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Announcements: HW4 – DES due Friday midnight HW4 – DES due Friday midnight Any volunteers to help config C/C# later today? Who’s using Scheme? Quiz on ch 3 postponed until after break Quiz on ch 3 postponed until after break Term project groups and topics due end of week after break Term project groups and topics due end of week after break Use ch 10 – 19 as inspiration Today Finish Rijndael Finish Rijndael RSA concepts RSA conceptsQuestions? DTTF/NB479: DszquphsbqizDay 19
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Rijndael/AES Tie-ins with Galois field, GF(2 8 ): S-box implements z = Ax -1 + b in GF(2 8 ) MixColumn multiplies by a matrix in GF(2 8 ) to diffuse bits Key schedule (next) uses S-box and powers in GF(2 8 ) Wikipedia’s visuals visuals
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AddRoundKey (ARK) XOR the round key with matrix d. XOR the round key with matrix d. Key schedule on next slide
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Key Schedule Write original key as 4x4matrix with 4 columns: W(0), W(1), W(2), W(3). Key for round i is (W(4i), W(4i+1), W(4i+2), W(4i+3)) Other columns defined recursively: Highly non-linear. Resists attacks at finding whole key when part is known K0K0 K1K1 K 10 192-, 256-bit versions similarsimilar
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Decryption E(k) is: (ARK 0, BS, SR, MC, ARK 1, … BS, SR, MC, ARK 9, BS, SR, ARK 10 ) Each function is invertible: ARK; IBS; ISR; IMC So D(k) is: ARK 10, ISR, IBS, ARK 9, IMC, ISR, IBS, … ARK 1, IMC, ISR, IBS, ARK 0 ) Half-round structure: Write E(k) = ARK, (BS, SR), (MC, ARK), … (BS, SR), (MC, ARK), (BS, SR), ARK Write E(k) = ARK, (BS, SR), (MC, ARK), … (BS, SR), (MC, ARK), (BS, SR), ARK (Note that last MC wouldn’t fit) D(k) = ARK, (ISR, IBS), (ARK, IMC), (ISR, IBS), … (ARK, IMC), (ISR, IBS), ARK D(k) = ARK, (ISR, IBS), (ARK, IMC), (ISR, IBS), … (ARK, IMC), (ISR, IBS), ARK Can write: D(k) = ARK, (IBS, ISR), (IMC, IARK), … (IBS, ISR), (IMC, IARK), (IBS, ISR), ARK
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Wrap-up Do you trust 128-bit encryption now? You should, especially when keys are sent using public key cryptography (next)
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Public-key Cryptography Problem: how can I send my AES key without Eve intercepting it? Consider a scheme in which everyone publishes a (public) method by which messages can be encrypted and sent to them … but only the publisher can decrypt. Knowing how to encrypt does not reveal how to decrypt! Knowing how to encrypt does not reveal how to decrypt!
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RSA (Rivest – Shamir – Adelman) For Alice to send a message to Bob. Bob chooses primes p,q (large, ~100 digits each) He publishes his public key (n,e): n = pq n = pq e, a large number such that gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1 e, a large number such that gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1 Alice has a message m < n. Otherwise (if m > n), break message into chunks n), break message into chunks < n Alice sends c = m e (mod n) Bob computes c d (mod n) = (m e ) d = m (mod n). What does he use for d?
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Why does decryption work? Alice – (m) Bob Bob’s key: n = pq n = pq e: gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1 e: gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1 This is so d=e -1 mod (p-1)(q-1) exists This is so d=e -1 mod (p-1)(q-1) exists Alice sends c = m e (mod n) Bob computes c d (mod n) = (m e ) d = m (mod n), where d = e -1 (mod n). What does he use for d? Recall Euler’s theorem: as long as gcd(m,n) = 1 So m ed = m (mod n) iff ed = 1 (mod (n) = 1 (mod (p-1)(q-1)) So d = e -1 *mod (p-1)(q-1)
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Toy example Alice – (m) Bob Bob’s key: n = pq = (13)(17) = 221 n = pq = (13)(17) = 221 e = 35: gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1 e = 35: gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1 d=e -1 mod 192 exists: d = __11__ d=e -1 mod 192 exists: d = __11__ m = 20 (letter t) 1-based, so leading ‘a’ = 1 not ignored 1-based, so leading ‘a’ = 1 not ignored c = m e (mod n) = _197___ c d (mod n) = _20__ Issues: How to compute 20 35 (mod 221)? Efficiency is O(log e) How to compute d? Extended Euclidean alg. And why is this secure? Why can’t Eve calculate d herself?
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Security Eve knows e, n, and c only To find d = e -1 (mod (n)), Eve needs to know (n) = (p-1)(q-1) If she knows n, she can factor it into p and q to find (n), right? That’s a big if, since n is ~200 digits long! Large numbers are hard to factor! Can’t just test every prime from 1.. sqrt(n) Can’t just test every prime from 1.. sqrt(n)
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Security c = m e (mod n) Can Eve just compute e-th root of c? Not since mod n Not since mod n Unless we brute force, but not when n is large! Unless we brute force, but not when n is large!
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Is (n) as hard to find as the factors of n? Claim: factoring n hard finding (n) hard Equivalently: (n) easy factoring n easy If I know n and (n), how can I find p, q? Hint: write n and (n) in terms of p and q. Hint: write n and (n) in terms of p and q. I will show later that finding d is as hard to find as factors of n (uses factoring). So Eve has no shortcuts to factoring!
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