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Automatic Synthesis of Fault-Tolerance Ali Ebnenasir Software Engineering and Network Systems Laboratory Computer Science and Engineering Department Michigan State University Advisor: Dr. Sandeep Kulkarni
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2 Problem Given a program p and a class of faults f, Question: How do we add desired fault-tolerance properties to p in order to create a new program p’ such that: Requirements: 1.In the absence of f, the resulting fault-tolerant program p’ behaves similar to p 2.In the presence of f, the resulting fault-tolerant program p’ satisfies the desired fault-tolerance property.
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3 Solution Strategies Two possible approaches 1.Redesign p’ and verify its correctness w.r.t problem requirements Expensive approach 2.Automatically synthesize p’ from p Correct by construction
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4 Previous Work on Automated Synthesis
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5 Synthesis: Specification-Based Specification of p (Temporal Logic Expressions/ Automata) Synthesis Algorithm (prove the satisfiability of the specification) Faults Fault-tolerance requirements (Temporal Logic Expressions) Fault-tolerant program p’ Program synthesis:Fault-Tolerance synthesis: [EmersonClarke 1982][AroraAttieEmerson 1998] [AttieEmerson 2001] [KupfermannVardi 2001]
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6 Synthesis: Calculational [KulkarniArora 2000] [KulkarniAroraChippada 2001] Fault-intolerant program p (Transitions) Synthesis Algorithm (Calculate the set of transitions) Fault-tolerant program p’ (Transitions) Fault-tolerance requirements Faults (Transitions)
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7 The Complexity of Calculational Synthesis High atomicity model: processes can atomically read/write all program variables –Polynomial in the state space of the fault-intolerant program p [KA00] Low atomicity model (distributed programs): processes have read/write restrictions with respect to program variables –Exponential in the state space of the fault-intolerant program p for synthesizing masking fault-tolerance [KA00] [KA00] S.S. Kulkarni and A. Arora, Automating the addition of fault-tolerance, FTRTFT 2000. Propose techniques for the synthesis of fault-tolerant distributed programs
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8 Outline Preliminary concepts Synthesis problem Current results –Theoretical issues Step-wise automation Polynomial-time boundary Heuristics Pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components –Practical issues A framework for the synthesis of fault-tolerant programs Contributions Open problems
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9 Preliminary Concepts: Programs and Faults Program –Finite number of variables with finite domains –Finite number of processes State: a valuation of program variables Finite state space S p State predicate X X S p Program p, Fault f { (s 0, s 1 ) | (s 0, s 1 ) S p S p } Closure: X is closed in p X SpSp p
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10 Preliminary Concepts: Specifications and Fault-Tolerance Safety specification: something bad never happens –Representation { (s 0, s 1 ) | (s 0, s 1 ) S p S p } E.g., transitions that change the value of a counter from non-zero values to zero Liveness specification: something good will eventually happen –In the absence of faults, fault-tolerant program p’ satisfies the liveness specification of the fault-intolerant program p Invariant S, fault-span T S p Fault-tolerance: Failsafe, Nonmasking, Masking S T p/f p f SpSp Program Fault
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11 Preliminary Concepts: Distribution Model Read/Write restrictions (low atomicity model) –Assumption: a process cannot write a variable that it cannot read. Example: program p Two processes j, k Two Boolean variables a and b Process j cannot read b, but can read and write a Write restrictions –Can we include the following transition in the set of transitions of process j ? Write restrictions identify the set of transitions of each process. a=0,b=0 a=1,b=1 jk ab
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12 Preliminary Concepts: Distribution Model – Continued Read restrictions –Can we include the following transition in the set of transitions of process j ? Groups of transitions (instead of individual transitions) must be chosen. a=0,b=0 a=1,b=0 a=0,b=1 a=1,b=1 Only if we include the transition
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13 Outline Preliminary concepts Synthesis problem Current results –Theoretical issues Step-wise automation Polynomial-time boundary Heuristics Pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components –Practical issues A framework for the synthesis of fault-tolerant programs Contributions Open problems
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14 Synthesis Problem Synthesis Algorithm Fault-intolerant program p Specification Spec Invariant S (Masking/Nonmasking/Failsafe) Fault-tolerant program p' Invariant S' Faults f Distribution restrictions Requirements 1.No new behaviors are added in the absence of faults. 2.In the presence of faults, p’ provides desired level of fault-tolerance. Desired level of Fault-intolerance (Masking/Nonmasking/Failsafe)
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15 Outline Preliminary concepts Synthesis problem Current results –Theoretical issues step-wise automation Polynomial-time boundary Heuristics Pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components –Practical issues A framework for the synthesis of fault-tolerant programs Contributions Open problems
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16 Theoretical Issues: Step-Wise Automation Intolerant Program Nonmasking fault-tolerant Masking fault-tolerant Failsafe fault-tolerant Failsafe [KA00]
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17 Outline Preliminary concepts Synthesis problem Current results –Theoretical issues step-wise automation Polynomial-time boundary Heuristics Pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components –Practical issues A framework for the synthesis of fault-tolerant programs Contributions Open problems
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18 Theoretical Issues: Polynomial-Time Boundary Complexity: reduction from 3-SAT to the problem of synthesizing failsafe fault-tolerant distributed programs In general, the problem of synthesizing failsafe fault-tolerant distributed programs from their fault-intolerant version is NP-complete. Intuitively, the exponential complexity is due to the inability of a process to safely estimate unreadable variables even in the absence of faults (grouping issue). What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for polynomial synthesis of failsafe fault-tolerant distributed programs? Restrictions on –The transitions of the fault-intolerant programs –Specifications
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19 Theoretical Issues: Monotonicity of Specifications Definition: A specification spec is positive monotonic with respect to a Boolean variable x iff: For every (s 0, s 1 ) and (s’ 0, s’ 1 ) grouped together due to inability of reading x s1s1 s0s0 x = false If Does not violate safety s’0s’0 s’1s’1 x = true Does not violate safety Then
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20 Theoretical Issues: Monotonicity of Programs Definition: Program p with invariant S is positive monotonic with respect to a Boolean variable x iff: For every (s 0, s 1 ) and (s’ 0, s’ 1 ) grouped together due to inability of reading x s1s1 s0s0 Invariant S x = false s’0s’0 s’1s’1 x = true Monotonicity requirements capture the notion that safe assumptions can be made about variables that cannot be read
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21 Theoretical Issues: Monotonicity Theorem Sufficiency: if Program is negative monotonic, and Spec is positive monotonic –Or Program is positive monotonic, and Spec is negative monotonic Then Synthesis of failsafe fault-tolerance can be done in polynomial time Necessity: If only one of these conditions is satisfied then synthesizing failsafe fault-tolerance remains NP-complete. For many problems, these requirements are easily met (e.g., Byzantine agreement, consensus, atomic commit)
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22 Theoretical Issues: An Example for Monotonicity Theorem Dijkstra’s guarded commands (actions) –Guard Statement –{ (s 0, s 1 ) | Guard holds at s 0 and atomic execution of Statement yields s 1 } Example: Byzantine agreement –Safety Specification of Byzantine agreement: Agreement: No two non-Byzantine non-generals can finalize with different decisions Validity: If g is not Byzantine then no non-Byzantine process can finalize with a different decision with respect to g –Processes: General, g, and three non-generals j, k, and l –d.g : {0, 1} –d.j, d.k, d.l : {0, 1, ┴ } –b.g, b.j, b.k, b.l : {0, 1} –f.j, f.k, f.l : {0, 1} g lkj
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23 Theoretical Issues: An Example for Monotonicity Theorem Program actions for process j d.j = ┴ f.j = 0 d.j := d.g d.j ≠ ┴ f.j = 0 f.j := 1 Fault transitions for process j ¬b.g ¬b.j ¬b.k ¬b.l b.j := 1 b.j d.j :=0|1 Read/Write restrictions: –Readable variables for process j: b.j, d.j, f.j, d.g, d.k, d.l –Process j can write d.j, f.j
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24 Theoretical Issues: An Example for Monotonicity Theorem – Continued Observation 1: Negative monotonicity of specification with respect to f.j Observation 2: Positive monotonicity of program, consisting of the transitions of j, with respect to f.k Observation 3: Positive monotonicity of specification with respect to b.j –The specification does not stipulate anything about the Byzantine processes Observation 4: Negative monotonicity of program, consisting of the transitions of j, with respect to b.k Synthesis of agreement program that is failsafe to Byzantine faults can be done in polynomial time.
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25 Outline Preliminary concepts Synthesis problem Current results –Theoretical issues step-wise automation Polynomial-time boundary Heuristics Pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components –Practical issues A framework for the synthesis of fault-tolerant programs Contributions Open problems
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26 Theoretical Issues: Heuristics Heuristic: A strategy for making deterministic decisions to reduce the complexity of synthesis –Example: Reuse the structure of nonmasking programs in the synthesis of their masking versions Intolerant Program Nonmasking fault-tolerant Masking fault-tolerant Fault-Tolerance Enhancement
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27 Outline Preliminary concepts Synthesis problem Current results –Theoretical issues step-wise automation Polynomial-time boundary Heuristics Pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components –Practical issues A framework for the synthesis of fault-tolerant programs Contributions Open problems
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28 Theoretical Issues: Pre-Synthesized Fault-Tolerance Components What if existing heuristics fail? How can we reuse the techniques used in the synthesis of a program, in the synthesis of another program? Can we encapsulate commonly encountered synthesis patterns in terms of pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components? Detectors and correctors are necessary and sufficient in the design of fault-tolerance [AK98] –Detectors and correctors have the potential to provide a rich library of pre- synthesized fault-tolerance components [AK98] A. Arora and S.S. Kulkarni, Detectors and Correctors: A Theory of Fault-Tolerance, IEEE ICDCS 1998.
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29 Theoretical Issues: Using Pre-Synthesized Components If available heuristics fail to add recovery from a deadlock state s d Automatically specify the required component Extract the component from the component library Verify the interference-freedom of the composition Add extracted component to the fault-intolerant program
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30 Theoretical Issues: Pre-Synthesized Components - Achievements Reducing the chance of failure in the synthesis Providing a mechanism for the reuse of synthesis techniques Extending the scope of synthesis problem where the state space is expanded during the synthesis Controlling the way new variables are introduced
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31 Outline Preliminary concepts Synthesis problem Current results –Theoretical issues step-wise automation Polynomial-time boundary Heuristics Pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components –Practical issues A framework for the synthesis of fault-tolerant programs Contributions Open problems
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32 Practical Issues: Framework Goals Goals of the framework design –Ability to synthesize fault-tolerant programs from their fault- intolerant versions –Ability to integrate new heuristics into the framework –Ability to change implementation
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33 Practical Issues: Synthesis Framework Synthesis algorithm Interactive user interface The user (Fault-tolerance developer) Query Results p, S, f, spec p’, S’ Guarded commands, State predicates Guarded commands/ Promela, State predicates Library of pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components Pre-synthesized detectors/correctors Component specification
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34 Practical Issues: Framework Internals –Synthesis Algorithm Remove bad transitions Remove bad states Expand the reachability graph Initialization Ensure safety Ensure deadlock freedom Calculate a valid fault-span Preserve Invariant Ensure deadlock freedom Calculate a valid invariant Modify Invariant Resolve non-progress cycles Reachability graph of the fault-tolerant program Interaction points p, S, f, spec p’, S’ Fault-tolerant program Fault-intolerant program
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35 Practical Issues: Current Status of the Framework Example synthesized programs: –Token ring with 7 processes –Byzantine agreement with 4 non-general processes and one general process –An agreement program that is subject to both Byzantine and fail-stop faults (1.3 million states) Currently, the framework can –handle different types of faults (e.g., process restart, Byzantine, fail- stop) –synthesize programs that are simultaneously subject to multiple types of faults
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36 Outline Preliminary concepts Synthesis problem Current results –Theoretical issues step-wise automation Polynomial-time boundary Heuristics Pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components –Practical issues A framework for the synthesis of fault-tolerant programs Contributions Open problems
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37 Contributions Showing the NP-completeness of synthesizing failsafe fault-tolerance Identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for polynomial-time synthesis of failsafe fault-tolerance Reusing the computational structure of fault-intolerant programs to reduce the complexity of synthesis (enhancement) Identifying synthesis patterns as pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components Developing a framework for the synthesis of fault-tolerant programs
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38 Outline Preliminary concepts Synthesis problem Current results –Theoretical issues step-wise automation Polynomial-time boundary Heuristics Pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components –Practical issues A framework for the synthesis of fault-tolerant programs Contributions Open problems
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39 Open Problems Theoretical issues –Non-monotonic programs/specifications to monotonic ones Extending the scope of the programs that can reap the benefit of efficient automation –Necessary and sufficient conditions for simultaneous addition of multiple pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components –Necessary and sufficient conditions for polynomial-time synthesis of nonmasking fault-tolerant programs –Automated synthesis of multitolerance
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40 Open Problems - Continued Practical issues –Distributed synthesis algorithm –Symbolic synthesis of fault-tolerance Distributed Synthesis Algorithm SAT solver Verify safetyY/NClosureY/NCycle detection Y/N... SAT solver
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41 Open Problems - Continued Using model checkers for acquiring behavioral information during synthesis Distributed Synthesis Algorithm... SPIN
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42 Publications Published papers –Sandeep S. Kulkarni and Ali Ebnenasir. "Enhancing The Fault- Tolerance of Nonmasking Programs". IEEE ICDCS 2003. –Ali Ebnenasir. "Algorithmic Synthesis of Fault-Tolerant Distributed Programs". Doctoral Symposium of ICDCS 2003. –Sandeep S. Kulkarni and Ali Ebnenasir. "The Complexity of Adding Failsafe Fault-Tolerance". IEEE ICDCS 2002. Submitted papers –Sandeep S. Kulkarni and Ali Ebnenasir. "Adding Fault-Tolerance Using Pre-Synthesized Components". Submitted to CBSE7, ICSE 2004. –Ali Ebnenasir and Sandeep S. Kulkarni. "A Framework for Automatic Synthesis of Fault-Tolerance". Submitted to DSN 2004. –Sandeep S. Kulkarni and Ali Ebnenasir. "Automated Synthesis of Multitolerance". Submitted to DSN 2004.
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43 Thank you! Questions and comments?
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