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1 Conflict in the South China Sea SOSC 228
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2 A. Background on South China Sea Islands and Why Care? B. Competing Claims C. Points of Conflict D. ASEAN Views and Efforts E. China ’ s Statements and Activities F. Roots of Chinese actions? G. External forces H. How big a threat to regional peace? I. Potential Solutions
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3 A. Background on South China Sea Islands and Why Care? two island groups, Paracels and Spratlys, Paracels firmly in Chinese hands since January 1974, when China seized islands from South Vietnamese government. little land, huge area of water, nations cannot easily station troops need for blue water navy, aircraft that refuel in the air. Resources: natural gas, oil, fishing Important shipping lanes with 15% of world ’ s trade passing through these sea lanes. End of Cold War created a power vacuum in the region
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4 B. Competing Claims Six governments — Philippines, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei have claims, very overlapping. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim all the islands — Malaysia, Brunei, and Philippines claim some of them. Dobson and Fravel--China ’ s claims ambiguous, refusing to draw clear “ exclusive economic zones ” (EEZ) to maximize flexibility in negotiations. China ’ s claim based on history, artifacts, Zeng Ho voyages. goes back to 1930s, but bolstered by March 1992 NPC territorial law affirming China ’ s claim to the Spratly Islands and authoring the PLAN to use force to protect its sovereignty.
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5 C. Points of Conflict Dispute began after UN Convention on the Law of the Sea guaranteed exploitation rights of undersea resources to state ’ s adjacent waters, so pushed state ’ s to make public claims to offshore islands. Law of Sea set 200 mile offshore area as exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Also gave states sovereign rights over continental shelf. Before this, China and Vietnam had fought over the Paracel Islands in 1974.
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6 D. ASEAN Views and Efforts ASEAN hesitancy to air dispute in public and confront China, although several members feel threatened. Indonesia sought to carry out “ confidence building measures ” after 1991 to keep dispute from exploding but these efforts have had limited success 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea called on all states to settle disputes peacefully and support regional cooperation. Philippines (and Vietnam) as most strenuous resistor of China ’ s efforts 1995, President Ramos went on public television to challenge China in Mischief Reef. In 1998, Philippines took journalists to see China ’ s building of naval platforms at Mischief Reef, well inside Philippines 200 mile zone.
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7 D. ASEAN Views and Efforts (con’t) Philippines feels unable to defend itself due to weaker military, Vietnam fought with China in 1988 and lost 6 islands. Major conflict with China over oil exploration. Vietnamese problems seen in isolation by ASEAN, until China took Mischief Reef (Philippine ’ s claim) and until Vietnam joined ASEAN. Now, as member of ASEAN, Vietnam tries to use ASEAN to defend its interests in the SCS, but receives only limited support. Feels it must “ bandwagon ” on this issue. Critical role of Hangzhou meeting in April 1995, where ASEAN criticized China behind closed doors. ASEAN maintains somewhat united front versus China and before the Asian Crisis was buying lots of weapons.
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8 E. China’s Statements and Activities Took Paracels by force in 1974 from South Vietnamese government. Paracels as key base for military support in Spratlys. China professes conciliatory policy but most aggressive in pursuing military solutions. 1990, Li Peng offered to resolve conflict peacefully Defense Chief, in 1993, Chi Haotian promised that China would not use force. July 1995, Qian Qichen told ASEAN that China would insure freedom of navigation. May 1996, China ratified the Law of the Sea Convention
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9 F. Roots of Chinese actions? Garver sees PLAN pushing south, based on bureaucratic energies — bases in Zhanjiang — that cannot be constrained by the central government. Could also increase PLAN demand for funding. Dobson and Fravel call this a “ talk and take ” policy, and see it due to bureaucratic conflict between PLA Navy (PLAN) and the MOFA. also see PLAN independence on Spratlys as pay-off to PLA for supporting CCP in Tiananmen crackdown. Sovereignty issues, relating to “ century of humiliation, ” — creates support for claims for Taiwan as well, which also appeal to nationalism — key source of CCP legitimacy. In meeting in Shanghai, retired military leaders took hard-line position, that they could not give up territories that might be claimed by the next generation of Chinese. China keeps issue off multilateral agendas, preferring bilateral discussions.
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10 G. G. External forces Philippines pulls in U.S., while most ASEAN powers want to keep the external powers out of the dispute. U.S. as hegemon, feels need to prevent conflict and insure right of passage for all vesels. U.S. Defense Dept. in 1995 said the U.S. would insure free navigation by escorting ships through the South China Sea if conflicts broke out. Japanese enhanced security agreement with U.S. could get them more involved in minesweeping and other support activity. Vietnam tried to pull U.S. in by giving oil concessions to U.S. oil companies.
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11 H. How big a threat to regional peace? Dobson and Fravel do not see the South China Sea becoming “ a Chinese lake. ” Much activity to date is establishing claims, outposts and then threatening other country ’ s citizens who come too close to claimed territories. Conflict limited by China ’ s limited capabilities-- ” even if China were the hegemon some believe it to be, its military is incapable of filling a hegemon ’ s shoes. ” (p. 261). China has no aircraft carrier, but it does have power to refuel in the air.
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12 I. Potential Solutions Track II negotiations underway under Indonesian lead since 1990, leading to establishment of working groups on resource assessment and development, marine scientific research, environmental protection, biodiversity research, and legal matters. concept of joint exploration, setting aside territorial claims, put forward by Li Peng in 1990 but quite unclear what “ joint exploration ” means in practise. Valencia ’ s solution of a Spratly Management Authority (SMA) to administer the region, with countries holding shares in the authority and getting profits from resources. current debate in 1999 to establish a “ code of conduct ” for states in the region.
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