1. 國立清華大學資訊工程系 資訊安全實驗室 孫宏民 博士 hmsun@cs.nthu.edu.tw Phone: 03-5742968 Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols

2. 第 2 頁 Cryptographic System

3. 第 3 頁 Symmetric Cryptosystem  Stream Cipher  DES (1977)  IDEA (1992)  RC5 (1994)  Skipjack (1993)  AES (2001)

4. 第 4 頁 Security Service: Confidentiality Authentication  Integrity Advantage ： High Speed Disadvantages ：  how to obtain a common secret key between two parities, the number of secret keys is too big, can not achieve nonrepudiation. Symmetric Cryptosystem

5. 第 5 頁 Asymmetric Cryptosystem RSA (1978) El-Gamal (1984) McEliece (1978) Knapsack (1978) Elliptive Curve

6. 第 6 頁 Security Service: Confidentiality Integrity Authentication (by Signature) Nonrepudiation (by Signature) Advantage ： a pair of keys for each user Disadvantages ： Slow speed Public key need to be authenticated by CA Asymmetric Cryptosystem

7. 第 7 頁 One-way hash function  Input: X (unlimited length) Output: Y=H(X) (fixed length, e.g., 160 bit) Given X, it is easy to compute Y. Given Y, and H( ), it is computational infeasible to compute X.  Given X and Y, it is computational infeasible to find X’ such that Y=H(X’).

8. 第 8 頁 Message Signature(S) M Signer AVerifier B Signature Generation Private Key Signature Verification Public Key Ture or False Digital Signature

9. 第 9 頁 Hash Functions : SHA MD5 FFT Snefru N Hash Hash Signature Functions : RSA DSA El-Gamal Elliptive Curve LUC Digital Signature M h(M) S S M

10. 第 10 頁 Digital Envelope (1) M

11. 第 11 頁 Digital Envelope (2)

12. 第 12 頁 Secure Communication between Client and Server  Using Symmetric Cryptosystem: Each client and the server share a common secret key. Disadvantages: 1. Secret key must be strong 2. If the secret key is revealed, the messages in the past will also be revealed. ClientServer E(M’) ID, E(M)

13. 第 13 頁 Secure Communication between Client and Server  Using Asymmetric Cryptosystem: Use Digital Envelope (2) to send a session key. Disadvantages: 1. Public keys need to be authenticated by a CA. 2. Private key must be strong. 3. If the server’s private key is revealed, the messages in the past will also be revealed.

14. 第 14 頁 Authentication in general  Based on one or more of: something a user has (smart card/token card) something a user is (fingerprint/voiceprint/retinal scan) something a user knows (password/short secret)  What’s a popular user authentication system based on three of these?

15. 第 15 頁 Secure Password Authentication  Remote user access  Goal: secure without requiring the user to carry/remember anything except password Remote clientFirewall protected domain VPN traffic (authenticated using password)

16. 第 16 頁 Dictionary Attacks (Password Guessing Attacks)  An off- line, brute force guessing attack conducted by an attacker on the network.  Attacker usually has a “dictionary” of commonly-used passwords to try  People pick easily remembered passwords  “Easy- to- remember” is also “easy- to- guess”

17. 第 17 頁 Passwords in the Real World  Entropy is less than most people think  Dictionary words, e. g. “pudding”, “plan9” – Entropy: 20 bits or less  Word pairs or phrases, e. g. “hate2die” – Represents average password quality – Entropy: around 30 bits  Random printable text, e. g. “nDz2\ u> O” – Entropy: slightly over 50 bits

18. 第 18 頁 Password-based protocols  Telnet, FTP are insecure Client Server ID, Password Client Server ID, h(Password)  Hash function is not helpful due to dictionary attacks.

19. 第 19 頁 Password-based Protocol with Challenge  Insecure against the dictionary attacks. Client Server h(Cha,Password) Cha ID

20. 第 20 頁 We need.............. a password-based authentication protocol which is secure against dictionary attacks.

21. 第 21 頁  What to do after authentication?  We need a common session key to protect our communication.  Diffie-Hellman key agreement provides two parties to share a common session key. Secure Communication between Client and Server

22. 第 22 頁 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement  Goal : to provide two parties share a common session key  p : large prime, g : generator g Ra mod p g Rb mod p K= (g Rb ) Ra mod p K= (g Ra ) Rb mod p ClientServer

23. 第 23 頁 Man-in-the-middle attack

24. 第 24 頁 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement  Diffie-Hellman key agreement is vulnerable to the man-in- the-middle attack; it does not reach authentication  How about Diffie-Hellman key agreement using public key?  Problem: (1) does not provide forward secrecy, (2) hard to remember (not a password). Client Server

25. 第 25 頁 Forward Secrecy  Prevents one compromise from causing further damage Compromising Should Not Compromise Current password Future passwords Old password Current password Current password Current or past session keys Current session key Current password

26. 第 26 頁 Research Goal  To design a user authentication and key agreement protocol via password.  The protocol must satisfy the following requirements: 1. based on password only, 2. password may be weak, 3. be secure against the dictionary attack, 4. can provide perfect forward secrecy.

27. 第 27 頁 Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) [Bellovin and Merritt, 1992]  Two parties share a common password  EKE can withstand dictionary attack P P Generate encrypt/decrypt keys Generate R R(Cha) R(Cha||Chb) R(Chb) ServerClient

28. 第 28 頁 DHEKE [Bellovin and Merritt, 1992]

29. 第 29 頁 Three-Party Key Exchange Protocol  Each client shares an easy-to-remember password with the server.  The protocol is responsible for establishing secure communication between two clients via the help of the server.  Application: E.g., ICQ, or mobile users

30. 第 30 頁 STW-3PEKE [Steiner, Tsudik, and Waidner, 1995] ASBASB

31. 第 31 頁 Undetectable On-line guessing attack (I) [Ding and Horster, 1995] ASBASB record guess get

32. 第 32 頁 Undetectable On-line guessing attack (II) [Ding and Horster, 1995] SBSB guess compute

33. 第 33 頁 Off-line Guessing Attack on STW-3PEKE [Lin, Sun, and Hwang, 2000] A*S*B

34. 第 34 頁 LSH-3PEKE (with server’s public key) [Lin, Sun, and Hwang, 2000] ASBASB

35. 第 35 頁 LSSH-3PEKE (without server’s public key) [ Lin, Sun, Steiner, and Hwang, 2001] ASBASB A,B

36. 第 36 頁 Performance Comparison

37. 第 37 頁 Conclusions  Password authentication and key agreement protocols are widely used. EX ： Electronic Commerce, Electronic Stock Trading  Two-parties protocols are suitable for client/server environment. EX ： Telnet, FTP  Three-Party protocols are suit for single server and multiple clients environment. Any two clients can authenticate each other and reach secure communication.

38. 第 38 頁 MQV A B

39. 第 39 頁 EKE, Bellovin & Merritt: 1992 “Secret public- key”, Gong, Lomas, Needham, Saltzer: 1993 SPEKE, Jablon: 1996 OKE, Lucks: 1997 Plaintext-Equivalent Protocols

40. 第 40 頁 Verifier-based Protocols A- EKE, Bellovin & Merritt: 1994 B- SPEKE, Jablon: 1997 SRP, Wu: 1997 GXY, SNAPI X, AuthA, and PAK X

41. 第 41 頁 Verifier-based Protocol  A server does not store plain password directly.  Instead of storing a plain password, a server stores a verifiable text (called verifier).  It provides higher security level: an attacker must perform dictionary attack when the server is corrupted.  Furthermore, a verifier-based protocol can withstand the stolen verifier attack.

42. 第 42 頁 1. Bellovin, S. Merritt, M., 1992, “Encrypted key Exchange: Password-based Protocols Secure against Dictionary Attacks. Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and privacy, Oakland. 2. Steiner, M. Tsudik G. and Waidner, M., 1995, “Refinement and Extension of Encrypted Key Exchange,” ACM Operating Systems Review, Vol.29, Issue 3, pp. 22-30. 3. Ding, Y. and Horster, P., 1995, “Undetectable On-line Password Guessing Attacks”, Technical Report, TR-95-13-F, July. 4. C. L. Lin, H. M. Sun, and T. Hwang, 2001, “Efficient and Practical DHEKE Protocols,” ACM Operating Systems Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 41-47. 5. C. L. Lin, H. M. Sun, M. Steiner, and T. Hwang, 2001, "Three-party Encrypted Key Exchange Without Server Public-Keys," IEEE Communications Letters, Vol. 5, No. 12, pp. 497-499. 6. C. L. Lin, H. M. Sun, and T. Hwang, 2001, “Efficient and Practical DHEKE Protocols,” ACM Operating Systems Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 41-47. References