanatory) aspect Epistemological (explanatory) aspect Focus: ontological aspect Focus: ontological aspect Target: Bill Bechtel (2008) Target: Bill Bechtel (2008)

3. Mechanistic explanation S Ψ -ing X 2 Φ 2 -ing P 1 ρ 1 -ing P 3 ρ 3 -ing P 2 ρ 2 -ing X 1 Φ 1 -ing X 5 Φ 5 -ing X 4 Φ 4 -ing X 3 Φ 3 -ing

4. What happens in mechanistic explanation The grasping of a phenomenon through its causal/ functional role The grasping of a phenomenon through its causal/ functional role Decomposition: the finding of relevant parts and their organisation. Decomposition: the finding of relevant parts and their organisation. Mechanistic explanations explain how a mechanism as a whole can do what it does by showing how the constituent parts such organised can do together what the mechanism as a whole does. Mechanistic explanations explain how a mechanism as a whole can do what it does by showing how the constituent parts such organised can do together what the mechanism as a whole does. Identification of the activity of the parts with the activity of the higher level phenomenon. Identification of the activity of the parts with the activity of the higher level phenomenon.

5. Mechanistic explanation Level 0 Level +1 Level -1 X S P 1 ρ 1 -ing X Φ-ing P 2 ρ 2 -ing P 3 ρ 3 -ing

6. Causation at different levels S Ψ -ing X 2 Φ 2 -ing P 1 ρ 1 -ing P 3 ρ 3 -ing P 2 ρ 2 -ing X 1 Φ 1 -ing X 5 Φ 5 -ing X 4 Φ 4 -ing X 3 Φ 3 -ing

7. Levels and terminology “the working parts of a mechanism do different things than does the whole mechanism” (Bechtel, 2008, p.146.) “the working parts of a mechanism do different things than does the whole mechanism” (Bechtel, 2008, p.146.) “different vocabulary is required to describe the operations of the parts of the mechanism from that used to describe the activity of the whole mechanism” (Bechtel, 2008, p.146.) “different vocabulary is required to describe the operations of the parts of the mechanism from that used to describe the activity of the whole mechanism” (Bechtel, 2008, p.146.)

8. „Bridge laws” in the case of mechanisms ‘‘individual lower-level components do not explain the overall performance of the mechanism.... Only the mechanism as a whole is capable of generating the phenomenon, and then only under appropriate conditions. Herein lies the explanation for the need for bridge principles in the theory-reduction account— different vocabulary is needed to describe what the parts of a mechanism do than is required to describe what the mechanism as a whole does. The appropriate bridge in this case, however, is not a set of translation rules, but an account of how the operations of the parts of the mechanism are organized so as to yield the behavior of the whole mechanism” (Bechtel & Hamilton, 2007, p. 25, emphasis added) ‘‘individual lower-level components do not explain the overall performance of the mechanism.... Only the mechanism as a whole is capable of generating the phenomenon, and then only under appropriate conditions. Herein lies the explanation for the need for bridge principles in the theory-reduction account— different vocabulary is needed to describe what the parts of a mechanism do than is required to describe what the mechanism as a whole does. The appropriate bridge in this case, however, is not a set of translation rules, but an account of how the operations of the parts of the mechanism are organized so as to yield the behavior of the whole mechanism” (Bechtel & Hamilton, 2007, p. 25, emphasis added)

9. Identity and autonomy “In this sketch of events involved in remembering a lecture, I twice stepped down levels by appealing to an identity between the effect on a system and a change in constituents of the system. At the lower level the causal story was an ordinary causal one. Then I stepped up a level by appealing to an identity between the new operations within the mechanism and the way it behaved as a whole. At the level of the whole the story was again an ordinary causal one.” (Bechtel, 2008, pp.154-155, emphases added) “And insofar as that non-functioning constitutes the general’s death, we explain her death. Notice that when we reach the state of the mechanism that constitutes the state of death, we do not say, with Betty Crocker, that it causes death. It just is death.” (Craver and Bechtel, 2007, p. 557, emphases added)

10. Arguments for autonomy Although mechanistic explanation is reductive insofar as it appeals to the componenet parts and operations within a mechanism to explain the behavior of the mechanism, the reductive aspect alone is insufficient to explain the behavior of the mechanism. “ Although mechanistic explanation is reductive insofar as it appeals to the componenet parts and operations within a mechanism to explain the behavior of the mechanism, the reductive aspect alone is insufficient to explain the behavior of the mechanism. The parts of a whole behave in a particular way because of how they are organized in the mechanism. Information about how the parts are organized goes beyond the account of the parts and their operations. The parts of a whole behave in a particular way because of how they are organized in the mechanism. Information about how the parts are organized goes beyond the account of the parts and their operations. Moreover, the mechanism interacts causally with other entities. These interactions provide the input and set the conditions for the mechanism and information about them is not part of the reductive account charcterizing the parts and operations within the mechanism. Securing information about both the organisation within the mechanism and the relations between the mechanism and its environment requires going beyond the reductive aspect of mechanistic explanation and incorporating the,results of other, autonomous inquiries.” (Bechtel, 2007, emphases added) Moreover, the mechanism interacts causally with other entities. These interactions provide the input and set the conditions for the mechanism and information about them is not part of the reductive account charcterizing the parts and operations within the mechanism. Securing information about both the organisation within the mechanism and the relations between the mechanism and its environment requires going beyond the reductive aspect of mechanistic explanation and incorporating the,results of other, autonomous inquiries.” (Bechtel, 2007, emphases added)

11. Information about organisation S Ψ -ing X 2 Φ 2 -ing P 1 ρ 1 -ing P 3 ρ 3 -ing P 2 ρ 2 -ing X 1 Φ 1 -ing X 5 Φ 5 -ing X 4 Φ 4 -ing X 3 Φ 3 -ing

12. Information about organisation Can a full-blown lower level account capture organisational facts? Can a full-blown lower level account capture organisational facts? Accounting for organisation requiers information about: Accounting for organisation requiers information about: Entities Entities Activities Activities Spatiotemporal cordinates Spatiotemporal cordinates Dynamical couplings Dynamical couplings All of these are accessible at the lower level. All of these are accessible at the lower level.

13. S Ψ -ing P 1 ρ 1 -ing P 3 ρ 3 -ing P 2 ρ 2 -ing X 2 Φ 2 -ing X 1 Φ 1 -ing X 5 Φ 5 -ing X 4 Φ 4 -ing X 3 Φ 3 -ing

14. Moral Autonomy as the simple need for higher levels: Autonomy as the simple need for higher levels: True. True. Too weak to be interesting. Too weak to be interesting. Autonomy as special authority of higher levels: Autonomy as special authority of higher levels: Interesting enough. Interesting enough. False. False.

15. Thank you for your attention!