1. Web Spoofing 1 Outline Motivation Web spoofing problem Web spoofing attacks – works done Web spoofing Countermeasures – works done New Idea

2. Web Spoofing 2 Citibank scam - 2004 account holder citibank email Not the real bank Tricked to the wrong site Your account was blocked, you have to fill a form in the following link

3. Web Spoofing 3 PayPal Targeted by Scam Artists - 2002 account holder email Not the real bank Tricked to the wrong site We are replacing the current system with a new one. click here to fill your details. https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr/?cmd=_login-run http://www.paypalsys.com/

4. Web Spoofing 4 Bank Leumi – potential scam http://www.leumi.co.ilhttp://www.bankleumi.co.ilhttp://www.leumibank.co.ilhttp://www.bll.co.il Consistency LackComplex Url Structure

5. Web Spoofing 5 Our Players server authentication is possible. user server performs sensitive tasks. Is the browser-user communication model secure enough to warrant this assumption.

6. Web Spoofing 6 He Wants to check his bank account Great. I get it. Intended site Faked site Other sites Faked Site ! Faked Site ! Internet Spoofing is pretending to be someone else. Web Spoofing The user surf a “faked site” as it was the real one he intended to.

7. Web Spoofing 7 Faked Site Site that imitate another one in its appearance and action for malicious purposes. To succeed, the imitation process must take into account the level of awareness of the potential victim. Content imitationContent & Status imitation Imitate the page content Created by copying HTML files. “fine” for users who judge sites according to their Visual Context. page content as sent by the server Status information produced by the browser Actions must be imitated Requires some programming efforts. “fine” for sophisticated users.

8. Web Spoofing 8 How the Users Get “Phished” Normal surfing Link in popular web page Search engine Web-enabled email Sent by the attacker Man in the middle attack The attacker sit between the user and the real site

9. Web Spoofing 9 Web spoofing: An Internet Con Game -1996 Edward W.Felten and others. spoofing entire WWW attacks remedy Works Done Web Spoofing Revisited: SSL and Beyond – 2002 Zishuang, Yuan and Smith. Can users believe what their browsers tell them? Trust on Web Browser: Attack vs. Defence No author given Trusted Paths for Browsers: An Open-Source Solution to Web Spoofing – 2002 Zishuang, Yuan and Smith. Demonstrate Open source solution

10. Web Spoofing 10 request url www.attacker.org www.server.com real page content 1 23 4 change page 5 spoofed page content Request real url Victim somehow lured into the attacker Web. Victim remains trapped in the attacker’s web due to url rewriting. http://home.netscape.com rewritten http://www.attacker.org/ http://home.netscape.comhttp://home.netscape.com 4

11. Web Spoofing 11 Complete the Illusion Still there some evidence that may disclose the attack. Status Line Mouse click/move events written in javascript Location Line Replace the original with fake one. Viewing Document Source Hide the menu bar and provide another SSL evidence do not help The secure connection made against the attacker’s site.The secure connection made against the attacker’s site.

12. Web Spoofing 12 The target was WebBlitz, a web-based e-mail system.The target was WebBlitz, a web-based e-mail system. The language used was Javascript. They take into account the browser type.(Netscape, IE). Create new window with all bars turned off. They provide a interactive fake bars instead. The location bar get input from keyboard A fake statusbar with lock icon to indicate SSL session. The fake statusbar updated as needed SSL warning windows spoofed also. They spoof the server certificate that emerged when lock icon double clickedThey spoof the server certificate that emerged when lock icon double clicked Images were cached to improve load time

13. Web Spoofing 13 Countermeasures Browser Configuration & recommendations Configuring browser settings: disable javascript Short term Maybe selective Make sure the location bar always visible Make sure the url points to the server you intended to Browser Extension Extending functionality so the user interface is safe Long term Good solution must prevent web spoofing and keep the browser in full functionality.

14. Web Spoofing 14 Abstract suggest a solution that defend against web spoofing. create a trusted path from the browser to the user. implemented in Mozilla: open source browser. Design Criteria Effectiveness User can correctly recognize large amount of status info Work Cannot expect users to do a lot of work Intrusiveness Minimize intrusion on content

15. Web Spoofing 15 Rejected Approaches Preventing the open of windows with status elements turned off. What about pop-up warning window What about certificate information pages Constrict the display of server pages User enter a “MAC phrase” at startup and browser insert it in each status element. Adding some phrase to the title of windows.

16. Web Spoofing 16 Solution marking scheme that servers could not predict. This scheme marks the trusted status content. Synchronized random dynamic boundaries SRD Window Types untrusted trusted Server materialBrowser material Style of boundary changes in random.

17. Web Spoofing 17 Animation of the Solution

18. Web Spoofing 18 New Idea Creating a safe region in the top of each browser window. It is out of loaded sites control. Enable personal skinning. SSL secured sites identified by a logo in this region. Credential logos will appear in this region Implemented in Mozilla browser.

19. Web Spoofing 19 לוגו לזיהוי המלצה אזור בטוח

20. Web Spoofing 20 דפדפןאתר הקמת ערוץ בטוח / אמות תעודת שרת TBSR רשימת המלצות ולוגויים ע"פ בקשה המלצות נוספות מהאנטרנט דפדפן משופר Ineraction between TBRS and other entities

21. Web Spoofing 21 CAMM SRCM CTM CCM דפדפן אתר נצפה מקורות נוספים תעודת שרת ראשונית ה מ ל צ ו ת המלצות שנאספו המלצות במבנה אחיד מאפיינים ממופים ללוגיים הצגת לוגויים באזור הבטוח TBRS Components