1. Making and breaking government The Veto Player perspective Camilla Mariotto5th November 2009 Positive Political Theory Prof. Francesco Zucchini

2. 2 On stability (1) Up to now we have discussed about policy stability and how it is affected by different institutional structures. What consequences? On the regime On the government stability On the independence of bureaucracies and the judiciary

3. 3 On stability (2) Government instability (Parliamentarism)

4. 4 Government stability (1) Formation of government coalition + Duration of corresponding government Most prolific branches in the literature of politics  Lijphart (1999: 129): “Cabinet durability is an indicator not just of the cabinet’s strength compared with that of the legislature but also of regime stability”

5. 5 Government stability (2) No agreement on the conditions for what a government replacement is. 4 different criteria: Change in the party composition of the government; Election; Formal government resignation; Change in prime minister.

6. 6 Different relations: Government duration: VPs and Government duration Agenda setting and executive dominance Executive dominance Agenda setting Agenda setting and executive dominance

7. 7 Government duration (1) A) Parliamentary features Theory of coalition – blindness of policy 1.Policy blind models  MWC 2.Policy models  MCWC Under MCWC perspective, in 1-D space a connected coalition would not exclude a party located between coalition parties. Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Riker Axelrod, de Swaan

8. 8 Government duration (2) A) Parliamentary features Size party Party position Party government Other parties position N° of parties Effective n° Government duration Extreme or anti-system party

9. 9 Government duration (3) 1.The deterministic approach (Laver&Schofield) introduced the “bargaining environment”.  On an 1-D policy space (LR) different political systems are characterized as:  unipolar centrist  unipolar off center  bipolar  multipolar 2.The events approach (Browne, Gleiber, Mashoba) did not focus on cause but on “randomness”.  Conditional rate of termination – hazard rate

10. 10 Government duration (4) 3. King, Alt, Burns and Laver combined the 2 approaches: “[…] governments fall as a result of random events, but the capacity of different governments to survive was a function of different characteristics prevailing in the party system of the country. The results of this unified model indicate that fragmentation of the party system and polarization of the opposition are the regime attributes most strongly associated with cabinet duration.” (Tsebelis)  The probability of a party to be included in the new government depends on the characteristics of the party system.

11. 11 Government duration (5) B) Government features Warwick gave a different definition of:  Polarization measures the proportion of parliamentary seats held by extremist parties (anti-system parties)  noncoalitionable parties. High vulnerability to early collapse or termination.  Fractionalization variable should be measured regarding to the government  Ideological heterogeneity or distance (more in minority governments).  The government survival depends on the bargaining within government

12. 12 VPs and government duration (1) Focus on the status quo as essential element of multidimensional policy models. Models assume 1) policy space, 2) complete information, and 3) stability of the status quo.

13. 13 VPs and government duration (2) In order to understand mechanisms of government selection and duration, two uncertainties: 1.Uncertainty between policies and outcomes 2.Uncertainty between current and future outcomes Taking into account both uncertainties, how are parties going to address the situation when forming a government?  Reduction of distance between coalition parties enables governments to produce a policy program before they form and respond to subsequent exogenous shocks.

14. 14 VPs and government duration (3) 3 VPs: A1, A2 and A3 If SQ then W(SQ), if SQ1 then W(SQ1) The further away the status quo is and the closer they are to each other, the more items are included by the VPs in the gov program.

15. 15 VPs and government duration (4) What happens in case of an exogenous shock? Replacement of an existing outcome, but for a government this can be: o Manageable o Non-manageable No direct correspondence between the size of the shock and the government termination.

16. 16 VPs and government duration (5) oImplications on government formation oMajority government with close parties oIdeologically heterogeneous government oMinority government oImplication on government duration oIdeological distances oFractionalization and polarization only in minority government.

17. 17 VPs and government duration (6) Government duration is proportional to the government’s ability to respond to unexpected shocks.  the size of the unanimity core of the veto players.  the closer the VPs, the more they are able to manage policy shocks, and consequently the longer the duration of the government. Moreover, the closer different VPs the higher probability that they will form a government

18. 18 Agenda setting and executive dominance Why do party positions matter? A government has 2 distinct advantages (Tsebelis): positional advantages  the centrality of its location inside parliament, generated with the coalition formation process institutional advantages  the agenda setting rules, pre- existing the game

19. 19  Executive dominance Lijphart: Executive dominance measures the relative power of the executive and legislative branches of government, therefore its best indicator is cabinet durability. Government duration – executive dominance  self evident

20. 20 COUNTRY Average cabinet life I Average cabinet life II Gov Duration Executive Dominance Austria8.422.535.47 Belgium2.291.681.98 Denmark2.811.752.28 Finland1.311.181.24 France2.882.082.48*5.52* Germany3.602.032.82 Greece3.602.162.88 Iceland2.782.172.48 Ireland3.722.423.07 Italy1.280.991.14 Luxembourg5.623.164.39 Netherlands2.942.502.72 Norway4.222.113.17 Portugal2.321.862.09 Spain6.352.384.36 Sweden4.772.073.42 Switzerland16.190.998.59*1* U. Kingdom8.492.555.52 Lijphart: Government duration and executive dominance

21. 21  Agenda setting Doering: Government dominates the policy-making process because it holds the power of agenda setting  7 variables: 1. Authority to determine the Plenary Agenda of Parliament 2. Money Bills as Government Prerogative 3. Is the Committee Stage of a Bill Restricted by a Preceding Plenary Decision? 4. Authority of Committees to Rewrite Government Bills 5. Control of the Timetable in Legislative Committees 6. Curtailing Debate before the Final Vote of a Bill in the Plenary 7. Maximum Lifespan of a Bill Pending Approval After Which It Lapses if not Adopted

22. 22 COUNTRY Plenary agenda Financial Initiative CommitteeRe-write Time Table Financial Voting Lapse Bill Agenda Control Austria4333222-0.044 Belgium4334323-0.170 Denmark5321421-0.106 Finland5334132-0.148 France21312130.333 Germany4334322-0.126 Greece22322120.280 Iceland5331421-0.170 Ireland11141220.519 Italy6334222-0.219 Luxembourg3333224-0.053 Netherlands7331434-0.527 Norway4334222-0.063 Portugal31332230.147 Spain41142220.221 Sweden5334434-0.427 Switzerland3334324-0.135 U. Kingdom11111110.690 Doering: Government Agenda Control

23. 23  Agenda setting and executive dominance (1) Tsebelis: The relevance of agenda setting for coalition formation. Government formateurs are parties centrally located The closer different potential veto players the higher probability that they will form a government  proximity of other parties to the formateurs

24. 24 W (ABC)  Agenda setting and executive dominance (2) A B C B1 C1 SQ W (AB1C1) Party “A” can form 2 potential coalition: ABC and AB1C1. “A” chooses AB1C1 on the basis of both ideological (to implement more plans) and pragmatic (to respond to more shocks) criteria. “Minimizing the distances between the coalition partners is the dominant solution in all cases […], the formateur should select parties closer to his preferences”.

25. 25  5 parties  equal seats, 3 parties to form a majority  3 exclusive and exhaustive subsets of the policy space: 1. the points preferred to G by majority  GG’ and GG”, 2. the points for which a majority is indifferent to G  the boarder of GG’ and GG”, 3. the points that are defeated by G by a majority. G E A B C D Issue1 Issue2 G' G'' X X' X’ SQ G is a very expensive partner, but a coalition without it has very little chance of policy success.  Agenda setting and executive dominance (3)

26. 26 G E A B C D Issue1 Issue2 G' G'' X X' X’ SQ Institutional advantages Under closed rule: G can have its own preference voted by a majority in Parliament since the SQ is not inside the lenses GG’ or GG’’.  If the SQ is inside the shaded area of the lenses, the government leaves the SQ as is.  If the SQ is in the non-shaded area of the lenses, the government can propose something inside the shaded area that will prevail.  Agenda setting and executive dominance (4)

27. 27 G E A B C D Issue1 Issue2 G' G'' X X' X’ SQ Institutional advantages Under open rule: When the government proposes its own ideal point, anything inside the lenses GG’ and GG” can be proposed on the floor, and it will defeat G.  Agenda setting and executive dominance (5)

28. 28 G E A B C D Issue1 Issue2 G' G'' X X' X’ SQ Institutional advantages Under fire by fire rule: The amendment is proposed in X, the G is able to propose another one in X’.  Agenda setting and executive dominance (6)

29. 29  Agenda setting and executive dominance (7) Impact on agenda control and executive dominance on formateur parties – EMP policy space

30. 30  Agenda setting and executive dominance (8) Impact on agenda control and executive dominance on formateur parties – EMP policy space

31. 31  Agenda setting and executive dominance (9) Impact on agenda control and executive dominance on Government membership – EMP policy space

32. 32  Agenda setting and executive dominance (10) Impact on agenda control and executive dominance on Government membership – LR policy space

33. 33 Conclusions (1) Governments with lots of agenda setting powers will not care very much about positional advantages, governments with low agenda setting powers will focus on achieving positional advantages (central location of formateur, small number of parties in government, small ideological distance among parties).

34. 34 Politics will be more centrist in countries with low agenda setting powers, and there will be low levels of alternation. Whether the centrist formateur parties will find other parties close to them in order to form coalitions or not, depends on the polarization of the country, not on the number of parties (extreme pluralism – Sartori) or consociationalism (Lijphart). Conclusion (2)