1. Harvard University CSCI E-2a Life, Liberty, and Happiness After the Digital Explosion 2: Privacy

3. Who Knows What About Whom? How Do They Know It? How Long Will They Remember It?

5. By posting User Content to any part of the Site, you automatically grant, and you represent and warrant that you have the right to grant, to the Company an irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable, fully paid, worldwide license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, publicly perform, publicly display, reformat, translate, excerpt (in whole or in part) and distribute such User Content for any purpose, commercial, advertising, or otherwise, on or in connection with the Site or the promotion thereof, to prepare derivative works of, or incorporate into other works, such User Content, and to grant and authorize sublicenses of the foregoing.

6. Global Disk Storage per Person Latanya Sweeney

7. Father's birthplace (town/city, state, county) Father's occupation Typical Birth Certificate Fields, post 1925

8. Baby’s Sex 113Blood Type 121Born Here? 1340Place of Birth 141Facility Type Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999 -starting fields 1-15

9. Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999 -starting fields 16-30

10. Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999 -starting fields 31-45

11. Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999 -starting fields 46-60

12. Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999 -starting fields 61-75

13. Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999 -starting fields 76-90

14. Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999 -starting fields 91-105

15. Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999 - fields 106-120

16. Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999- fields 121-135

17. Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999 - fields 136-150

18. Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999 - fields 151-165

19. Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999 - fields 166-180

20. Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999 - fields 181-195

21. Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999 - fields 196-210

22. Typical Electronic Birth Certificate Fields in 1999 - fields 211-226.

24. De-identified records

25. Two separate data bases De-identified medical research database Voter registration list

26. Re-identification Find records with the same values in the overlapping fields

27. {date of birth, gender, 5-digit ZIP} uniquely identifies 87.1% of USA pop.

36.  8. The core component of the Program is Defendants ’ nationwide network of sophisticated communications surveillance devices, attached to the key facilities oftelecommunications companies such as AT&T that carry Americans ’ Internet and telephone communications.  9. Using this shadow network of surveillance devices, Defendants have acquired and continue to acquire the content of a significant portion of the phone calls, emails, instant messages, text messages, web communications and other communications, both international and domestic, of practically every American who uses the phone system or the Internet, including Plaintiffs and class members, in an unprecedented suspicionless general search through the nation ’ s communications networks.  10. In addition to using surveillance devices to acquire the domestic and international communications content of millions of ordinary Americans, Defendants have unlawfully solicited and obtained from telecommunications companies such as AT&T the complete and ongoing disclosure of the private telephone and Internet transactional records of those companies ’ millions of customers (including communications records pertaining to Plaintiffs and class members), communications records indicating who the customers communicated with, when and for how long, among other sensitive information.  8. The core component of the Program is Defendants ’ nationwide network of sophisticated communications surveillance devices, attached to the key facilities oftelecommunications companies such as AT&T that carry Americans ’ Internet and telephone communications.  9. Using this shadow network of surveillance devices, Defendants have acquired and continue to acquire the content of a significant portion of the phone calls, emails, instant messages, text messages, web communications and other communications, both international and domestic, of practically every American who uses the phone system or the Internet, including Plaintiffs and class members, in an unprecedented suspicionless general search through the nation ’ s communications networks.  10. In addition to using surveillance devices to acquire the domestic and international communications content of millions of ordinary Americans, Defendants have unlawfully solicited and obtained from telecommunications companies such as AT&T the complete and ongoing disclosure of the private telephone and Internet transactional records of those companies ’ millions of customers (including communications records pertaining to Plaintiffs and class members), communications records indicating who the customers communicated with, when and for how long, among other sensitive information.

37. RSightMaxMobile takes your real-time chat and monitoring capabilities to brand new level Rsupervise chats privately in real time to see what the mice are telling customers while the cats away, all from your mobile device! RThe moment a new visitor hits your site, you can see which page they are currently viewing. We even allow you to fully co- browse the session as if you were there. Our Co-Browse is a great way for operators to "peek" into a visitor's shopping cart or session. Rdisplays a map, pinpointing the visitor location RSightMaxMobile takes your real-time chat and monitoring capabilities to brand new level Rsupervise chats privately in real time to see what the mice are telling customers while the cats away, all from your mobile device! RThe moment a new visitor hits your site, you can see which page they are currently viewing. We even allow you to fully co- browse the session as if you were there. Our Co-Browse is a great way for operators to "peek" into a visitor's shopping cart or session. Rdisplays a map, pinpointing the visitor location

46. Source: http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/01/02/phishing-for-facebook/http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/01/02/phishing-for-facebook/