1. Chains of Delegation in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico Alexander Ruiz Euler Poli 235A

2. Are chains of delegation of political authority functional for voters in Latin America?  Functional: Useful for transmiting preferences bottom/up. Broad analytical framework.- Delegation Chains of delegation are mirrored by a corresponding chain of accountability that runs in the reverse direction (Strøm). Voters LegislativeExecutive Bureaucracy ABureaucracy B Voters Legislative Bureaucracy ABureaucracy B Executive PresidentialismParliamentarism I focus on this system, at this level

3. Polarization and gridlock are useful to analyze the functionality of chains of delegation because: Polarization and gridlock 1.They allow us to observe two different set of mutually exclusive policy positions. 2.If polarization is present at both voter and legislative level, then the elites mirror the preferences of voters. 3.If polarization is present at only the elite level, it is difficult to see how voters’ preferences are delegated into government if there is gridlock. Polarization and gridlock Real (Voters Preferences) Mobilized (Strategic mobilization of voters to advance agenda)

4. Some literature: Linz - Institutions matter. Voters LegislativeExecutive Bureaucracy ABureaucracy B Voters Legislative Bureaucracy ABureaucracy B Executive PresidentialismParliamentarism 2 separately elected heads of gov’t If divided gov’t or multiparty: gridlock (Mainwaring). Legislative elects executive, and government depends on cooperation.

5. Some literature: Hammond and Buttler - Institutions matter, but so do preferences Central argument: In both presidentialism and parliamentarism it is important not to overstate the role of institutions. In both regimes, it is preferences which fundamentally determine legislative coalitions and cooperation.

6. Research question.- Polarization: Convergence or divergence between masses and elites? There are 2 possibilities: 1.Elites and masses preferences converge or 2.Elites and masses preferences diverge or elites masses elites masses H O : + mass polarization implies + elite polarization H a : + mass polarization does not imply + elite polarization These hypotheses DO NOT focus on the reasons behind convergence/divergence: “True “ preferences of masses Elite mobilization of masses These hypotheses DO NOT focus on the reasons behind convergence/divergence: “True “ preferences of masses Elite mobilization of masses

7. Research design.- General scheme N O 1,2 O 1,2 O 1,2 O 1,2 X 1 O 1,2 O 1,2 O 1,2 O 1,2 Legislative voting over 2 issues. People agree/disagree with an issue I want to isolate the effect of institutions and preferences over legislative gridlock. Therefore, I will focus on a longitudinal study in a single country to control for institutional variation. Multiple pretest and multiple posttest single group. Causal mechanism explored: Polarization at the elite level is caused by polarization at the voter level. Some threats to internal validity: 1.History threat 2.Regression to the mean N O 1,2 O 1,2 O 1,2 O 1,2 X 2 O 1,2 O 1,2 O 1,2 O 1,2 O 1 is % agree that issue should be solved in form y. O 2 is O 1 segmented by Party Identification. X is legislative voting on issues 1 and 2. Time For each one of 4 countries: Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico

8. Research design.- Sources for empirical evidence (Mexico) 1.O 1 is % agree that issue should be solved in form y. a.Source: Public reports of polling firms (e.g. Consulta Mitofsky, Parametría, BGC y Asociados). 2.O 2 is O 1 segmented by Party Identification. a.Source: Public reports of polling firms (e.g. Consulta Mitofsky, Parametría, BGC y Asociados). 3.X 1,2 is legislative voting on issues 1 and 2. a.Source: Legislative Gazette of Upper or Lower House. The indicators are constructed as follows:

9. Help! Some problems with my project: 1.Gridlock by definition implies legislative inactivity. Therefore, I cannot observe legislative voting on such an issue. 2.BUT polarization is observable, both at the mass level and in legislative activity. I am unclear on how to link polarization and Linz + Hammond and Butler. 3.Should I focus on polarization, gridlock, or both? 4.Literature?