1. Presidents and Policy Outcomes Last time: modeling presidential elections Overview of 2 nd half of course

2. Forecasting Presidential elections Can citizens forecast the winner? –NES question, 1956-84, about 69 pct of respondents correctly forecast the winner; best predictor of correct prediction: vote preference for the actual winner Campbell’s model: nat’l & state economics, state history, Sept. vote intentions strongly predict observed results at state level Erikson’s model: weighted avg. of national economic quarterly data and avg NES candidate net likes/dislikes balance strongly predicts national vote shares

3. This year’s models PS, October 2004 issue –Earliest prediction: Jan. 29, 2004 (Norpoth) – Bush 54.7 pct of 2-party vote, 95 pct probable > 50 pct –Median forecast (7 models): Bush 53.8 pct, ranging from 49.9 (Aug. 27, 2004) to 57.6 pct (May 21, 2004) Think of these as campaign-neutral predictions so that deviations can be attributed to candidates’ campaign efforts down the stretch

4. Sam Wang (Princeton biophysicist) http://synapse.princeton.edu/~sam/pollcalc.htmlhttp://synapse.princeton.edu/~sam/pollcalc.html Median outcome, decided voters: Kerry 252 EV, Bush 286 EV (±40 EV MoE) Popular Meta-Margin among decided voters: Bush leads Kerry by 0.9% Electoral prediction with undecideds and turnout: Kerry 323 EV, Bush 215 EV Popular vote prediction with undecideds and turnout: Kerry 50.3%, Bush 47.7%, Nader/other 2%

5. Andrea Moro

6. Presidents and policy preview Presidents and legislation –Negative agenda power: the veto and veto threats –Positive agenda power Priming and framing –Action-forcing powers and presidential initiative –Proposal powers and first-mover advantages Presidents and implementation –Nominations, appointments and removals –Recissions and impoundments: budgetary gatekeeping –Executive orders

7. Federalist Papers and the prez Fed 47: fusion of executive, legislative and judicial functions == tyranny –these functions are partially distinct in the U.S. structure Fed 48: exec, leg and judiciary need some measure of power to check one another –state executives were too weak during the Articles period Fed 51: executive needs ambitions, powers and federalism to maintain independence of legislature Fed 70: energy in the executive?