1. Military Coups and Military Rule Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

2. What are the goals/motivations of national leaders?

3. Possible goals of national leaders Wealth Power National interests Social group interests – Class, ethnic group, religious group, family/clan) Corporate interests (e.g., military) Ideology

4. Intermediate vs. final goals Power => wealth National prosperity => power Ideology => class interests Power => national prosperity

5. Intermediate vs. final goals Power => wealth National prosperity => power Ideology => class interests Power => national prosperity – This is what most leaders say, but their actions betray them

6. How do the motives of national leaders in low income countries differ from those in wealthier countries, and why?

7. Some differences in motives/goals Lower income countries – Relatively more wealth-motive in politics – Power-motive rulers more difficult to remove – Politically relevant groups may differ e.g., ethnic group rather than economic class

8. Self-selection => More money-motive rulers in low-income countries Developed countryLess developed country $ $ Politics Business Politics Business

9. “Natural” selection => More (explicitly) power-motive rulers in low-income countries Developed countryLess developed country P I NP P I NP

10. Indicators of (unrestrained) power motive Coronation ceremony Opulent palace(s) Unqualified relatives in important military and government posts Execution of senior government & military officials w/o trial Cannibalism Billion dollar Swiss bank personal accounts

11. Methods to restrain ruler Rule of Law (institution) Separation of powers – Law-making, purse, executive, judiciary Veto points Accountability (ability to remove ruler)

12. What are some ways to remove a leader who is not performing satisfactorily?

13. Methods to remove leader “Regular” methods Term limits Direct vote Party vote Parliament vote “Irregular” methods (domestic) Military coup Rebellion Popular protest Assassination Deposed by another state

14. What are advantages and disadvantages of regular methods v. coup v. revolution v. foreign intervention?

15. Rulers are at risk of removal by multiple methods US: Term limits & direct vote UK: Party vote & parliamentary vote Zaire, Libya, Iraq (under Hussein): Rebellion, military coup, and foreign state – State is autonomous from citizens=> popular protest unlikely to be effective Iraq (current): Party vote, parliamentary vote, military coup, rebellion, foreign state

16. Rulers assess the greatest risks and take steps to remain in power Mobutu judged military to be greatest threat “split his military into many different units so that each can function as a check on the others” (Collier p. 149) Outcome: overthrown by invasion from Rwanda

17. In general, military coup is the greatest risk among “irregular” exits Source: Goemans et al 2009

18. Irregular exits generally lead to exile, imprisonment, or death Source: Goemans et al 2009

19. In some cases, the military coup has a constitutional basis Brazilian constitutions of 1891, 1934, 1946 (via Stepan 1988): – Military should obey the president “within the limits of the law” – Military is a permanent national institution charged with maintaining internal law & order and of guaranteeing normal functioning of constitutional powers Turkey (1920 constitution, etc.): – military guardian of secular tradition Thailand – Military’s first priority is loyalty to throne, not elected gov’t

20. Military prerogatives that can compromise/threaten civilian control (Stepan 1988) Constitutionally sanctioned independent role of military in political system Active-duty participation in Cabinet & defense department civil servant jobs De facto control of armed services De facto control of military budget & promotions Control of intelligence & police Control of key state enterprises National-security laws and military-court system cover large areas of political and civil society

21. Examples of civilian rule with high military prerogatives Egypt Pakistan Turkey (civilians now exerting more control) Brazil (before most recent democracy) Thailand

22. Rulers at greater risk of coup if... (Collier 2009) Government not severely repressive Previous coups, in country or neighborhood Ethnic polarization (in Africa ONLY) Low income Poor economic performance Aid dependence Ruler in power for a long time Not recent years No term limit

23. Huntington: “modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability” But economic growth deters military coups

24. Number of successful coups (1960-2008) and GDP/capita in 1960 Source: Center for Systemic Peace

25. Geographic distribution of coups Source: Ppwell and Thyne 2011

26. Temporal pattern of coups Source: Ppwell and Thyne 2011

27. If the military has all the guns, why don’t they stay in power?

28. Military in politics leads to politics in military Don’t want to be held responsible for economic and social problems Don’t have expertise in communicating with, motivating, etc. the masses

29. Principal-Agent Model Principal: `A chief actor or doer; the chief person engaged in some transaction or function, esp. in relation to one employed or acting for him (deputy, agent, etc.); the person for whom and by whose authority another acts’ (see Brooker p. 41)

30. Military Regimes Military is principal Chief executive (perhaps a junta chairman or a civilian figurehead president) is agent

31. Military Regimes Brazil 1964 Greece 1967 Burma

32. Although Egypt’s President Sisi was elected in 2014, many consider Egypt to be a military regime 2011: Youngest member of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) during Egyptian Revolution 2012: Appointed Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief by President Morsi 2013: Ousted Morsi in coup 2014: Resigned from military and elected president 2015: Continued crack-down on Muslim Brotherhood