1. Paul Cheeseman & Dr Rob Davis Technical Program Delivery paul.cheeseman@tpd.uk.com rob.davis@tpd.uk.com international Engineering Safety Management Overview and what’s new © TPD 2013

2. iESM - Aim To assist the international railway industry in delivering products/systems with acceptable levels of safety by developing & sharing good practice in railway Engineering Safety Management worldwide. Developed as part of the TPD internal research activities, for the good of the rail industry. © TPD 2013

3. ESM - History “YB0” – early 1990’s Network SouthEast Signalling and Telecomms YB1 -1996 Railtrack Electrical Engineering and Control Systems YB2 -1997 Railtrack YB3 -2000 Rail Industry iESM “YB0” – early 1990’s Network SouthEast Signalling and Telecomms YB1 -1996 UK Railtrack EE&CS YB2 -1997 UK Railtrack YB3 -2000 UK Rail Industry YB4 - 2005 Generic iESM -2013 International Handbook on Engineering Safety Management International Emerging Good Practice © TPD 2013

4. iESM - Who is producing it? Dr Rob Davis – the originator of the risk- based safety engineering process in rail as part of the BR NSE quality system later published as “Yellow Book”. Established Yellow Book and the YB Steering Group (YBSG) and now chair of iESM WG. Paul Cheeseman – part of the BR team and the last chair of YBSG. Bruce Elliot – editor of the Yellow Book content throughout 1991 -2007 and iESM 2012-13 © TPD 2013

5. iESM Working Group Act as authority for iESM and develop/support the creation of associated supporting materials); Facilitate the efficient and effective application of iESM; Promote and facilitate the exchange of ideas for good practice that are found in the world railway community and other relevant industries; Sponsored by MTR Corporation, Hong Kong. © TPD 2013

6. iESM WG Members Recognised as having significant standing within the industry on matters relating to the management of engineering safety, Available and commit to the work of the Working Group and promotion of iESM; Provide a professional contribution to Working Group activities based on their skills and expertise...............could that be you? © TPD 2013

7. iESM supporters Worldwide © TPD 2013

8. iESM - Structure Volume 0 © TPD 2013

9. iESM - Business benefits Identifying risks early Integrated hazard management – three “legs” Encouraging consistency and re-use Scaling with the problem Empowering project managers and supporting users through a common approach and common “language” © TPD 2013

10. iESM - What’s in? Emerging good practice Support for Common Safety Methods for Risk Assessment have been mandated on parts of the railway by European Directives Consistent with: – Recent EN50128 with focus on roles and competence – New CENELEC EN50126 incorporating the former EN50128/9/155 and covering all technical systems – Guidance from RSSB UK “Taking Safe Decisions” – Guidance on using “Cross Acceptance” fast track © TPD 2013

11. iESM - What’s out? Bias towards any one legal system or regulatory framework (e.g. requirement to reduce risk ALARP) Known deficiencies and poor practice e.g. using risk matrices as a sole method for risk acceptance Templates, checklists, techniques etc to layer 3 Explicit consideration of maintenance activities – (temporary) English spellings! © TPD 2013

12. Lets look inside …… © TPD 2013

13. Snap shot from Vol 1 © TPD 2013

14. Presentation of Volume 2 © TPD 2013

15. iESM - Overview #1 © TPD 2013

16. 1. Estimating risk by applying standards The standard shall at least satisfy following requirements: – be widely acknowledged in railway domain. If not the case, the standard will have to be justified; – be relevant for control of considered hazards in system under assessment; – be publicly available for all who want to use it. © TPD 2013

17. IEEE1474 – thank you © TPD 2013

18. 2. Estimating risk by comparing with a reference system A Reference System shall at least satisfy following: – it has already been proven in-use to have an acceptable safety level and would still qualify for acceptance where change is to be introduced; – it has similar functions and interfaces as system under assessment; – it is used under similar operational conditions as system under assessment; – it is used under similar environmental conditions as system under assessment. © TPD 2013

19. CBTC Roll out using reference system Specific Application Safety Case Chengdu Line 1 Generic Application Safety Case for core system Chengdu Line 2 Reference to CDL 1 plus specific application hazard management Xian Line 2 Hangzhou Line 1 Hangzhou Line 2 Zhengzhou Line 1 © TPD 2013

20. 3. Estimating risk by explicit risk estimation The need for the use of an explicit risk estimation could typically arise: – when the system under assessment is entirely new, OR – where there are deviations from a Standard or a Reference System, OR – when the chosen design strategy does not allow the usage of a Standard or similar Reference System because e.g. of a wish to produce a more cost effective design that has not been tried before © TPD 2013

21. Explicit Risk Estimation – putting it all together Derailment Rolling Stock Fault P-Way Fault Axle failure Undetected in Maintenance AND Gate OR Gate Basic Events Derailment Containment Fails Peak Loading Consequence Yes No Consequence 1 No Consequence 2 Yes Consequence 3 No Consequence 4 Yes Frequency Risk Summation Severity 1.0E-055 Fatalities 10 Serious Injuries1.0E-04 1.0E-03 1.0E-02 5 Minor Injuries No Effect © TPD 2013

22. iESM Overview #2 FROM RISK ANALYSIS © TPD 2013

23. iESM - Risk Control - Overview 1. Product / System / Project development, (design, build, test, etc.) 2. iESM activities (risk evaluation, risk control, safety argument, etc.) 3. Independent Assessment (checking and certification) © TPD 2013

24. iESM - Technical Support Processes Managing hazards Independent assessment Configuration management & records © TPD 2013

25. iESM - Team Support Processes Managing safety responsibilities Promoting a good safety culture Building & managing competence Working with suppliers Communicating and co-ordinating © TPD 2013

26. iESM - Summary Is advisory, not mandatory; Provides good practice guidance and will continue to reflect emerging good practice; Is applicable in an international market; Supports use of CENELEC standards and Common Safety Methods (CSM) for risk assessment, with practical, cost- effective advice; Assists in discharging legal & professional obligations; Is guided by a Working Group of practitioners and supporters. Is supported by training courses from TPD and Lloyd’s Register www.intesm.org © TPD 2013

27. A final thought Absolute safety is not achievable in the real world and therefore success relies on two fundamentals: 1) good processes, and 2) good people; such that when there is a problem or failure in one, the railway can be sustained by the other. © TPD 2013