1. 1 Risk Management Approaches to the Japanese Regulations of Hydrogen Supply Stations September 12, 2007 Japan Petroleum Energy Center (JPEC) Hydrogen Technology Group Shigeki Kikukawa INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HYDROGEN SAFETY Second Plenary Risk Management Approaches to Hydrogen Safety, Regulations, Codes, and Standards (RCS)

2. 2 First Glance In this section: 1. Introduction 2. Risk Assessment Approaches to Hydrogen Supply Stations 3. Overview of the new combined gasoline/hydrogen supply station 4. Future issues 5. Summaries

3. 3 1. Introduction Japanese government positively promotes widespread use of fuel cells. They address a wide variety of technologies from the basic study about FC to the demonstrations of automotive FC and stationary FC system. Stationary FC System Safety evaluation facilities for FCV 206 million Euro

4. 4 The society using hydrogen energy Demonstration Codes & Standards Harmonize International C&S R&D of Hydrogen and FC

5. 5 Establishment of Codes & Standards for the society using hydrogen energy Code & standard review projects in Japan  FCV Japan Automobile Research Institute  Stationary FC System Japan Gas Association  Hydrogen supply stations Japan Petroleum Energy Center Aim: to collect data necessary to review the codes and standards, and to establish test methods. Budget: 2.6 billion Yen (16 million euro) for 2007 from New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO).

6. 6 2. Risk Assessment Approaches to Hydrogen Supply Stations

7. 7 Hydrogen supply stations Reformer Trailer CompressorAccumulator Dispenser On-site type Off-site type FCV Overview IWATANI, JHFC HP Liquid hydrogen type FCV (LH2) Tanker truckLH2 tank, Evaporator LH2 dispenser

8. 8 Key Issue: Setback Distance H2 17m 11.3m 8m 17m: Hospital, school, etc. 11.3m: Dwellings 8m: Fire sources Setback distance for general high pressured equipment H2 We had to review the High Pressure Gas Safety Law. Hydrogen stations must be FREE from DANGER! To establish safety hydrogen stations in an urban area 6m

9. 9 Review of the High Pressure Gas Safety Law Traditional ways  Accumulation of safety related results  Negotiations with relevant authorities  Review of laws by empirical rules In this case  Needs about review of laws are increased to spread hydrogen supply stations.  Data about safety of hydrogen supply stations is insufficient.  The risk is not zero (0). Risk Assessment approach  Becoming popular and there is a lot of proof based on the past experiences  ISO/IEC Guide 51  There have been no examples to review the law using the risk assessment. So it is epoch-making.

10. 10 Risk Assessment Approach Definition of H2 station model Hazard Identification Risk Estimation Risk Evaluation Risk Reduction Tolerable Risk? N Y Output of the study : Safety requirements for H2 stations Experiments, Simulations, Surveys, etc. by Project Partners END START

11. 11 Definition of the Hydrogen Station model To undertake risk assessments, we designed a detailed model of the hydrogen station. We decided on a design that could actually be built and that would be widely used in the future after several years. On-site type Hydrogen station  H2 Demand: 300Nm 3 /hr (30Nm 3 /vehicle * 10vehicles/hr)  H2 Generation : 300Nm 3 /hr  Compressor : 300Nm 3 /hr, 40MPa  H2 Cylinders : 250L * 14 = 3500L (40MPa, 1400Nm 3 )  Dispenser : 35MPa (supply pressure)

12. 12 Hazard Identification Applied Methods : HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Studies) FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) 233 accident scenarios were identified for the on- site type H2 station model Failure and deterioration Human Error Natural Disasters

13. 13 Risk Matrix (Risk Acceptance Criteria) H (High):Risk is not acceptable. Remedial actions should be considered to reduce risk to an acceptable level. M (Medium):In principle, risk is not acceptable. It can be accepted only when risk reduction cannot be achieved by reasonably practical action L (Low):Acceptable. Further risk reduction is not necessarily required. Likelihood Consequence severity A Improbable B Remote C Occasional D Probable 1 Extremely Severe Damage HHHH 2 Severe Damage MHHH 3 Damage MMHH 4 Small Damage LLMH 5 Minor Damage LLLM

14. 14 Likelihood Levels LevelDescriptionDefinition A ImprobablePossible, but the probability is extremely low. About once in several thousand years or less. B RemoteUnlikely to occur in the lifetime of one H2 station. About once in several hundred years. C OccasionalLikely to occur once in the lifetime of one H2 station. About once in several decades. D ProbableLikely to occur several times in the lifetime of one H2 station. About once in several years or more. Likelihood Estimation Qualitative Evaluation  Based on engineering judgment  Not enough data available for quantitative evaluation

15. 15 Consequence Levels LevelDescriptionMaterial DamageHuman Damage 1Extremely Severe Damage Collapse of nearby houses One or more fatalities of pedestrians or residents 2Severe DamageMajor damage to nearby houses One or more fatalities of customers or station workers 3DamageMinor damage to nearby houses Injury requiring hospitalization 4Small DamageWindows brokenInjury requiring medical treatment 5Minor DamageNo damage to nearby houses Minor injury

16. 16 Experiments, Simulations and Surveys Basic data for likelihood and consequence estimation were provided by project partners.  Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd.  Japan Steel Works  Tatsuno Corporation  Japan Industrial Gas Association

17. 17 Blow-out flame of Hydrogen with protection wall Large Scale Hydrogen Release Experiments （ 40MPa ， φ10mm ） Hydrogen release experiment (in snow) Hydrogen explosion experiment 障壁あり 障壁なし Blow-out flame of Hydrogen Release point

18. 18 Note: The temperature region higher than 1,100 ℃ is made visible with an NaCl solution mist. 0.32mmφ 0.53mmφ 1.17mmφ 2mmφ Blow-out Flame of Hydrogen per hole diameter (40MPa) Hole diameter

19. 19 Dispenser Durability Tests for Filling hose & Joint Hand valve Breakaway device Etc.

20. 20 Compressor Durability Tests Hydrogen leakage Noise Control Vibration Etc.

21. 21 Metal Material (Stainless Steel and Chromium Molybdenum Steel) Tests for Hydrogen Embrittlement in a pressurized hydrogen environment are necessary. Tensile test Deep notch test Fracture toughness test Fatigue test Etc. 45MPa hydrogen test unit

22. 22 Reflection of risk assessment results on regulations and standards Risk Assessment Approach to Hydrogen supply stations 90 safety measures Regulation Exemplification Standard Voluntary Standard Points ・ Social acceptability about safety ・ Cost effectiveness about safety ・ Public profits ・ Consistency with conventional regulations Example Gasoline stations CNG stations Other pressure vessels Government The High Pressure Gas Safety Institute of Japan (KHK) JPEC

23. 23 3. Overview of the new combined gasoline/hydrogen supply station P A C D Continual improvement We proposed new regulations for hydrogen supply stations through the risk assessment. Then we installed a hydrogen supply station in conformity with the new regulations. This station is intended to verify the safety of overall hydrogen supply station. - Safety verification test - Investigation of extension of inspection frequency

24. 24 Overview of the Facility SiteIchihara city Chiba prefecture Space726m2 FeedstockKerosene Process Steam reforming with desulfurization of kerosene + PSA purification Production capacity50Nm3/h Hydrogen purity More than 99.99% in volume ( CO less than 1ppm) Refueling capacity Pressure : 25MPa(3,600psi) and 35MPa(5,000psi) Capable of refue ｌ ling 5 passenger vehicles continuously

25. 25 Sequential flow of processes

26. 26 Major Safety measures (High Pressure Gas Safety Law) Road H2 Dispenser Office C T Compressor Accumulator Gasoline Dispenser Reformer Ｒ PSA Ａ Ａ Ａ Ａ Ｐ Tank Setback Distance 6 m Wall h=2m Setback Distance can be shortened with appropriate fire protection wall

27. 27 Road H2 Dispenser Office C T Compressor Accumulator Gasoline Dispenser Reformer Ｒ PSA Ａ Ａ Ａ Ａ Ｐ Tank H2 leak detector Flame detector Earthquake detector

28. 28 Road H2 Dispenser Office C T Compressor Accumulator Gasoline Dispenser Reformer Ｒ PSA Ａ Ａ Ａ Ａ Ｐ Tank Emergency isolation valve Excess flow valve

29. 29 Compressor should be placed in an enclosure. Ventilation with Interlock System Compressor H2 Leak Detector

30. 30 Frame Structure H2 Leak Detector Emergency Isolation Valve, Check Valve Water Sprinkler Flame Detector Accumulator Pressure Indicator, Safety Valve Metal materials are limited to SUS316L or SCM435.

31. 31 Excess flow valve Closed (Emergency)Open (Normal)

32. 32 Breakaway Device Guardrail Piping in Trench Flame Detector Emergency Stop Button Pressure release after refueling Dispenser

33. 33 4. Future Issues To widespread use of hydrogen supply stations  We need to research and develop metal materials having less hydrogen embrittlement.  We also need to reduce the costs of each unit, compressor, and accumulator used for hydrogen supply stations.  Additionally, we must promote development of new units in parallel to review of regulations and standards. To extend the cruising range of FCV  We need to verify the safety of the hydrogen supply stations applicable to 70MPa-charging. To achieve highly efficient hydrogen transportation and storage  We need to utilize liquid hydrogen.  We must research and develop utilization of metallic alloy for hydrogen storage or organic hydride.

34. 34 5. Summaries We used the risk assessment approach to review the High Pressure Gas Safety Law so as to make proposal drafts. Japanese government reviewed the regulations and standards based on our proposals. New regulations and standards have been in effect since March, 2005. We installed a hydrogen supply station combined with the gasoline station that is in conformity with new regulations and standards. From this time onward, we will conduct the verification test of the safety. Presently, we are investigating safety measures for hydrogen gas supply station applicable to 70MPa- charging.

35. 35 Thank you for your attention. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This study is a partial summary of results obtained by JPEC as part of a study into safety technology for a hydrogen supply infrastructure. The study was commissioned by the independent administrative organization New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) and conducted from 2003 to 2006.