1. Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures
Bronius Cikotas
John Kappenman

2. An Overview of Space Weather & EMP Risks
and the US Electric Power Infrastructure
Comparing Space Weather Threat to Other Power System Threats
Conventional Terrestrial Threats
Geomagnetic Storm Threats
High Winds & Ice Loading – Design Code
Storm Development
Electromagnetic Processes nearly Instantaneous
Lightning – Shield Wires & Lightning Arresters
Geographic Extent
Planetary Scale - Impact at each station – with Large Cumulative Impact
Seismic – Design Code
Terrestrial Weather – Air mass related that can take many days to evolve - Hurricanes
Industry Design Approach
Design Evolutions have unknowingly Escalated GIC Risks and Potential Impacts
Un-Recognized Systemic Risk – No Design Code Yet to minimize this Threat
Severe Threats are geographically confined
Continuously monitor and base operational decisions on Terrestrial weather conditions

3. Common Solution Approaches - Overview
Hardening the Power Grid for Naturally Occurring Geomagnetic Storms also Hardens against slow pulse or E3 portion of EMP
Hardening the Power Grid for Fast Pulse or E1 portion of EMP Threat also diminishes Threat from RF Weapon Attacks (IEMI)
Proximity Control – important for Physical Attacks also diminishes Threat from IEMI
Layered Mitigation Approach for both Geomagnetic Storms and EMP
Improved Situational Awareness for Power Grid Operators is needed and is readily available
(Emphasis on disturbance environments/GIC levels instead of ambiguous K Indices)
Hardening - Major Emphasis should be focused on Preventing Storm-Related Catastrophic Failure - Remedial Design measures for the Grid (transformer neutral devices) are readily feasible and cost effective

4. Common Solution Approaches - Overview
Given Sufficient Time the Reoccurrence of Large Storm Event is a Certainty – with Significant Consequences for Society
Power Grid has not been designed for Terror or War Fighting Mission, but it does provide an attractive and asymmetric target.
Proliferation of Nuclear Materials & Designs is a reality
Non-Nuclear Device Options are readily available & growing in unchecked capability
Methods for Hardening Infrastructures are known and readily available – not a Technology Push
International Standards & Guidelines exist for Hardening against EMP and IEMI Threats

5. Common Solution Approaches – GIC Blocking
Blocking Devices will Protect Transformers and Grid from Damage
Devices were originally developed in early 1990’s
At Present Only Limited Numbers of Devices are installed
Wide-Spread Installation Needed to Reduce GIC Flows
Appropriate & Robust Design will work to Block GIC from Storms and EMP
Can be easily applied Remedially to Today’s Power Grids
GIC Blocking Capacitor
Hi-Speed ByPass
Electron Tube is Critical High Speed / High Current Technology

6. Improved Situational Awareness View of Storm Environment - May 4, 1998
Provides Details on Impacted Region to End-Users
Synoptic Condition Map provides Ability for End-Users to Quickly make Situational Assessments

7. Improved Situational Awareness
Storm and GIC Flows in New England
Transformer GIC
Red & Green Indicate Polarity of GIC – Red Into Transformer, Green Out of Transformer
Geo-Electric Field
Orientation and Size of Vector Indicate Relative Direction and Intensity of Field
Power Grid State Estimation at 4:16 UT May 4, 1998

8. Improved Situational Awareness Other Critical Infrastructures
Improved Situational Awareness – End Users of Electric Power with Critical Functions
Examples are various IT, Telecommunications, SCADA centers
Critical Systems which have UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) and Back-Up Generation Capability
“Island or Disconnect from the Grid” for extra protection
UPS’s general vulnerabilities to Harmonic Distortion due to Geomagnetic Storms (from Defense Dept work)

9. Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI Hardening
Shielding Structures
Filtering
Zoning or Nesting of Multiple Barriers

10. Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI Hardening
Concept of Layered Mitigation

11. Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI Hardening
Cable Management
Power cables
Data communications (e.g. IT networks)
Auxiliary circuits (e.g. door openers, fire alarm)
Sensitive circuits
Widespread migration to Fiber Optic-based Data and Signal Cabling is an important improvement in Robust Hardening for E1 & IEMI Threats

12. Example of Bulkhead Device for EMP Protection for Power Supply to Secure Facility
4138 Bi-tron™Series Configuration
13.8kV Power Out
13.8kV Power In
Flange Provides secure grounding of power feed penetrations at Facility Wall Perimeter

13. Time Scale of EMP Protection
New Advanced Fusion Systems technology significantly improves Protection margin compared to MOV
MOV – much slower