1. The Political Economy of Population: Trade, Treaties, and the Fertility Transition John A. Doces Bucknell University International Political Economy Society Annual Conference 2009

2. Why has fertility fallen?

3. My answer Rise of international trade Ratification of the U.N.’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

4. Portugal

5. The demographic transition

6. The fertility transition Biological component – age of menstruation Social component – institutions – economic development – cultural values – modernization

7. Determinants of the fertility transition Infant/child mortality (demographic transition model) Relative cohort size, The Easterlin Hypothesis Income per person Female literacy Female access to education Birth control Abortion legalization Age of marriage

8. Where does fertility fit into IPE? Central to the study of classical political economy. – Malthus Associated with conflict/security Associated with economic growth and development Associated with democracy/political stability

9. Trade and CEDAW Ratification Gray et al. (IO 2006) – TSCS analysis – international trade and ratification are associated with women’s empowerment Richards and Gelleny (ISQ 2007) – TSCS analysis – international trade improves women’s status

10. A simple logic International Trade If trade empowers women then it should be inversely associated with fertility. Galor and Mountford (2008), in a cross-section analysis of the OECD, find international trade is inversely associated with fertility. CEDAW ratification If ratification empowers women then it should be inversely associated with fertility.

11. Theory I build a supply-demand framework of fertility based on Easterlin’s (1985, 2001) work. Components – demand for children – potential supply of children – regulation costs

12. Theory

13. Theory: International Trade **Decreases price of substitute goods** Also, – increases women’s employment opportunities – increases household’s real income – encourages urbanization Therefore, trade reduces demand for children

14. Theory: CEDAW Ratification Increases female literacy – Earlier onset of the mortality revolution – Thus, potential supply begins to increase at an earlier point in time

15. Theory

16. Hypotheses International trade is inversely associated with fertility CEDAW ratification is inversely associated with fertility Trade and ratification increase the probability of the fertility transition

17. Empirical Analysis Time-series cross-section of the OECD from 1960 to 2002 Dependent variables – total fertility rate – fertility transition: 1 if TFR≤2.1 and 0 otherwise Test variables – level of trade openness – year after CEDAW ratification Control variables – relative cohort size (-) – income per capita (-) and income per capita squared (+) – infant mortality (+) – population size (-) – abortion legalization (-) – lagged fertility (-)

18. Summary of Empirical Results International trade – inverse effect on fertility – direct effect on fertility transition – 50% increase in trade reduces fertility by about.12 children per woman CEDAW ratification – inverse effect on fertility – direct effect on fertility transition – ratification reduces fertility by about.07 children per woman

19. Summary of Empirical Results The Easterlin hypothesis – Relative cohort size has inverse effect Infant mortality – As predicted by the DT, directly associated with fertility Abortion legalization – Reduces fertility and thus youth bulges Consistent with research arguing legalization of abortion reduces crime

20. Implications Population growth

21. Implications Reconsideration of the liberal peace thesis – more trade means less population pressure/s and less conflict Women’s empowerment – open trade and CEDAW ratification (and similar policy) are good ideas for women’s empowerment Developing world? – UN’s population predictions for sub-Saharan Africa (2050): low-variant fertility: 1.5 billion medium-variant fertility: 1.75 billion high-variant fertility: 2.0 billion

22. Thank you Questions?

23. Appendix: Regression Results

24. Appendix: Fixed-Effects

25. Appendix: Fertility Transition

26. Appendix: Literature Citations Conflict – Caprioli 2000, 2003, 2005; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Eichenburg 2003; Melander 2005a, 2005b; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986. Economic growth – Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1999; Bloom and Williamson 1998; Carter and Sutch 2003; Easterlin and Crimmins 1985, 2001; Ray 1998; Simon 1998; Weil 2005. Democracy/political stability – Feng et al. 1999, 2000; Przeworski et al. 2000