1. doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/156ar0 Submission March 2002 RogawaySlide 1 Some Comments on OCB and CCM Phil Rogaway UC Davis and Chiang Mai Univ. rogaway@cs.ucdavis.edu http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway * This talk corresponds to contribution: “Some Comments on WHF Mode”, doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/156r0

2. doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/156ar0 Submission March 2002 RogawaySlide 2 Why is Phil here? I came in July 2001 to describe OCB. At that time, OCB was quite new. –The paper had not even appeared! Since then, OCB (and auth enc in general) has continued to do well. –The papers have appeared. Nice follow-on work. Lot of implementations. Lots of interest. But I’m told that OCB is in jeopardy in 802.11. So I’ve come to clarify cryptographic questions and address whatever else has given people pause.

3. doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/156ar0 Submission March 2002 RogawaySlide 3 What is OCB ? Auth enc mode by Bellare, Black, Krovetz, Rogaway. Appears in ACM CCS 01 + a proposal to NIST. Follow-on work to early version of [Jutla01]. Uses any block cipher (eg, AES). Uses  |M| / n  + 2 block cipher calls to encrypt+authenticate M (n=block length). About half of what alternatives use. Provably secure: if you break OCB-E privacy/authenticity with advantage > 1.5 m 2 /2 n then you break E with the “excess” advantage (m = # ciphertext blocks you get hold of). Adopted for the draft 802.11i standard.

4. doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/156ar0 Submission March 2002 RogawaySlide 4 Why the move away from OCB? Some specious technical issues. –[FHW01] non-issues: size of SW implementation, size of HW implementation, power consumption, HW speed, crypto confidence, … Only valid issue: plaintext integrity coverage; addressed. –[Fe02] non-issue: m 2 / 2 n security bound. Main issue for [FHW01, Fe02] appears to be patent avoidance.

5. doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/156ar0 Submission March 2002 RogawaySlide 5 What is this Ferguson attack? [Fe02] points out: if you have m blocks of ciphertext (and its plaintext) you can forge with probability  m 2 / 2 n –Right. This is obvious, well-known to the OCB authors, and the same as other popular modes. A non-issue for 802.11. –In general, when security upper bounds are available (as with OCB), you should always use them, and not attacks, to assess security. –Numerical example: 2 41.2 bytes of encrypted data (max possible) gives < 2 -53 chance of forgery. So gathering data at 1 Gbit/sec for one million years will give chance of forgery < 1 in 4 million. –Has nothing to do with tag length. m 2 / 2 n security degradation perhaps more significant for privacy than authenticity, but still of no practical importance when n=128.

6. doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/156ar0 Submission March 2002 RogawaySlide 6 The “Real” Issue: Patents From [FHW01] –“IEEE 802 has long history with patents—Bottom line: Avoid patents when there are viable unencumbered alternatives” –“Fair, non-discriminatory, and non-onerous are subjective (especially after standard is done)” From [Fe02] –“OCB mode has been patented. This last reason has been the main reason for the author … not to spend any time on OCB. Spending time on OCB will only help the patent- holders sell their licenses without any further compensation to the cryptanalyst… Given that OCB’s computational advantage over the patent-free modes is at most a factor of 2, … [we] expect OCB only to be used in niche applications” From the Chief Scientist at RSA –Lovely algorithm, but RSA just cannot support this because of the patents… (my paraphrase)

7. doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/156ar0 Submission March 2002 RogawaySlide 7 Why the Patent Bashing? Take your pick. –Dislike of crypto patents; uncomfortable with non-corporate patent holder; possibility of more than one party to deal with; fear of my/Virgil/IBM avarice; fear of my/Virgil licensing inexperience; … Phil doesn’t exactly understand. –Phil, IBM, and VDG have all sent in their letters of assurance. –Already licensed under very simple & inexpensive terms. –All owners of auth enc IP are focused on auth enc succeeding beyond 802.11; none of us have any interest for this to be costly or difficult.

8. doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/156ar0 Submission March 2002 RogawaySlide 8 CCM Mode An OCB alternative by [WHF02]. New, unpublished, still evolving. Invented specifically for 802.11. Twice the # of block cipher calls. Positioned as generic composition, but it is not. A new writeup, [Jo02], abstracts out the mode (does excellent job of this) and drafts a proof. Generic composition (with encrypt-then-mac taken over proven primitives) would be safer.

9. doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/156ar0 Submission March 2002 RogawaySlide 9 More on Generic Compostion Studied by [BN00]. –encrypt-then-mac: always achieves the desired security property (“auth of ciphertexts” [BR00,KY00]) under the customary assumptions. –mac-then-encrypt, encrypt-and-mac: doesn’t. No known results establish that one gets a better bound (in special cases) with mac-then-encrypt. Landscape unchanged by [Kr01]. Known results become inapplicable if one uses a common key.

10. doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/156ar0 Submission March 2002 RogawaySlide 10 More on the MAC within CCM CCM uses a kind of length-prepend CBC MAC. –[BKR94] suggested an approach for analyzing the length- prepend CBC MAC. –[PR97] claimed a more general result, for prefix-free message spaces, but gave no proof (they referred to [BKR94] instead). Single key of CCM means that one cannot appeal to the [PR00] claim even if one regards it as proven.

11. doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/156ar0 Submission March 2002 RogawaySlide 11 Is CCM more secure than OCB (wrt authenticity) ? Currently there is no publshed or independently verified proof of CCM. [Fe02, Jo02] suggest that CCM might have better Adv auth than m 2 /2 n. Who knows! One should focus on security bounds, not attacks. Statements like: –“[CCM] can be used for any amount of data up to 2 64 blocks” [Fe02] –“[CCM] is secure against attackers limited to 2 128 steps of operation if the key K is 256 bits” [WHF02] have no basis in results. Overall, an interesting academic question, but of limited practical significance.

12. doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/156ar0 Submission March 2002 RogawaySlide 12 OCB vs. CCM Published, peer-reviewed work from an experienced team of cryptographers. Proof under standard complexity assumption, getting standard bounds. Stable algorithm. Unpublished algorithm. Still evolving. Designed specifically for 802.11. Does not follow well- understood enc-then-mac generic composition paradigm. Unlikely to be used outside of 802.11.  |M| / n  + 2 block cipher calls 2  |M| / n  + 2 block cipher calls Yes. Letters of assurance on file None known Not significantly differentiated for 802.11 purposes: differences are overly assumption-dependent and likely “in the noise” Assurance HW/SW size HW speed Power use Ciphertext expansion... SW speed Patents