1. security in the post-Internet era: the needs of the many the needs of the few Terry Gray University of Washington Fall Internet2 Meeting 16 October 2003

2. 2003: security ”annus horribilis” Slammer Blaster Sobig.F increasing spyware threat attackers discover encryption hints of more “advanced” attacks and let’s not even talk about spam…

3. 2003: security-related trends RIAA subpoenas growing wireless use VoIP over 802.11 pilots more mobile devices more critical application roll-outs faster networks “personal lambda” networks SEC filings on security? class action lawsuits?

4. impact end of an era… say farewell to  the open Internet  autonomous unmanaged PCs  full digital convergence? say hello to  one-size-fits-all (OSFA) solutions  conflict... everyone wants security and max availability, speed, autonomy, flexibility min hassle, cost the needs of the many trump the needs of the few (but at what cost?)

5. consequences more closed nets (bug or feature?) more VPNs (bug or feature?) more tunneling -“firewall friendly” apps more encryption (thanks to RIAA) more collateral harm -attack + remedy worse MTTR (complexity, broken tools) constrained innovation cost shifted from “guilty” to “innocent” pressure to fix problem at border pressure for private nets

6. revelations system administrators (2 kinds…)  want total local autonomy… or  want someone else to solve the problem  often unaware of cost impact on others users (2 kinds: happy & unhappy)  want “unlisted numbers”  need “openness” defined by apps feedback loop:  closed nets encourage constrained apps  constrained apps encourage closed nets

7. perimeter defense tradeoffs border  biggest vulnerability zone  biggest policy vs. performance concern subnet  doesn’t match org boundaries  worst case for NetOps debugging  consider also: sub-subnet LFWs, etc. host  optimal security perimeter  hardest to implement

8. never say die goal: simple core, local policy choice how to avoid OSFA closed net future?  design net for choice of open or closed  pervasive IPsec combine with “point response” won’t reverse trend to closed nets, but may avoid bad cost shifts alternative: only closed nets, policy wars

9. questions? comments?