1. 1 Enhanced Cooperation with Partnership in Integrated Safeguards Seminar 20 Years of ABACC Nov. 11, 2011 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Wan Ki Yoon Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation And Control

2. Page 2 Outlines New Korean SSAC Enhanced Cooperation Korean Approach Conclusion

3.  Completed Safety Inspection on All Nuclear Power Plants in Korea after Fukushima Accidents  50 Complementary Measures Establishing Independent Nuclear Regulatory Body - Nuclear Safety & Security Commission (2011. 10. 26) Investing $1 Billion for 5 years to Enhance Safety Increasing Radioactive Surveillance Stations (71 -> 120) New Nuclear Regulatory Body

4. President Prime Minister MEST KINS KINAC NSC KAERI President Prime Minister MEST KINS KINAC NSSC KAERI Before After Nuclear Safety & Security Commission New Korean SSAC

5. Role and Responsibility  Ensuring Nuclear Safety  Ensuring Nuclear Security including Safeguards  Preparing and Responding against Radiological Disaster Organization  Commissioner, Vice-Commissioner  5 - 7 additional committee members Commissioner Vice-Commissioner Safety Policy Bureau Radiological Safety Bureau Role and Organization

6. Page 6 Evolution of IAEA Safeguards INFCIRC 66 INFCIRC 153 Additional Protocol Broader Conclusion Integrated Safeguards

7. Page 7 Type of SSACs SSACs with SQP SSACs with baseline functions SSACs with beyond baseline functions & no national inspection SSACs with beyond baseline functions & national inspection RSACs of bilateral inspection RSACs of multilateral inspection SSACs of weapon states

8. Page 8 National Safeguards Harmonization with International Safeguards Differentiation from International Safeguards If National Safeguards is just for International Safeguards, SSACs with minimum functions are enough. If National inspection is similar to IAEA inspection, is national inspection necessary? Necessity and justification of national inspection, especially under IS should be reviewed. Cooperation with IAEA can provide additional justification ? Integrated Approach of 3 S Limitation of International Safeguards Combined Approach of National Safeguards and Security (and Safety)

9. Page 9 IAEA Enhanced Cooperation Cooperation with the SSAC has been identified an essential element of effective and efficient safeguards Increased cooperation can significantly increase the efficiency of safeguards implementation In principle, depending on a range of variables, different degree of cooperation can be implemented according to characteristics and capabilities of the SSAC state’s fuel cycle feasibility of conducting joint inspections

10. Page 10 Cooperation Level Three levels of possible cooperation Enabling level Activities carried out by the SSAC/operator that have the objective of enabling the IAEA to meet its mandate in an efficient and effective manner Facility-level arrangement, timely reporting of accountancy data, advance reporting, timely assistance in the resolution of inconsistencies, etc The enabling actions by the SSAC and facility operators are integral feature in the implementing of Safeguards activities Joint activities level The joint activities level envisages a sharing of activities in such a way that both sides would be able to gain efficiencies. Shared procurement, joint use, joint review and evaluation of safeguards equipment including C/S, joint R/D, joint training programmes and joint conduct of inspections. Cooperation between the IAEA and the SSAC that possess extensive capabilities, resources and experience. Both sides are able to gain efficiencies through joint activities

11. Page 11 Cooperation Level Three levels of possible cooperation SSAC inspection level Under appropriate circumstances, the results of SSAC inspection activities can be used in drawing its safeguards conclusion These would require necessary arrangements such as new procedures, training of state inspectors and technical preparation, e.g. authentication of the NDA and C/S data, and also a proper application of the IAEA QA procedures As stated in the Article 3 of the INFCIRC/236 “The IAEA, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the national system

12. Page 12Example New Partnership Agreement with EURATOM Quadripartite Agreement with ABACC Enhanced Cooperation with Japan Enhanced Cooperation with ROK SSACs Maximum is Joint activities level RSACs Maximum is SSAC inspection level

13. Page 13EURATOM Euratom was established in 1958 before IAEA Started with 9 Countries, currently 27 New Partnership Approach (NPA) between IAEA and EURATOM in 1992 Optimization and sharing Inspection and its planning, procedures, review and evaluation Equipment and its method, techniques, evaluation Chemical sampling and analysis Research development Training of inspectors Cost share

14. Page 14EURATOM Equal partnership guarantee the IAEA and EURATOM access to all necessary information and enable it to draw independent conclusion and obtain the necessary degree of assurance and meet own safeguards goals Performance of inspection activities on the basis of the principle “one job one person”, supplemented by quality control measures to enable both organizations to satisfy their respective obligations

15. Page 15 Contributing Factors for Partnered Cooperation IAEA : Emphasize utilization of enhanced cooperation, especially under integrated safeguards Integrated safeguards : overall objective of more effective and efficient safeguards SAGSI: Further considerations of greater cooperation between IAEA and SSAC/RSAC INFCIRC/153 Article 7 (National System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material) The IAEA, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the state’s system. INFCIRC/153 Article 31 The IAEA, shall make full use of the state’s system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement, and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of the state’s accounting and control activities. Experience of Job-sharing partnership with RSAC

16. Page 16 SAGSI Explore ways to improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of safeguards thru cooperation Consistently working on enhanced cooperation Greater Cooperation between the IAEA and SSACs SAR-42 of 2004, SAR-50 of 2008 To identify possible opportunities for cooperation with SSACs that have technical competencies and capabilities beyond the baseline and which could provide the basis for optimizing safeguards efficiency and effectiveness

17. Page 17 SAGSI Advice Advice 6.F.1 The Secretariat should continue to work with Member States to develop more efficient methods for safeguards implementation based on cooperation with SSACs, such as: ensuring that SSAC data are timely and accurate; the use of unattended and remote monitoring; mailbox approaches for data reporting; the conduct of joint inspections; and enabling unannounced/short-notice inspections. → SSAC Project to improve State’s capability → Development / implementation of advanced concept Advice 6.F.2 The Secretariat should develop guidelines for increased cooperation between the Agency and the SSAC. Such guidelines should, inter alia, articulate clearly the conditions required for greater collaboration with SSACs, focusing in particular on independent verification and use of SSAC findings, including information, data, and where applicable, SSAC inspection results. SAGSI notes these activities would require a high level of commitment and competence on the part of SSACs. → Utilization of increased cooperation, especially under integrated safeguards

18. Page 18 Partnered Cooperation Potential area for cooperation Efficient use of inspectorate personnel by delegation and/or sharing Reporting to the IAEA of SSAC findings and Independent verification of IAEA Audit on SSACs and quality assurance Cost Sharing Data Sharing Joint Use of Equipment Joint Sampling and Analysis Joint Training Relevant support program development Others

19. Page 19 Requirements for Partnered Cooperation Sample List Integrated Safeguards in place Sound SSAC with national inspection system of verification capability supplemented by IAEA quality assurance Transmission of national findings to IAEA and its verification Enhanced cooperation record with IAEA ISSAS evaluation and completion of ISSAS recommendations Equipment and cost sharing Insensitive facilities Active member state support program Proactive support

20. Page 20 Korean Approach Revising MOU for Enhanced Cooperation Ups and Downs Fundamentally agreed : To avoid duplication of efforts, both Parties agree to cooperate in the identification of specific safeguards- relevant activities which can be implemented by the SSAC without compromising the Agency’s ability to draw independent conclusions. This may include the SSAC conduct of inspection activities as prescribed by the Agency. The Agency selection of SSAC activities will be based on the Agency’s safeguards objectives and SSAC capabilities

21. Evolution of Safeguards Inspection Note : IC : Independent Conclusion, R : Report, S : Support  IAEA inspection only  Parallel IAEA and national inspections  Technology Based Approach  RM, UMS, Mailbox  Delegation/Sharing IAEASSAC Facilities IC R, S IC IAEASSAC Facilities R, S Bilateral Support IC IAEASSAC S IC IAEASSAC Facilities IC Partnered InspectionCooperative InspectionNational Inspection No National Inspection Level 4Level 3Level 2Level 1 S IC Facilities Unilateral Support

22. Page 22 Conclusion It is a future direction of safeguards cooperation for qualified single states Win-win approach for the IAEA and the state It can help the state help the IAEA more