1. Classical Indian Metaphysics

2. Idealism
Classical Indian metaphysics centers on the contrast between realism and idealism
Buddhism and the most popular school of Hinduism, Advaita Vedanta, are thoroughly idealist
They insist that everything is mind-dependent

3. Idealism
What appear to be independent objects are mental constructions
Objects do not really endure over time; they exist for no more than a moment
What we take to be objects are really bundles of momentary entities that we group together for our own purposes

4. Realism
Hindu philosophers of the Logic and Particularist schools, in contrast, are realists
They hold that objects such as rocks, stones, and trees are truly “out there” in the world
These objects in no sense depend on our minds
They endure over time

5. Vaisesika (Particularism)
Kanada (c. 100): “I will enumerate everything that has the character of being.”
Fundamental question of ontology: What is there?
Everyday speech and behavior is the touchstone
Categories (padartha, types of things to which words refer)

6. Basic Categories Substance: pot, cloth, fire, soul
Quality: square, blue
Motion (action): move, eat, throw
These correspond to items in Aristotle's categories, and to
Nouns, adjectives, and verbs
They are existent (sat)

7. Additional Categories
Universality: triangularity
Inherence: the pot's being blue
Individualizer: differentiates atoms (‘this’)
Absence: the elephant in here
The first three are present (bhava); the last, absent (abhava)
But they can all be talked about and named

8. Inherence
Quality
Inherence
Substance

9. Individualizer Black’s two iron spheres
They are qualitatively identical
But they are different
What distinguishes them?

10. Absences

11. Kanada’s Beard? How do we know anything about Universals Inherence
Particularizers
Absences?

12. Another Trilemma? We must either
Reinterpret sentences that lead us to introduce these entities (the semantic strategy)
Reinterpret the entities as concepts (the metaphysical strategy)
Postulate some way of knowing these entities (the epistemological strategy)

13. Substance All the other categories depend on substance
Qualities, quantities, relations, etc., are always of substances
There are many senses in which a thing may be said to be
But all depend on a focal meaning of ‘being’, substance

14. Vaisesika: Kinds of Noncomposite Substance
Earth
Air
Fire
Water
Ether
Composite substances are the causal result of combinations of these
Space
Time
Self
Mind

15. Two Concepts of Substances
Realist (Aristotle/Vaisesika) Idealist (Buddhist)
The world is divided into We divide the world into
Substances— bearers of Objects— bundles of
Qualities Qualities
We carve the world at joints There are no joints

16. Hinduism Hinduism is the primary religion of India.
It regards the Upanishads ( BCE) as sacred.
Jagatmandir temple, 1730, Dwarka

17. Henotheism There are many gods,
But all are forms of one being, Brahman.
Srisailam Shiva, Andhra Pradesh

18. Rg Veda
“They have styled Him Indra (the Chief of the Gods), Mitra (the Friend), Varuna (the Venerable), Agni (Fire), also the celestial, great-winged Garutma; for although one, poets speak of Him diversely; they say Agni, Yama (Death), and Matarisvan (Lord of breath).”
All these gods exist, but as diverse appearances of one God, “the divine architect, the impeller of all, the multiform.”

19. Bhagavad Gita
“Even those who are devotees of other gods, And worship them permeated with faith, It is only me, son of Kunti, that even they Worship, (tho’) not in the enjoined fashion. For I of all acts of worship Am both the recipient and the Lord ”
“I see the gods in Thy body, O God ”

20. Concepts of Brahman
Nirguna brahman: God without attributes; neti neti (not this)
Saguna brahman: God with attributes
Hampi temple ruins

21. Attributes of God Abstract: Sat: being Chit: awareness Ananda: bliss
Concrete
Creator (Brahma)
Preserver (Vishnu)
Destroyer (Shiva)

22. Six Orthodox Schools (darshanas)
Vedanta (end of Veda, or sacred knowledge)
Samkhya (nature)
Yoga (discipline)
Purva Mimamsa (exegesis, interpretation)
Vaisesika (realism)
Nyaya (logic)

23. Vedanta
Brahman: the Absolute, ground of all being, reality as it is in itself
Atman: the soul

24. Advaita Nondualism: soul (atman) = Brahman
Monism: Everything is ultimately one
Everything is Brahman
Brahman is the child and the elephant, you and me
We are one with everything
Everything is holy

25. Advaita Idealism: The world as it appears is not real
Distinctions are illusory
The world is maya (play, illusion)

26. Theism Dualism: soul (atman) ≠ Brahman
Not everything is identical with everything else
Realism: Some aspects of the world are independent of us
At least some distinctions are real

27. Buddhaghosa (-400) There are 89 kinds of consciousness
Nothing unifies them
There are only streams of consciousness
Nothing unites past, present, and future

28. Buddhaghosa A living being lasts only as long as one thought
People, minds, objects are only ways of speaking

29. People and Passengers
Jane flies from Austin to Houston and back <———————————>
She is one person
She is two passengers
‘Passenger’ is just a way of counting
Buddhaghosa: every noun is like ‘passenger’

30. Questions to King Milinda
“there is no ego here to be found”
“there is no chariot here to be found”
No one element is the whole
The combination isn’t the whole; parts could change while object remains the same

31. Consciousness-Only
Vasubandhu’s idealism —> Dharmapala —> Xuanzong ( )
Idealism: Everything depends on mind
No-self: There is no mind

32. The Atomic Theory of Matter
The atomic theory poses a challenge to this conception of substances
Atomic theory: things are composed of atoms; properties of things depend on nature and motion of atoms
Democritus

33. Dignaga (c. 450), Buddhist
“Though atoms serve as causes of the consciousness of the sense-organs, they are not its actual objects like the sense organs; because the consciousness does not represent the image of the atoms. The consciousness does not arise from what is represented in it. Because they do not exist in substance just like the double moon. Thus both the external things are unfit to be the real objects of consciousness.”

34. Plato’s Philosophy of Mind
The Good
Participation
This is a
triangle
Form
Recollection
Perception
Object

35. Nyaya-Vaisesika Philosophy of Mind
Instantiation
Quality
This is a
triangle
Inherence
Universal
Perception
Object

36. Making Universals Mind-Dependent
Application
Quality
This is a
triangle
Inherence
Concept
Perception
Object

37. Buddhist Philosophy of Mind
Application
This is a
triangle
Concept
Dharma
Perception
Internal Object
Actual Object

38. Nyaya-Vaisesika Conception
There are continuing substances
Qualities inhere in substances
Our talk of substances is a good guide to metaphysics
Substances are the basic constituents of the world
They have essences— properties necessary to them
Their essences give them identity through change

39. The Buddhist Conception
There are no continuing substances
Everything is momentary
“Substances” are just bundles of qualities (dharmas)
Our talk of substances is a convenient fiction
“Substances” are conceptual constructions
Nothing gives them unity
They have essences only as constructed

40. Yogi Berra
“Here’s your pizza, Mr. Berra. Would you like me to cut it into four pieces or eight?”
Yogi: “Better make it four. I don’t think I can eat eight.”

41. Actual and Internal Objects
Aristotle: objects cause perceptions, and are represented in them
Causes of perception = objects of perception
Dignaga: No—
causes are the atoms— actual objects [alambana]
objects are appearances— internal objects [artha]

42. Causes and Effects Causes of perception are the atoms
We don’t see atoms, but their effects
What we see doesn’t exist in reality; it is “like the double moon”
How could we distinguish aspects of the effects (appearances) that do match the causes?

43. Buddhist Arguments
Yogacara (Buddhist idealism): Vasubandhu, Asanga, Samghabhadra (4th century)

44. Argument from Change
Distinctness of discernibles: The same thing can’t have contrary properties
Any difference in properties implies numerical difference
Change implies a difference in properties
So, change implies numerical distinctness
Change occurs at every moment
So, things persist only for a moment

45. Nyaya-Vaisesika Response
Substances can endure through change
Substances can have contrary properties
Change does not occur at every moment
These relations are different:
Substance/properties
Whole/parts
Properties/parts
Things have essences
Qualities
Substance
Atoms

46. Argument from Destruction
Everything is destroyed by its own nature, with no external cause
Everything destroyed by its own nature is destroyed immediately
So, everything is destroyed immediately
So, nothing persists for more than a moment

47. Against External Destruction 1
A cause can’t have contradictory effects
External causes of destruction would also be causes of production (e.g., fire causing ash)
Destruction and production are contradictory
So, there are no external causes of destruction

48. Against External Destruction 2
Nonexistence can’t have a cause
Destruction is nonexistence
So, destruction can’t have a cause
Nyaya-Vaisesika response: absences can be causes and effects

49. Immediate Destruction
Say an object is destroyed, not at t, but at a later t’
Some contributing factor must have absent at t but present at t’
But no external factor can contribute to the thing’s destruction
So, the factor must be part of the thing’s nature
But the thing has the same nature at t and t’; contradiction

50. Argument from Causality
Everything that exists is causally efficient
Everything causally efficient is momentary
So, everything that exists is momentary

51. Capacities There are no unrealized capacities
So, anything that can cause something causes it immediately
So, things have different capacities at different times
Difference in capacities implies numerical distinctness
So, nothing persists for more than a moment

52. Argument from Momentariness
Mental states are momentary
Anything that depends on something momentary is momentary
The body depends on mental states
So, the body is momentary

53. Argument from Momentariness
Mental states are momentary
Anything that causes something momentary is momentary
Physical objects cause mental states
So, physical objects are momentary

54. Argument from consciousness
Dignaga: We know world only through sense organs
So, we know objects only insofar as they become internal objects
They are objects of consciousness, constituted by consciousness
We know objects only as conditioned by consciousness

55. Jainist Perspectivism
Jainism, a religion and philosophy tracing from Mahavira ( BCE), is best known for its emphasis on nonviolence
Jainism also advances a version of perspectivism

56. Jain Ethics Jains base their ethical views on five great vows:
1. noninjury
2. truthfulness
3. respect for property
4. chastity
5. nonattachment

57. Jain Metaphysics
They believe that these vows can be fulfilled only from a certain metaphysical standpoint
A conviction that one has the absolute truth, for example, is likely to lead one to be willing
to injure others for its sake, and
to become attached to it

58. Nonabsolutism
Nonabsolutism (anekantavada, non-one-sidedness): no statement captures the truth absolutely
Everything we say is true, at best, in some respect
Nothing is true simpliciter

59. Nonabsolutism The same is true of falsehood
Every statement approaches its topic from one point of view
To understand any topic, however, we must see it from many points of view

60. Respect
We should respect people no matter what they believe or say, therefore, because every statement contains some element of truth
Everything is true in some respect, or from some point of view

61. Multifaceted Reality Reality is many-sided
Indeed, it has infinitely many facets, some of which are opposites
Whatever we say is true syat, maybe, perhaps, in some respect
It is also false in some respect
We never capture the whole truth

62. Language Accompanying nonabsolutism is a view of language
Maybeism, or relativism (syadvada): language can express the truth only from some point of view

63. Law of Sevenfold Predication
Vadi Devasuri (twelfth century) develops this into a theory of language based on the Law of Sevenfold Predication:
1. It is
2. It is not
3. It is and is not
4. It is indeterminate
5. It is and is indeterminate
6. It is not and is indeterminate
7. It is and is not and is indeterminate

64. Pluralism Nonabsolutism implies a positive pluralism of perspectives
Reality is so rich that it makes true, with qualifications, every intellectual stance
Reality is so incredibly rich that it can underlie and give rise to opposed pictures

65. Skepticism Nonabsolutism ≠ skepticism
It promises reconciliation of apparently opposed points of view
It targets only the absolutism that partisans propose for their preferred positions, blind to the truth in their opponents’ theories

66. Intellectual Nonviolence
The point is not to deny but to affirm seemingly incompatible perspectives
The special sevenfold logic, the maybeism, was developed to facilitate the disarming of controversy
Here are the tools of intellectual nonviolence (ahimsa)

67. Self-Defeating? Is the Jain position self-defeating?
Jainists say no. It is not meant to be an absolute claim
That would be like practicing ahimsa toward everyone except oneself
Nonharmfulness requires humility
So, the Jainist offers it merely as one perspective alongside others