1. 6/28/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore0

2. 6/28/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore1 Core Concepts Collective Action Public Goods Free-Rider Problem

3. 6/28/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore2

4. 6/28/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore3

5. 6/28/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore4 Key Characteristics of Public Goods Non-Excludability Non-Rival Goods (Jointness of Supply)

6. 6/28/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore5 The Tragedy of the “Commons”

7. 6/28/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore6 Cornucopia of the Commons? (Bricklin 2001)

8. 6/28/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore7 “Public Good”

9. 6/28/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore8 The Free-Rider Problem Individual interests tend to make non-contribution tempting, especially if other people will do the work. In collective action, we can view this as an n-person prisoner’s dilemma

10. 6/28/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore9 Free-Riding and the Logic of Collective Action “If all individuals refrained from doing A, every individual as a member of the community would derive a certain advantage. But now if all individuals less one continue refraining from doing A, the community loss is very slight, whereas the one individual doing A makes a personal gain far greater than the loss that he incurs as a member of the community.” (Pareto 1935, vol. 3, sect. 1496, pp. 946-7)

11. 6/28/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore10 “I guess I will never vote again… unless of course no one else is voting.” – Deepti (2007)

12. 6/28/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore11 Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem?  Selective Incentives  Self-Interest

13. 6/28/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore12 Reconsidering the Free-Rider Problem Communality and Discretionary Databases “Second-Order” Communality