1. MAXWELL SECURITY AUTHORITY

2. THE THREAT: The TERROR PLOT of AL QAEDA

3. 1. What kind of threat? The Smuggling of RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (Terrorist Attack with Dirty Bomb) The Smuggling of RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (Terrorist Attack with Dirty Bomb) 2. By whom? AL QAEDA OPERATIVES AL QAEDA OPERATIVES 3. Where is the AL QAEDA OPERATIVES? Pakistan/Afghanistan Border Pakistan/Afghanistan Border THE THREAT

4. 4. What are the materials? Low yield radioactive materials taken out Low yield radioactive materials taken out from Pakistani nuclear laboratory from Pakistani nuclear laboratory 5. Where are the materials now? Not yet found. They will smuggled through Shanghai into a port of West Coast Not yet found. They will smuggled through Shanghai into a port of West Coast THE THREAT

5. PORT SECURITY SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, PORT SECURITY EMERGED SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, PORT SECURITY EMERGED AS A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE AS A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE PORTS ARE VULNERABLE TO ATTACK DUE TO SIZE, PORTS ARE VULNERABLE TO ATTACK DUE TO SIZE, EASY ACCESSIBILITY AND TREMENDOUS AMOUNT EASY ACCESSIBILITY AND TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF CARGO THEY HANDLE OF CARGO THEY HANDLE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN IS A TERRORIST GROUP ’ S OF PARTICULAR CONCERN IS A TERRORIST GROUP ’ S ABILITY TO SMUGGLE WMD OR MATERIAL FOR A ABILITY TO SMUGGLE WMD OR MATERIAL FOR A DIRTY BOMB INTO THE US DIRTY BOMB INTO THE US

6. WHY PORTS ARE IMPORTANT VITAL TO US ECONOMIC WELL-BEING VITAL TO US ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 6-9 MILLION CONTAINERS ENTER US PORTS EVERY YEAR 6-9 MILLION CONTAINERS ENTER US PORTS EVERY YEAR 15,000-20,000 CONTAINERS REACH US PORTS EACH DAY 15,000-20,000 CONTAINERS REACH US PORTS EACH DAY A TERRORIST ATTACK ON A US PORT COULD CAUSE AS MUCH AS $1 TRILLION IN DAMAGE TO THE US ECONOMY A TERRORIST ATTACK ON A US PORT COULD CAUSE AS MUCH AS $1 TRILLION IN DAMAGE TO THE US ECONOMY

7. US GOVERNMENT ACTION TO PROTECT PORTS PROVIDED OVER $563 MILLION FOR PORT SECURITY PROVIDED OVER $563 MILLION FOR PORT SECURITY COAST GUARD CAN BOARD ANY VESSEL TO MAKE INQUIRES, EXAMINATIONS, INSPECTIONS, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND ARRESTS FOR VIOLATION OF US LAWS COAST GUARD CAN BOARD ANY VESSEL TO MAKE INQUIRES, EXAMINATIONS, INSPECTIONS, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND ARRESTS FOR VIOLATION OF US LAWS US DEPT OF ENERGY PLACING MONITORS IN ALONG RUSSIAN BORDERS TO HALT NUCLEAR MATERIAL SMUGGLING US DEPT OF ENERGY PLACING MONITORS IN ALONG RUSSIAN BORDERS TO HALT NUCLEAR MATERIAL SMUGGLING US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION PLACES US PERSONNEL AT FOREIGN PORTS TO INSPECT CONTAINERS AT POINT OF ORIGIN US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION PLACES US PERSONNEL AT FOREIGN PORTS TO INSPECT CONTAINERS AT POINT OF ORIGIN

8. EXISTING TECHNOLOGY LOW-TECH EQUIPMENT LIKE FIBER-OPTIC SCOPES, CHAINSAWS AND TORCHES ARE USED TO SEARCH CONTAINERS LOW-TECH EQUIPMENT LIKE FIBER-OPTIC SCOPES, CHAINSAWS AND TORCHES ARE USED TO SEARCH CONTAINERS X-RAY MACHINES DETECT DIFFERENCES IN MATERIAL DENSITY (SIMILAR TO X-RAY MACHINES USED AT AIRPORTS) X-RAY MACHINES DETECT DIFFERENCES IN MATERIAL DENSITY (SIMILAR TO X-RAY MACHINES USED AT AIRPORTS) GAMMA RAY INSPECTION SYSTEMS DETERMINE CERTAIN TYPES OF MATERIAL INSIDE CONTAINERS BASED ON ATOMIC CHARACTERISTICS GAMMA RAY INSPECTION SYSTEMS DETERMINE CERTAIN TYPES OF MATERIAL INSIDE CONTAINERS BASED ON ATOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

9. PORT SECURITY PROBLEMS CONTAINER AND SECURITY INITIATIVE DOES NOT APPLY TO MIDDLE- EASTERN PORTS CONTAINER AND SECURITY INITIATIVE DOES NOT APPLY TO MIDDLE- EASTERN PORTS IMPOSSIBLE TO INSPECT EVERY CONTAINER IMPOSSIBLE TO INSPECT EVERY CONTAINER ONLY 3% - 6% OF ALL CONTAINERS REACHING US PORTS ARE INSPECTED ONLY 3% - 6% OF ALL CONTAINERS REACHING US PORTS ARE INSPECTED WITHOUT INCREASED FUNDING COAST GUARD CANNOT CONTINUE CARRYING OUT BOTH COUNTER-TERRORISM AND TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS (DRUG ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION, ETC) WITHOUT INCREASED FUNDING COAST GUARD CANNOT CONTINUE CARRYING OUT BOTH COUNTER-TERRORISM AND TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS (DRUG ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION, ETC) INSPECTORS HAVE TROUBLE DEFERENTIATING BETWEEN OBJECTS IN CONTAINERS INSPECTORS HAVE TROUBLE DEFERENTIATING BETWEEN OBJECTS IN CONTAINERS WILL COST $10 - $50 MILLION PER PORT TO INCREASE SECURITY MEASURES WILL COST $10 - $50 MILLION PER PORT TO INCREASE SECURITY MEASURES

10. The Physical, Psychological, and Economic impacts of a DIRTY BOMB

11. PHYSICAL IMPACT Conventional explosive itself would have more IMMEDIATE LETHALITY than a dirty bomb Conventional explosive itself would have more IMMEDIATE LETHALITY than a dirty bomb A DIRTY BOMB is unlikely to cause large numbers of immediate fatalities. A DIRTY BOMB is unlikely to cause large numbers of immediate fatalities.

12. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT It ’ s a Weapon of Mass Disruption. Not a Weapon of MASS DESTUCTION. It ’ s a Weapon of Mass Disruption. Not a Weapon of MASS DESTUCTION. FEAR FACTOR is the major component of a dirty bomb FEAR FACTOR is the major component of a dirty bomb

13. ECONOMIC IMPACT Inability to access the area where a DIRTY BOMB is set off can cause a large economic impact. Inability to access the area where a DIRTY BOMB is set off can cause a large economic impact. An estimate shows one-day closure of the Long Beach and Los Angeles port costs $1 BILLION. An estimate shows one-day closure of the Long Beach and Los Angeles port costs $1 BILLION.

14. DIPLOMATIC MEASURES Strengthen U.S. Alliances Strengthen U.S. Alliances Prepare U.S. Diplomats Prepare U.S. Diplomats Support Educational Measures Support Educational Measures Promote “ Peace in Middle-East ” Promote “ Peace in Middle-East ”

15. MILITARY MEASURES Accelerate Transformation Accelerate Transformation Rapid Deployment of Forces Rapid Deployment of Forces Boost Naval Transformation Boost Naval Transformation Joint Defense Training Center Joint Defense Training Center Increase U.S. Armed Forces Increase U.S. Armed Forces

16. INTELLIGENCE Unified Terrorist Watch List Unified Terrorist Watch List Coordinate Agencies Coordinate Agencies Improve Capabilities Improve Capabilities Integrate Intelligence Integrate Intelligence Promote Unity Promote Unity

17. PUBLIC MEASURES Organizational Standards Organizational Standards Secure Nuclear Materials Secure Nuclear Materials Strong Biodefense System Strong Biodefense System Encourage Modes of National Service Encourage Modes of National Service

18. RECOMMENDATIONS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MUST : IMPROVE the quality and method of inspection and advance the timing of information submitted by shippers IMPROVE the quality and method of inspection and advance the timing of information submitted by shippers ENHANCE intelligence operations in South Asia, as well as vigorously continue hunting Al-Qaeda operatives ENHANCE intelligence operations in South Asia, as well as vigorously continue hunting Al-Qaeda operatives DISSEMINATE information to the public to help alleviate the fears posed by a potential dirty bomb threat DISSEMINATE information to the public to help alleviate the fears posed by a potential dirty bomb threat PREPARE a Standard Operation Procedure to minimize economic impact of a “ dirty ” attack PREPARE a Standard Operation Procedure to minimize economic impact of a “ dirty ” attack DRAFT a legal instrument requiring states to secure all radioactive materials DRAFT a legal instrument requiring states to secure all radioactive materials