1. Detecting SYN-Flooding Attacks Ａａｒｏｎ Ｂｅａｃｈ ＣＳ ３９５ Ｎｅｔｗｏｒｋ Ｓｅｃｕ ｒｉｔｙ Ｓｐｒｉｎｇ ２００４

2. Overview SYN attack/floods Correlation between ”SYN” “FIN” ratio and “RST” How to detect deviations from these trends Solutions to detect and stop SYN attacks

3. Goals of authors To stop SYN attacks at leaf routers that connect users to internet Requires less overhead computation Stateless (simple) Make detection technique that is immune to flooding attacks

4. Syn Flood / Attack 90% of DoS attacks use TCP SYN floods Streaming spoofed TCP SYNs Takes advantage of three way handshake Server start “half-open” connections These build up… until queue is full and all additional requests are blocked

5. Problems with previous solutions Solutions such as: SYN cookies, SYNDefender, SYN proxying,SYNkil Knew nothing of source Relied on “costly IP traceback” These solutions are “statefull” so they can be overwhelmed by SYN attacks –14,000SYN/sec can overload

6. Flood Detection System (FDS) Stateless, simple, edge (leaf) routers Utilize SYN-FIN pair behavior Include (SYNACK - FIN) so client or server However, RST violates SYN-FIN behavior Placement: First/last mile leaf routers –First mile – detect large DoS attacker –Last mile – detect DDoS attacks that first mile would miss

7. SYN – FIN Behavior

8. Generally every SYN has a FIN

9. What to do about “RST” We can’t tell if RST is active or passive Consider 75% active Active represents a SYN passive does not Should balance out to be background noise RED – SYN BLUE- FIN BLACK – RST Make sense?

10. Statistical Attack Detection There are very many SYN’s necessary to accomplish a DoS attack At least 500 SYN/sec 1400 SYN/sec can overwhelm firewall 300,000 SYNs necessary to shut down server for 10 minutes So SYN-FIN ratio should be very skewed during an attack

11. False Positive Possibilities Many new online users with long sessions –More SYNs coming in than FINs A major server is down which would result in 3 SYNs to a FIN –Because clients would retransmit the SYN

12. CUSUM Algorithm Finding average number of FINs over a time period, and looking for a time period and testing for statistical homogeneity. If there are significant changes to this, then find when they changed.

13. Detection The algorithm will result in zero for all normal activity and cumulatively track (i.e. CUSUM = “cumulative sum”)

14. Detection The internet can be quite dynamic and too complicated for a parametric estimation, so we use sequential testing which requires much less computation Two aspects of detection: –1) False alarm time: the time without attacks between unique false alarms –2) Detection time: the detection delay after the attack starts. The goal is to minimize the second and maximize the first. However, the conflict and require trade offs

15. Performance Trends SYN-FIN

16. SYN attack vs Normal operation

17. Sensitivity of Detection 500 SYN/sec are required to shut down a server It takes a last mile FDS 20 seconds to detect 500 SYN/sec DDoS attack Once detected SYN defender could be used to protect victim

18. Detection is able to Distinguish between attacks and background noise Detect DDoS with last mile FDS Not effected by changes in overall traffic Detect attacks within seconds and implement protection. Do you think this would always work? Can you think of any exceptions??

19. Related Work SYN flood defense categories 1. Firewall based 2. Server based 3. Agent based 4. Router based

20. Firewall based Examples: SYN Defender, SYN proxying Filters packets and requests before router Maintains state for each connection Drawbacks: can be overloaded, extra delay for processing each packet

21. Server Based Examples: SYN Cache, SYN cookies SYN cache receives packets first and then uses a hash table, to partially store states, however much more streamlined than firewall. If the SYN-ACK is “acked” then the connection is established with the server.

22. SYN kill – this is kind of cool SYN kill monitors the network and if it detects SYNs that are not being acked, it automatically generates RST packets to free resources, also it classifies addresses as likely to be spoofed or legitimate… Performance???

23. MULTOPS Monitors the packets going to and from a victim and then blocks IPs from outside of network… limiting IP range of attack.

24. Route-based Distributed Packet filtering Uses packet information to determine if packet arriving at router has a spoofed Source / Destination addresses Results show many packets can be filtered and those that can’t can be traced back easily

25. Future Work Any ideas on how to break the SYN-FIN pair scheme?? Just send FINs along with the SYNs… Will result in more traffic… but what about DDoS that send FINs and SYNs

26. Alternatives to improve detection Monitoring SYN-ACK packets also SYN-ACKs wont go back through the same router that they originally passed through Backbone Router to Spoofed IP Router to Attacker Router to Victim

27. Can it work??? Spoofed address must be in different AS Also, if packet does not take same path back and forth from server it could possibly result in false positives Any other ways to beat it Large enough AS could spoof in AS Requires inter-FDS communication