1. The Choices Voters Make: The Decision Calculus Last time: Elections overview Last time extended: Incumbency advantage This time: focus on voters

2. Elections overview single-member districts (statutory requirements since 1842, with minor exceptions) rules for redistricting after reapportionment: –if state loses a seat but doesn’t redistrict, all are elected at large –if state gains a seat but doesn’t redistrict, the new seat is at-large states have broad control over other conditions; filing fees and petition requirements; filing dates; resign-to-run laws; plurality primary vs runoff primary Incumbency advantage? Buckley v. Valeo, McConnell v. FEC and campaign finance: can regulate the size of contributions to campaigns, but not own spending or total spending or third-party spending; some limits on “soft money” upheld

3. Drawing district lines congressional redistricting (drawing of lines, given an apportionment) is done by state governments the reapportionment revolution: –one man, one vote decisions of 1960s: Baker v. Carr (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) districts typically had been drawn on county lines; urbanization induced massive malapportionment redistricting changed balance of state leg./congressional power away from rural/agrarian interests toward urban/suburban interests; brought federal courts into the mix –Voting Rights Acts of 1965, 1982: no gerrymandering to minimize election of black, other minority candidates –consequences for electoral competitiveness? bias and responsiveness parameters

4. Reapportionment and competition Cox and Katz: pre-1960s: strong pro-Republican bias in non- south congressional elections; this disappears by about 1966. Why? Broader consequences? –Baker v. Carr forced reapportionment of state legislative districts in favor of urban populations; 1964 Dem landslide –judiciary becomes part of the calculus of redistricting; reversionary plans change –these new leg’s then oversaw redrawing of cong. districts after Wesberry v. Sanders Dem incumbents lost vote share on avg, but prob. of victory went up. How? More efficient use of Dem vote

5. Incumbency advantage? expected margin for incumbent over the normal vote for candidates from the incumbent’s party –What is the “normal vote”? Lots of ways to measure –2-party presidential vote –2-party vote for low-salience offices most congressional districts are partisan rather than competitive (not evenly divided between likely Democrat voters and likely Republican voters

6. Incumbency advantage (I) expected margin for incumbent over the normal vote for candidates from the incumbent’s party –how much is due to properties of the congressional race per se, how much due to roll-off? most states lean in a partisan direction overall –incentives for drawing congressional district lines? maximize expected number of seats won by majority party? maximize some product of expected seats and safety of seats? –most congressional districts are partisan rather than competitive (not evenly divided between likely Democrat voters and likely Republican voters, suggests state legislators are NOT drawing CDs to look like microcosms of the state; most states have a bunch of “safe” seats and a small number of “competitive” seats even if the state overall is “competitive” “reapportionment revolution”

7. Incumbency advantage (II) direct: resource advantages indirect: –scare-off effect (few quality challengers) –quality effect (within-party “multiplier” effect of having high quality rather than low-quality candidate) The indirect effect has grown from 10 pct of the total to ~25 pct of the total effect. Why? Cox and Katz: mostly an increase in the quality effect. Tied to reapportionment revolution and breakup of community-based districts and party organizations as electoral machines; new premium on personal-vote organiz. skills

8. Analyzing Incumbency advantage total incumbency advantage: under 5 percent 1950-64; 8- 12 percent today. –But the predictive power of lagged vote share for probability of winning the next election has declined; a 65-35 margin today is about as “safe” as a 60-40 margin was prior to the 1960s changes Decomposing the incumbency advantage in margins: –direct: resource advantages –indirect: scare-off effect (few quality challengers) quality effect (within-party “multiplier” effect of having high quality rather than low-quality candidate) The indirect effect has grown from 10 pct of the total to ~25 pct of the total effect. Why? Cox and Katz: mostly an increase in the quality effect. Reapportionment revolution linked to growth of importance of personal-vote organizational skills in candidates

9. Voter turnout Turnout: 55-60 pct of eligible electorate votes for president (avg 56 pct since 1948) roll-off: about 5 pct fewer votes are cast in congressional races than in presidential ones in the same election drop-off: 35-50 pct turnout in House elections in midterm years (avg: 39 pct since 1946) Why so few? Why so many?

10. Average Turnout in National Elections 1945-98, Selected Countries CountryPercentCountryPercent Italy(14)92.5Israel (14)80.0 New Zealand (18)86.2U.K. (15)74.9 Austria (16)85.1Canada (17)68.4 Belgium (17)84.9Nicaragua (10)62.0 Netherlands (15)84.8India (12)60.7 Australia (21)84.4U.S. (26)48.3 Denmark (22)83.6Mexico (18)48.1

11. The Calculus of Voting Vote iff EU(voting) > EU(not voting) –EU(voting) = P*B + D – C –EU(not voting) = 0 P is probability of being decisive B is the marginal benefit you get when your favorite guy wins (over outcome that would have arisen without your vote) D is “citizen duty” – psychic benefits of participation C are costs of voting Closeness matters. Attitudes matter. Preferences matter.

12. Rational Choice Models of Voting Decision-theoretic: I behave as though my choices affect no one else’s decisions. –predictions: depends on D vs C, where D is largely unobservable. Minimax regret: Choose a strategy that leads to the least- bad outcome that you can affect –predictions: each votes for his most-preferred candidate UNLESS the prior beliefs are for zero prob. of tie. –But this puts funky prior probability weights on possible outcomes Strategic model: Voting as a multi-player Prisoners’ dilemma –Mixed strategy equilibrium with positive expected turnout. Always vote your favorite candidate when you vote. But the eq. predicts very low turnout. Mobilization: voting is low cost, low benefit. Voters can easily be motivated to go to the polls via actual or psychic benefits (network or group effects, for example).