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1 Conflict in the South China Sea SOSC 228. 2 A. Background on South China Sea Islands and Why Care? B. Competing Claims C. Points of Conflict D. ASEAN.

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Presentation on theme: "1 Conflict in the South China Sea SOSC 228. 2 A. Background on South China Sea Islands and Why Care? B. Competing Claims C. Points of Conflict D. ASEAN."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 Conflict in the South China Sea SOSC 228

2 2 A. Background on South China Sea Islands and Why Care? B. Competing Claims C. Points of Conflict D. ASEAN Views and Efforts E. China ’ s Statements and Activities F. Roots of Chinese actions? G. External forces H. How big a threat to regional peace? I. Potential Solutions

3 3 A. Background on South China Sea Islands and Why Care?   two island groups, Paracels and Spratlys,   Paracels firmly in Chinese hands since January 1974, when China seized islands from South Vietnamese government.   little land, huge area of water, nations cannot easily station troops   need for blue water navy, aircraft that refuel in the air.   Resources: natural gas, oil, fishing   Important shipping lanes with 15% of world ’ s trade passing through these sea lanes.   End of Cold War created a power vacuum in the region

4 4 B. Competing Claims   Six governments — Philippines, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei have claims, very overlapping.   China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim all the islands — Malaysia, Brunei, and Philippines claim some of them.   Dobson and Fravel--China ’ s claims ambiguous, refusing to draw clear “ exclusive economic zones ” (EEZ) to maximize flexibility in negotiations.   China ’ s claim based on history, artifacts, Zeng Ho voyages.   goes back to 1930s, but bolstered by March 1992 NPC territorial law affirming China ’ s claim to the Spratly Islands and authoring the PLAN to use force to protect its sovereignty.

5 5 C. Points of Conflict   Dispute began after UN Convention on the Law of the Sea guaranteed exploitation rights of undersea resources to state ’ s adjacent waters, so pushed state ’ s to make public claims to offshore islands.   Law of Sea set 200 mile offshore area as exclusive economic zones (EEZs).   Also gave states sovereign rights over continental shelf.   Before this, China and Vietnam had fought over the Paracel Islands in 1974.

6 6 D. ASEAN Views and Efforts   ASEAN hesitancy to air dispute in public and confront China, although several members feel threatened.   Indonesia sought to carry out “ confidence building measures ” after 1991 to keep dispute from exploding but these efforts have had limited success   1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea called on all states to settle disputes peacefully and support regional cooperation.   Philippines (and Vietnam) as most strenuous resistor of China ’ s efforts   1995, President Ramos went on public television to challenge China in Mischief Reef.   In 1998, Philippines took journalists to see China ’ s building of naval platforms at Mischief Reef, well inside Philippines 200 mile zone.

7 7 D. ASEAN Views and Efforts (con’t)   Philippines feels unable to defend itself due to weaker military,   Vietnam fought with China in 1988 and lost 6 islands. Major conflict with China over oil exploration.   Vietnamese problems seen in isolation by ASEAN, until China took Mischief Reef (Philippine ’ s claim) and until Vietnam joined ASEAN.   Now, as member of ASEAN, Vietnam tries to use ASEAN to defend its interests in the SCS, but receives only limited support. Feels it must “ bandwagon ” on this issue.   Critical role of Hangzhou meeting in April 1995, where ASEAN criticized China behind closed doors.   ASEAN maintains somewhat united front versus China and before the Asian Crisis was buying lots of weapons.

8 8 E. China’s Statements and Activities   Took Paracels by force in 1974 from South Vietnamese government.   Paracels as key base for military support in Spratlys.   China professes conciliatory policy but most aggressive in pursuing military solutions.   1990, Li Peng offered to resolve conflict peacefully   Defense Chief, in 1993, Chi Haotian promised that China would not use force.   July 1995, Qian Qichen told ASEAN that China would insure freedom of navigation.   May 1996, China ratified the Law of the Sea Convention

9 9 F. Roots of Chinese actions?   Garver sees PLAN pushing south, based on bureaucratic energies — bases in Zhanjiang — that cannot be constrained by the central government.   Could also increase PLAN demand for funding.   Dobson and Fravel call this a “ talk and take ” policy, and see it due to bureaucratic conflict between PLA Navy (PLAN) and the MOFA.   also see PLAN independence on Spratlys as pay-off to PLA for supporting CCP in Tiananmen crackdown.   Sovereignty issues, relating to “ century of humiliation, ” — creates support for claims for Taiwan as well, which also appeal to nationalism — key source of CCP legitimacy.   In meeting in Shanghai, retired military leaders took hard-line position, that they could not give up territories that might be claimed by the next generation of Chinese.   China keeps issue off multilateral agendas, preferring bilateral discussions.

10 10 G. G. External forces   Philippines pulls in U.S., while most ASEAN powers want to keep the external powers out of the dispute.   U.S. as hegemon, feels need to prevent conflict and insure right of passage for all vesels.   U.S. Defense Dept. in 1995 said the U.S. would insure free navigation by escorting ships through the South China Sea if conflicts broke out.   Japanese enhanced security agreement with U.S. could get them more involved in minesweeping and other support activity.   Vietnam tried to pull U.S. in by giving oil concessions to U.S. oil companies.

11 11 H. How big a threat to regional peace?   Dobson and Fravel do not see the South China Sea becoming “ a Chinese lake. ”   Much activity to date is establishing claims, outposts and then threatening other country ’ s citizens who come too close to claimed territories.   Conflict limited by China ’ s limited capabilities-- ” even if China were the hegemon some believe it to be, its military is incapable of filling a hegemon ’ s shoes. ” (p. 261).   China has no aircraft carrier, but it does have power to refuel in the air.

12 12 I. Potential Solutions   Track II negotiations underway under Indonesian lead since 1990, leading to establishment of working groups on resource assessment and development, marine scientific research, environmental protection, biodiversity research, and legal matters.   concept of joint exploration, setting aside territorial claims, put forward by Li Peng in 1990   but quite unclear what “ joint exploration ” means in practise.   Valencia ’ s solution of a Spratly Management Authority (SMA) to administer the region, with countries holding shares in the authority and getting profits from resources.   current debate in 1999 to establish a “ code of conduct ” for states in the region.


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