1. Fair burden sharing: The possible role of the Greenhouse Development Rights Framework Dr. Paul Baer Assistant Professor School of Public Policy Georgia Institute of Technology Co-founder, EcoEquity Australia National University, Canberra 1 July, 2011

2. The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework Authors Paul Baer (EcoEquity) Tom Athansiou (EcoEquity) Sivan Kartha (Stockholm Environment Institute) Eric Kemp-Benedict (SEI) Key Supporters have included Christian Aid (UK) Oxfam (International) European APRODEV Network The Heinrich Böll Foundation (Germany) MISTRA Foundation CLIPORE Programme (Sweden) Stockholm Environment Institute (International) Rockefeller Brothers Fund (USA) Town Creek Foundation (USA) www.GreenhouseDevelopmentRights.org

3. GDRs: roots Authors were originally supporters of equal per capita allocations/contraction and convergence – Basis of founding of EcoEquity in 2000, book “Dead Heat” Following the CAN “Bali Equity Summit” in 2002, we tried to develop “per capita plus” – per capita modified to take account of national circumstances This turned out to be impractical, so we returned to the “right to development” First presented in 2004, reached maturity with publication of first edition in 2007

4. The climate challenge: in three steps

5. Per capita emissions allocated according to “contraction and convergence” (2030 convergence year) under an emissions pathway (based on Den Elzen et al. 2007) designed to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450 ppm CO2-equivalent.

6. Greenhouse Development Rights overview A global climate policy framework for “burden sharing” Assigns obligations to countries based on aggregating the wealth and GHG emissions of their citizens – “Capacity” (ability to pay) – and “responsibility” (contribution to the problem) – Combined “Responsibility and Capacity Indicator” (RCI) Excludes from consideration the wealth and emissions of poor individuals, below a “development threshold” Rich individuals are treated equally (have obligations) wherever they live In principle, an individually-based “right to development”

7. The ethical basis of GDRs Based on cosmopolitan egalitarianism – Individuals not countries are bearers of rights and obligations (in theory) – Countries are treated as aggregates of individuals – Individuals treated the same regardless of where they are born An idealist/constructivist account of politics and international relations – Ideas matter – Individual action matters – Countries act out of normative beliefs as well as self interest (and self-interest is subject to “construction”)

8. Defining and measuring capacity Capacity is a moral term: “resources that can be contributed without undue sacrifice” This raises the classic question of the “efficiency” with which resources are converted to welfare Historically captured by ideas of “basic needs”, luxuries, etc. Makes sense at an individual level Our definition: per capita income over $7500 “development threshold”

9. Defining and measuring responsibility Responsibility is an ambiguous term – Moral responsibility is not the same as causal responsibility – Collective (e.g., national) responsibility is problematic in many ways Nonetheless, “polluter pays” and other versions of responsibility have strong support Our definition: cumulative CO2 emissions from fossil fuels (and cement) since 1990

10. 10 Income and Capacity income distributions (relative to a “development threshold”)

11. Emissions and Responsibility fossil CO 2 (since 1990) (showing portion defined as “responsibility”) 11

12. Population (% of global) Income ($US / capita) Capacity (% of global) Responsibility (% of global) RCI (% of global) United States 4.6%44,70635.6%30.9%33.3% EU 27 7.3%24,17528.1%20.8%24.4% - EU 15 5.8%28,57326.7%18.3%22.5% Australia 0.3%33,8801.4%2.0%1.7% Japan 1.8%48,06514.3%5.9%10.1% Russia 2.0%3,5660.9%6.0%3.4% China 19.6%2,6832.9%4.0%3.4% India 17.6%8600.1% South Africa 0.7%4,5410.3%1.0%0.7% Brazil 2.8%5,1191.5%5.4%3.4% LDCs 11.4%4530.0%0.4%0.2% Annex I 19%27,61784.6%71.2%77.9% Non-Annex I 81.4%2,35315.4%28.8%22.1% World 17,061100% National obligations based on national “capacity” and “responsibility”

13. National obligations (based on “responsibility” and “capacity”) over time 201020202030 Population (% of global) Income ($US / capita) Capacity (% of global) Responsibility (% of global) RCI (% of global) RCI (% of global) RCI (% of global) EU 27 7.3%24,17528.1%20.8%24.4%22.1%18.7% - EU 15 5.8%28,57326.7%18.3%22.5%20.0%16.6% - EU +12 1.5%7,0741.3%2.5%1.9%2.1% United States 4.6%44,70635.6%30.9%33.3%30.0%25.6% Japan 1.8%48,06514.3%5.9%10.1%8.5%6.5% Russia 2.0%3,5660.9%6.0%3.4%3.6%3.9% China 19.6%2,6832.9%4.0%3.4%7.9%13.5% India 17.6%8600.1% 0.4%1.2% South Africa 0.7%4,5410.3%1.0%0.7% 0.9% Brazil 2.8%5,1191.5%5.4%3.4%3.5%3.8% LDCs 11.4%4530.0%0.4%0.2% 0.4% Annex I 19%27,61784.6%71.2%77.9%70.5%60.7% Non-Annex I 81.4%2,35315.4%28.8%22.1%29.5%39.3% World 17,061100% 100.0%

14. Allocating global mitigation obligations among countries according to responsibility & capacity 14

15. Implications for United States US mitigation obligation amounts to a reduction target exceeding 100% after ~2025 (“negative emission allocation”). 15

16. Implications for United States Here, physical domestic reductions (~25% below 1990 by 2020) are only part of the total US obligation. The rest would be met internationally. 16

17. 17 Implications for China 中国的测算结果

18. 18 A fraction of China's reduction, (and most of the reductions in the South) are driven by industrialized country reduction commitments. Implications for China 中国的测算结果

19. 19 Implications for India The majority of the reductions in the South are driven by industrialized country reduction commitments.

20. National Obligations in 2020 (for climate costs = 1% of GWP) Per capita Income ($/capita) National Capacity (Billion $) National Obligation (Billion $) National Obligation (% GDP) Ave. climate cost per person above dev threshold EU 27$38,385 $15,563$ 2161.12% $436 - EU 15 $41,424 $13,723$ 1881.12% $468 - EU +12 $25,981 $ 1,840$ 281.09% $300 United States $53,671 $15,661$ 2751.51% $841 Japan $40,771 $ 4,139$ 621.23% $504 Russia $22,052 $ 1,927$ 411.40% $326 China $9,468 $ 5,932$ 980.73% $169 India $4,374 $ 972$ 110.19% $58 South Africa $14,010 $ 422$ 101.42% $395 Mexico $14,642 $ 1,009$ 150.84% $207 LDCs $1,567 $ 82$ 10.06% $58 Annex I $38,425 $40,722$ 6521.29% $529 Non-Annex I $6,998 $18,667$ 2920.66% $180 High Income $44,365 $40,993$ 6551.33% $602 Middle Income $8,797 $18,190$ 2860.69% $149 Low Income $2,022 $ 206$ 30.08% $51 World $12,415 $59,388$ 9441.00% $330

21. Climate obligations, imagined as a (mildly progressive) tax Total global costs (mitigation and adaptation) 0.5% of GWP1.0% of GWP2.0% of GWP Countryincome marginal tax rate average tax rate annual tax marginal tax rate average tax rate annual tax marginal tax rate average tax rate annual tax US$7,5000.00% $00.00% $00.00% $0 US$15,0000.88%0.44%$651.75%0.87%$1313.50%1.74%$261 US$30,0000.88%0.66%$1971.75%1.31%$3933.50%2.62%$786 US$60,0000.88%0.77%$4591.75%1.53%$9183.50%3.06%$1,836 US$120,0000.88%0.82%$9781.75%1.63%$1,9563.50%3.26%$3,912 Ireland$7,5000.00% $00.00% $00.00% $0 Ireland$15,0000.66%0.33%$501.33%0.66%$1002.65%1.33%$199 Ireland$30,0000.66%0.50%$1491.33%1.00%$2992.65%1.99%$597 Ireland$60,0000.66%0.58%$3481.33%1.16%$6972.65%2.32%$1,393 Ireland$120,0000.66%0.62%$7471.33%1.24%$1,4932.65%2.49%$2,986 Sweden$7,5000.00% $00.00% $00.00% $0 Sweden$15,0000.58%0.29%$431.15%0.58%$872.30%1.15%$173 Sweden$30,0000.58%0.44%$1311.15%0.87%$2612.30%1.74%$522 Sweden$60,0000.58%0.51%$3031.15%1.01%$6062.30%2.02%$1,212 Sweden$120,0000.58%0.54%$6481.15%1.08%$1,2962.30%2.16%$2,592 Note that EC effort-sharing proposal imagines global mitigation costs of €175 billion, or about ¼% of the EC’s projected 2020 Gross World Product

22. GDRs: Strengths It is by some standards relatively simple It is specific and complete: it can actually be used to produce numbers. In theory it actually does protect the right to development - the necessary costs for each country are borne only by the “already developed” Compared to resource sharing proposals, it actually addresses adaptation costs By assigning obligations to rich people in poor countries, it answers a primary criticism of Annex- based proposals It has been developed organically by a team that is closely integrated with both civil society networks (CAN) and academic and policy networks

23. GDRs: Weaknesses It is by some standards relatively complex Even the numbers it produces are subject to a wide range of “uncertainties” (e.g., baselines) It doesn’t directly account for variation in national abatement cost curves It produces unbelievably large obligations for developed countries The individual approach to “the right to development” is problematic – much of what is required for “development” are collective (public goods) – GDRs offers no guarantee that national policies will reflect underlying principles

24. GDRs: political usefulness? It could, in theory, form the basis of a global treaty – Hah! In a “pledge and review” world, it can be used to measure national pledges against an equity benchmark – Requires some belief that its numbers are defensibly fair It could provide the basis for domestic campaigns to increase national ambition

25. GDRs: Questions Does our overall method produce a result that is defensibly fair? Is there a better way to define capacity? Is there a better way to define responsibility? Is there a better way to combine them? Do our models of application (tons, dollars) make sense? Does one make more sense than another? How can our proposal be politically useful? What problems are generic to any equity framework, and what are specific to GDRs?