1. Manhattan East Side Access Project Second Avenue Subway PEA Team: Jay Horwitz Bryan Mullins Muyiwa TeribaMay 3, 2004

2. 2 Overview of Presentation I.Introduction II.Funding and Finance III.Costs IV.Benefits V.Synthesis

3. 3 INTRODUCTION

4. 4 What is SAS? 8.5 mile subway project from 125th Street to the financial district in Lower Manhattan Will include 16 new stations along path under Second Avenue Purpose to provide faster travel for current transit riders and relieve severe overcrowding conditions on Lexington Avenue line Construction time estimated to start in 2004 and last 17 years

5. 5 On the Table for Nearly a Century Population density of East Side increased dramatically at turn of century Proposals to build north-south subway line along Second Avenue date back to 1929 During 1960s a two-track subway line from the Bronx to Lower Manhattan resulted in construction of several tunnel segments However, construction suspended in 1970s due to City’s financial crisis

6. 6 Transportation Problems have Renewed Interest in SAS Proposal Lexington Avenue express service (4/5/6) operates with passenger loads that exceed New York City Transit guidelines Overcrowding expected to increase Access (1/4 to 1/2 mile) to subway service is lacking on far East Side of Manhattan Overcrowding lengthens trip times and causes service delays Majority of rush hour buses are crowded and travel speeds are slow due to traffic congestion Severe traffic congestion on local streets and FDR Drive contribute to New York City’s inability to meet National Ambient Air Quality Standards

7. 7 SAS Wins Favor Among Officials, Community Groups, General Public No-Build Alternative: Examined future impacts of inaction Transportation System Management (TSM) Alternative: Bus service improvements Build Alternative 1: New subway line under Second Avenue from 125th Street to 63rd Street with connection to Lower Manhattan via Broadway subway line Build Alternative 2: 125th Street to 63rd Street subway line with addition of light rail transit line linking Lower East Side to Union Square and Lower Manhattan Build Alternative 3: Full-length Second Avenue Subway from 125th Street to financial district in Lower Manhattan

8. 8 Map of SAS and System Interconnection Source: MTA MESA Study, “Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement,” April 2001

9. 9 FUNDING

10. 10 Project Funding: Preliminary Consideration and Commitment Sources of Funding ($ in millions) Federal Government$4,984 New York City$530 Coliseum Sale Proceeds$145 Investment Income$245 Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority$60 Carryover from Prior Capital Program$225 Subtotal$6,189 Debt Restructuring Initiative$3,011 Revenue Bonds$8,262 Total$17,462 Source: MTA, FTA

11. 11 Where are we in the process? 2001 2002 2003 20042005 Environmental Analyses Preliminary engineering Final design Construction XX X X ? X : Federal approval received Decision Pending 2021 Est. 17 years X

12. 12 COSTS

13. 13 Costs Overview $1.05 billion for 2000-2004 Capital Program $728 million for 2000-2004 Capital Program personnel costs $16.8 billion total capital cost from 2004-2021 –$16.18 billion for project management, design, construction, right-of-way –$624.9 million for rolling stock $348.6 million annual operating cost starting in 2021 over 50 years at 2004 present value of $2.8 billion $1.13 billion cost per mile $210 incremental cost per incremental rider* * This figure is exceptionally high because of the difficulty of attracting new transit riders in a market in which the majority of commuters already use transit. Source: Annual Report on New Starts 2003 (November 2002), LowerManhattan.info

14. 14 Elements of $16.8 bn Total Capital Cost Northbound and Southbound twin tunnels (8.5 miles each) 16 new stations 30-35 fan plants Numerous pump rooms Electrical power substations 1-2 new or expanded train storage and maintenance yards Connections to existing stations Source: PEA Team Research

15. 15 2000-2004 Capital Program Allocates $1.05 Billion for SAS Preliminary Engineering Final Design Construction $625,000,000 $270,337,039 $154,662,961 Source: MTA Capital Construction, March 2004

16. 16 2000-2004 Capital Program Also Yields Personnel Costs $728 mn (average annual increase of 3.8%) 20002001200220032004 Source: Metropolitan Transit Authority Note: The MTA did not disclose assumptions regarding changes in staffing levels

17. 17 Cost-Per-Mile of Major Transit Projects Shows Magnitude of SAS 1970s1990s2004-2021 Source: Common Patterns, PEA Team Research $81 mn 1980s $152 mn $197 mn $300 mn $1.13 bn SAS 2001 Dollars Bay Area Rapid Transit MARTA (Atlanta) D.C. Metro Los Angeles Red Line

18. 18 Cost Timeline * $16.8 bn figure distributed evenly over 17 years; PV of annuity formula using 17 years, 5% interest rate ** Present value discounted back 17 years to 2004 at 5% interest rate Source: PEA Team Research 2000 Capital Program Start 2071 $348,600,000 Annual Operating Cost Over 50 Years PV 2004** = $2,776,598,933 2004 SAS Construction Start 2021 SAS Opening $16,804,900,000 Total Capital Cost PV 2004* = $11,144,679,758 $1,778,000,000 Capital Program (Sunk Cost) PHASE 3PHASE 2PHASE 1

19. 19 Baseline Cost Figure ITEMCOST* Total Capital Cost from 2004-2021$11,144,679,758 Annual Operating Cost from 2021-2071$2,776,598,933 BASELINE$13,921,278,691 * Figures in 2004 PV dollars Source: Annual Report on New Starts 2003 (November 2002), LowerManhattan.info, PEA Team Research

20. 20 BENEFITS

21. 21 Benefits (Qualitative Overview) New York City’s Economic Priorities: –Retain/Expand diversified workforce –Improve competitiveness in economic cycles –Improve growth in outer boroughs Improved commute to Manhattan, which generates more than one- third of wages and one-quarter of jobs in tri-state region 70,000 full-time jobs created during SAS construction 600,000 riders will experience shorter commutes/time savings Auto trips reduced by 30,000 per day Improved security of transit network Source: The Economic Benefits of the Second Avenue Subway, December 2003, Regional Plan Association; Transportation Choices and the Future of the New York City Economy 2003/2004, Partnership for New York City

22. 22 Benefits (Quantitative Overview) $7 billion gain in wages $7.4 billion gross increase in city’s productivity $1.26 billion in benefits from time savings $319.1 million in ridership Source: The Economic Benefits of the Second Avenue Subway, December 2003, Regional Plan Association; Transportation Choices and the Future of the New York City Economy 2003/2004, Partnership for New York City

23. 23 Methodology for Estimating Benefits + + Source: The Economic Benefits of the Second Avenue Subway, December 2003, Regional Plan Association; Transportation Choices and the Future of the New York City Economy 2003/2004, Partnership for New York City

24. 24 Total Benefits $21.02 billion comprising: –$12.62 billion in economic development benefits including job growth, commercial development and residential development –$8.4 billion in transportation benefits including time savings and ridership **Figures cover a 50-year period Source: The Economic Benefits of the Second Avenue Subway, December 2003, Regional Plan Association; Transportation Choices and the Future of the New York City Economy 2003/2004, Partnership for New York City

25. 25 Benefits Critique Jobs 70,000 jobs from SAS over 17 years worth $1,000,000 per job –No explanation of where these jobs will come from New jobs, or job movement/reallocation? What kind of jobs? Value? –22,500 direct construction jobs estimated, majority of which will be short term in nature –No reference to jobs lost resulting from construction No analysis of net jobs created (some jobs will be permanently lost due to subway, e.g. taxi drivers) Source: The Economic Benefits of the Second Avenue Subway, December 2003, Regional Plan Association; Transportation Choices and the Future of the New York City Economy 2003/2004, Partnership for New York City

26. 26 Benefits Critique Time Savings Estimated $1.26 billion in time savings –No discussion or analysis of how much of this time savings value will be translated into dollars –No estimation of “net” time savings taking into account time wasted as a result of delays caused by construction –Time savings valued at today’s estimation to time value Source: The Economic Benefits of the Second Avenue Subway, December 2003, Regional Plan Association; Transportation Choices and the Future of the New York City Economy 2003/2004, Partnership for New York City

27. 27 Benefits Critique Changes to “Time Savings” Benefits Source: The Economic Benefits of the Second Avenue Subway, December 2003, Regional Plan Association; Transportation Choices and the Future of the New York City Economy 2003/2004, Partnership for New York City vs.

28. 28 SYNTHESIS

29. 29 Context: This Project Must Inevitably Compete for Scarce Resources Total New York City budget FY2005: $46.9 billion –SAS equals a non-trivial fraction Financial pressure on City anticipated –Budget deficits expected to range from $3.7 billion to $4.2 billion annually from 2006-2008 –Debt service increases from $2.4 billion in 2004 to $4.3 billion in 2008 However, New York City pays $11.4 billion more in federal taxes and $2.6 billion more in state taxes than it receives in funding* * 1999 FY analysis

30. 30 What should we count? Depending on how you look at who has standing, things change: –Do federal dollars mean national standing? –Or, is it New York City’s turn at the federal transit pot? New real estate development? –Where is the marginal benefit? Jobs? –Construction? Business relocation? –Looks like redistribution of federal funds Nearly $2 billion in sunk costs? –Planning, design and assessment are all expensive; these costs cannot be recouped if project is a “no go”

31. 31 What is an appropriate discount rate? OMB Guidelines (public investment) = 7% –“approximates marginal pre-tax rate of return on an average private investment” U.S. Treasury bond rate (30 year) = 5.2% New York City municipal bond rate = 6.5% This is a long-lived project with high up-front costs—it matters Source: Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, OMB 1992, US Treasury Bond Rate for April 2004; NYC Municipal Bond rate based on Nuveen Bond Fund

32. 32 Sensitivity Analysis: Discount Rate Focus on transportation benefits: (in millions) Base case: as described above w/: (1) even distribution of capital costs over 17 years, (2) zero growth in operating costs, (3) only transportation benefits (60,000 incremental riders) Conservative case: (1) front loads construction costs, (2) zero growth in operating costs, (3) conservative rider forecasts and time savings benefits (15,000 incremental riders) (in millions)

33. 33 Sensitivity Analysis: Putting the Core Assumptions to the Test Ridership assumptions/forecast –Number of incremental riders (typically 150% overestimated) –Subway shift (tight travel corridors in New York City) Development assumptions –Incremental job creation: these remain a non-factor Capital costs –Time distribution matters –Overruns: time and cost (will focus on project creep)

34. 34 Comparing Proponents’ Research with Our Base Case Base case: present value estimates Optimistic case: present value estimates Notes 50 years at 5.2 percent, dead weight loss 15% of capital construction costs Benefits represent 60 percent of costs!

35. 35 Summary: What’s going on here? Applying discount rates uniformly: –Makes costs look better, however… –This is very expensive even relative to comparable transit projects Standing is important; we chose to ignore economic development because: –Difficult to estimate magnitude of effect Studies did not employ reasonable estimation techniques –Very difficult to isolate marginal effects –Given national standing, marginal effects even less likely to appear

36. 36 More Detailed Analysis Should Examine Air quality improvements from mass transit Quality of life: transportation options Social equity: distributional weighting according to rider income distribution (Harlem, Lower East Side); access to CBDs Value added of increased multimodal interconnection with other regional transportation Real estate squeeze on low-income areas—a chronic problem in New York City