1. Unidimensional spatial model Stewart, Chapter 1

2. Plan of presentation Why do we care about theory or explanation at all? History of studying Congress Politics of Lineland

3. I.Why do we care about theory or explanation at all? That’s what social scientists do That’s what politicians do That’s what citizens do Think about the current campaign and ideological polarization

4. Different professions have different ways of theorizing about legislatures Activists: good guys and bad guys Reporters: individual stories about good guys and bad guys Political scientists: The general, generic, and predictable

5. II.Brief history of political science Early days ~ 1880 “formalism” ~1900 to 1950: Progressivism 1950-1980 “Sociology” 1980 to present: “Economics”

6. What are they? Formalism: understand Congress by the written rules. Progressivism: understand Congress by comparing to normative standards Sociology: –The group is what is important –Congress is a group, made up of other groups Economics –The individual is what is important –Collective behavior derives from individual interests, preferences, and behaviors

7. Congress and intelligence reform Formalist: –What does the Constitution say about the role of Congress and the Executive in intelligence? Progressive: –Does the Constitution actually govern the exercise of intelligence? –Is intelligence gathering a war making power? Sociology –Who are the actors? What (social) roles do they play? –What factors constrain the actors to stay within their roles (e.g. what is the committee environment)? Economics –Who are the relevant actors, what are their goals (election, power, policy) –What are the strategic moves that the individuals make in order to optimize over the policy space?

8. Advancements in legislative studies Our understanding of legislatures has become more precise over time Modern legislative analysis focuses on the interaction between individuals and institutions –Without institutions, decision making is chaotic –Heritability problem Theoretical primitives –Preferences –Rules

9. Logic of this style of analysis Begin with simple preferences How does decisionmakingproceed without institutions? How does decisionmakingproceed withinstitution? Add complexity and stir

10. The politics of lineland Think of the world as a single dimensional policy space Harold Hotellings “grocery store” problem Downsian model of competition: converge on the median voter –No matter the shape of the underlying distribution! Wal Mart Target C1C2

11. More formally … We care about: –Preferences –Alternatives –Rules

12. Preferences Dimensionality (1,2,many) Location and characteristics of preferences –Ideal points –Utility curves

13. Different curves

14. Alternatives Plain English: motions, amendments, etc. Expressed in same coordinate system as preferences Heresthetics (Riker): The art/science of trying to alter the dimensionality of a policy debate –Clinton impeachment (private sex vs. perjury) –9/11-related detainees (civil liberties vs. security) –Framing of Bush/Kerry campaign

15. “Framing” in Bush/Kerry Campaign

16. The importance of the reversion point or status quo The point where we end up if nothing happens. It is an outcome. The most important alternative Taxing vs. spending: may have different reversion points E.g. Public schools in Pacific N.W.

17. Rules Matter Majority requirement –Simple or supermajority? Agenda setting –Which alternatives and in which order? Pure majority rule: does it ever happen? Example: Oleszek pg. 231 (6 th edition)

18. The median voter theorem drives this analysis IF –The issue is unidimensional –Voters decide based on their preferences –Preferences are single-peaked –Voting proceeds under pure majority rule THEN –The median voter’s ideal point will prevail –Or the median is the dictator

19. Reminders: symmetry does not matter, only single peakedness

20. Example of a lack of a single peak

21. The politics of flat land A B C SQ P c (SQ) P B (SQ) P A (SQ) I c (SQ)

22. Who was the median voter in Congress in 2003?