1. Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)
Welcome to
Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)
Overview
The military decision making process is a planning model that establishes procedures for analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action against criteria of success and each other, selecting the optimum course of action, and producing a plan or order. The MDMP applies across the spectrum of conflict and range of military operations. Commanders with an assigned staff use the MDMP to organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and orders.
The MDMP helps organize the thought process of commanders and staffs. It helps them apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to reach decisions.

2. The Seven Steps of the MDMP
Receipt of Mission
Mission Analysis
Course of Action Development
Course of Action Analysis
(War-Game)
Course of Action Comparison
Course of Action Approval
Orders Production

3. Military Decision Making Process
Input
Output
• Mission received from higher HQ or
deduced by the Commander and staff
•Higher HQ order/plan/IPB
•Staff estimates
•Facts & assumptions
Restated mission
•Cdr’s intent & planning guidance
•CCIR
•Staff estimates & products
•Enemy COAs
•Refined Cdr’s planning guidance
•Friendly COAs
•Staff/BOS COAs
Wargame results
• Established criteria for comparison
Decision Matrix
•Approved COA
Receipt of Mission
Commander’s initial guidance
WARNO to staff
Initial IPB products Cdr’s Intent
Restated mission Initial CCIR
Updated staff estimates/products
Preliminary movement
Cdr’s planning guidance Initial ISR plan
Updated staff estimates
COA statements and sketches
Refine Cdr’s planning guidance
Wargame results
* Decisions support templates
* Task Organization
Mission to subordinate units
Decision matrix
Approve COA
Refine Cdr’s intent and guidance
Refine CCIR
OPLAN/OPORD
WARNO #1
Mission Analysis
WARNO #2
Course of Action Development
Course of Action Analysis
(War-Game)
Course of Action Comparison
Each step begins with inputs that build on previous steps. The outputs of each step drive subsequent steps. Errors committed early affect later steps. While the formal process begins with the receipt of a mission and has as its goal the production of an order, planning continues throughout the operations process.
Preparation and execution, while not part of the MDMP, are shown in the lower portion to highlight the importance of continuous planning. Once a plan or order is produced, it is transmitted to those who will execute it quickly enough for them to produce their own plans and prepare for the operation. Backbriefs and rehearsals occur during preparation. They are essential to ensure those responsible for execution have a clear understanding of the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations. During execution, plans are refined or planning for a new operation begins, as the situation requires.
Assessment is continuous and occurs during planning, preparation, and execution. At any time during the operations process, the situation may require the commander to restart the MDMP. Examples of these circumstances include—
The commander receives a new mission.
The commander receives or perceives a possible follow-on mission.
The commander receives or perceives a contingency based on a variance in the current operation.
The MDMP can be as detailed as time, resources, experience, and situation permit. The MDMP is detailed, deliberate, sequential, and time-consuming. All steps and sub-steps are used when enough planning time and staff support are available to thoroughly examine two or more friendly and enemy course of actions (COAs). This typically occurs when developing operation plans (OPLANs), when planning for an entirely new mission, or during training designed to teach the MDMP.
Commanders can alter the MDMP to fit time-constrained circumstances and produce a satisfactory plan. In time-constrained conditions, commanders assess the situation; update their commander’s visualization, and direct the staff to perform those MDMP activities needed to support the required decisions. Streamlined processes permit commanders and staffs to shorten the time needed to issue orders when the situation changes. In a time-constrained environment, many steps of the MDMP are conducted concurrently. To an outsider, it may appear that experienced commanders and staffs omit key steps. In reality, they use existing products or perform steps in their heads instead of on paper. They also use many shorthand procedures and implicit communication. Fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and warning orders (WARNOs) are essential in this environment.
The full MDMP provides the foundation on which planning in a time-constrained environment is based. Before a staff can effectively abbreviate the MDMP, it must master the steps of the full MDMP. The advantages of using the full MDMP are—
It analyzes and compares multiple friendly and enemy COAs to identify the best possible friendly COA.
It produces the greatest coordination and synchronization in plans and orders.
It minimizes the chance of overlooking critical aspects of the operation.
It helps identify contingencies for branch and sequel development.
The disadvantage of using the full MDMP is that it is time-consuming.
Course of Action Approval
WARNO #3
Orders Production
Note 1: A star ( ) depicts Commander activities and decisions.
Note 2: Rehearsals and backbriefs occur during preparation and ensure an orderly transition between planning and execution.
Preparation
Plan
Prepare
Assess
Execution
Execute

4. Role of the Commander
Visualize - process of developing a clear understanding of the current state, with relation to the enemy and environment, envisioning a desired end state which represents mission accomplishment, and then subsequently visualizing the sequence of activity that moves the force from its current state to the end state.
Describe – Commanders describe their visualization in the form of their Commander’s intent and planning guidance.
Direct – Commanders direct throughout the operations process by issuing plans and orders, and establishing control measures.
Commanders are in charge of the planning process. From start to finish, their personal role is central. They discipline the staff to meet the requirements of time, planning horizons, simplicity, and level of detail. They also discipline the product to ensure it is relevant to the moment and suitable to subordinates. Commanders do this by visualizing, describing, and directing operations.
Commander’s visualization is the mental process of achieving a clear understanding of the force’s current state with relation to the enemy and environment (situational understanding), and developing a desired end state that represents mission accomplishment and the key tasks that move the force from its current state to the end state (commanders intent). Commander’s visualization begins in planning and continues throughout the operations process until the force accomplishes the mission.
During the MDMP, commanders describe their commander’s visualization through the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). Commanders describe an operation in terms suited to their experience and nature of the mission. They use an operational framework and the elements of operational design to describe the relationship of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to time and space (see SMFM 100-5). They emphasize how the combination of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations relates to accomplishing the purpose of the overall operation.
Commanders direct throughout the operations process. Their directions take different forms during planning, preparation, and executions. During planning, commander guide their staff during the MDMP, preparing mission orders, and establishing control measures. During the MDMP, commanders direct when they select a COA and communicate that decision to subordinates in a plan or order. They or their staff analyzes each possible COA for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability to select COAs for further analysis. After COA analysis and COA comparison using screening and evaluation criteria developed during MDMP, commanders select or approve the COA. Commanders also direct when they issue and revise planning guidance.

5. Sustaining Operations
Role of the Commander
LEAD
Principles of War
Tempo
Experience
Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops,
Time Available, Civil Considerations
Common Operational Picture
VISUALIZE
Art of War/Science
DESCRIBE
Art of War/Science
DIRECT
Art of War/Science
Nature and Design
Of the Operation
Time, Space,
Resources
Purpose and Action
Battlefield Operating
Systems
OBJ
Maneuver
Fire Support
Intelligence
Mobility / Countermobility / Survivability
Air Defense
Combat Service Support
Command and Control
Decisive Operations
Shaping Operations
Sustaining Operations
Commanders are in charge of the planning process. From start to finish, their personal role is central. They discipline the staff to meet the requirements of time, planning horizons, simplicity, and level of detail. They also discipline the product to ensure it is relevant to the moment and suitable to subordinates. Commanders do this by visualizing, describing, and directing operations.
Commander’s visualization is the mental process of achieving a clear understanding of the force’s current state with relation to the enemy and environment (situational understanding), and developing a desired end state that represents mission accomplishment and the key tasks that move the force from its current state to the end state (commanders intent). Commander’s visualization begins in planning and continues throughout the operations process until the force accomplishes the mission.
During the MDMP, commanders describe their commander’s visualization through the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). Commanders describe an operation in terms suited to their experience and nature of the mission. They use an operational framework and the elements of operational design to describe the relationship of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to time and space (see SMFM 100-5). They emphasize how the combination of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations relates to accomplishing the purpose of the overall operation.
Commanders direct throughout the operations process. Their directions take different forms during planning, preparation, and executions. During planning, commander guide their staff during the MDMP, preparing mission orders, and establishing control measures. During the MDMP, commanders direct when they select a COA and communicate that decision to subordinates in a plan or order. They or their staff analyzes each possible COA for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability to select COAs for further analysis. After COA analysis and COA comparison using screening and evaluation criteria developed during MDMP, commanders select or approve the COA. Commanders also direct when they issue and revise planning guidance.
Estimate
Input from other Commanders
Plans and Orders
Preparation
Execution
Planning Guidance
Intent
End State and Military Conditions
Center of Gravity
Decisive Points and Objectives
Lines of Operation
Culminating Point
Operational Reach, Approach and Pauses
Simultaneous and Sequential Operations
Linear and Nonlinear Operations
Tempo
ASSESS

6. Visualize Commanders must understand the situation in the battlespace
frame their battlespace during mission analysis
use the operational framework and elements of operational design to assist them in visualizing operations
After receiving a mission, commanders develop their initial commander’s visualization. During mission analysis, they visualize an operational framework by defining and arranging its three components—area of operations (AO), battlespace, and battlefield organization (see SMFM 100-5). The operational framework helps commanders visualize the arrangement of friendly forces and resources in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other, the enemy or situation. They consider the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT- TC), staff estimates, input from other commanders, experience, and judgment to develop situational understanding. From this situational understanding, commanders determine the desired end state and develop a construct of how to get their organization from its current position to that desired end state.

7. Battlespace
Area of Influence - A geographical area wherein a commander can influence operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under his command or control.
Area of Operations - A geographical area, including the airspace above, usually defined by lateral, forward, and rear boundaries assigned to a commander, by a higher commander, in which he has responsibility and the authority to conduct military operations.
Area of
Influence
Area of
Operations
Area of Interest - A geographical area from which information and intelligence are required to execute successful tactical operations and to plan for future operations. It includes any threat forces or characteristics of the battlefield/battlespace environment that will significantly influence accomplishment of the command’s mission.
Force
Projection
Base
Area of
Interest
Information
Environment
Battlespace is the environment, factors, and conditions commanders must understand to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest.
Battlespace is conceptual—a higher commander does not assign it. Commanders determine their battlespace based on their concept of operations, accomplishing the mission, and protecting the force. Commanders use their experience, professional knowledge, and understanding of the situation to visualize and change their battlespace as current operations transition to future operations. Battlespace is not synonymous with AO. However, because battlespace is conceptual, Army forces conduct operations only within that portion of it delineated by their AO.
An AO is an operational area defined by the Higher Command for land and naval forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the Higher Command but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. AOs should also allow component commanders to employ their organic, assigned, and supporting systems to the limits of their capabilities. Within their AOs, land and naval force commanders synchronize operations and are supported commanders. Component commanders normally designate AOs for subordinate units. They use control measures to describe AOs and design them to fit the situation and take advantage of joint force capabilities. Commanders specify the minimum control measures necessary to focus combat power, delineate responsibilities, assign geographic responsibility, and promote unified action. At a minimum, control measures include boundaries on all sides of an AO (see SMFM 90-9). In linear operations, AOs require forward boundaries. Commanders typically subdivide some or all of their AO by assigning AOs to subordinate units. Subordinate unit AOs may be contiguous or noncontiguous. When AOs are contiguous, a boundary separates them. When AOs are noncontiguous, they do not share a boundary; the concept of operations links the elements of the force. The higher headquarters is responsible for the area between noncontiguous AOs
Battlespace has an associated area of influence and area of interest. An area of influence is a geographical area in which a commander can directly influence operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control. Areas of influence surround and include the associated AO. The extent of subordinate units’ areas of influence normally guides higher commanders in assigning subordinate AOs. An AO should not be substantially larger than the unit’s area of influence.
An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence and areas adjacent to it. It extends into enemy territory, to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Areas of interest serve to focus intelligence development and IO directed at factors outside the AO that may affect the operation.
A commander’s battlespace includes that part of the information environment that encompasses information activity affecting the operation. The information environment contains information activities that collect, process, and disseminate information to national and international audiences but are beyond direct military influence. It includes space-based systems that provide data and information to Army forces. To envision that part of the information environment that is within their battlespace, commanders determine the information activities that affect their operation and the capabilities of their own and opposing C2 and information systems.
Army forces may deploy from home station directly to the AO or may move to the AO through force projection bases. Intermediate staging bases and power projection platforms are force projection bases. Force projection bases influence operations in a fashion similar to home stations. Sometimes one part of the deploying force will be at the force projection base while another operates in the AO. The deployed force may receive combat support (CS) and CSS from the force projection base for some or all of the operation.
Information Environment - The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information; also included is the information itself .
Home
Station
Battlespace - Battlespace is the environment, factors, and conditions commanders must understand to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air and land space, and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. Battlespace is conceptual; a higher commander does not assign it.

8. Elements of Operational Design
End State and Military Conditions
Center of Gravity
Decisive Points and Objectives
Lines of Operation
Culminating Point
Operational Reach, Approach, and Pauses
Simultaneous and Sequential Operations
Linear and Nonlinear Operations
Tempo
A major operation begins with a design: an idea that guides the conduct (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment) of the operation. The operational design provides a conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means. The elements of operational design are tools to aid designing major operations. They help commanders visualize the operation and shape their intent. The elements of operational design are most useful in visualizing major operations. They help clarify and refine the vision of operational-level commanders by providing a framework to describe operations in terms of task and purpose. They help commanders understand the complex combinations of combat power involved. However, their usefulness and applicability diminishes at each lower level of command. For example, senior tactical commanders must translate the operational commander's operational reach and culminating point into a limit of advance for ground forces. Decisive points become geographic or force-oriented objectives. Senior tactical commanders normally consider end state, decisive points and objectives, culminating point, simultaneous and sequential operations, linear and nonlinear operations, and tempo. However, their subordinates at the lowest tactical levels of command may only consider objectives.
End State and Military Conditions. At the operational level, these conditions attain the aims set for the campaign or major operation. Military commanders establish the end state for campaigns or joint major operations and set the military conditions necessary to accomplish them. In situations where military force is employed with nonmilitary means, commanders designate measures of effectiveness to focus military action. In many operations, particularly short-notice and smaller-scale contingencies, the end state and supporting military conditions may be poorly defined or entirely absent. In other operations, the end state may be vague or evolving. Commanders at all levels; therefore, monitor and assess progress toward the end state. Operational commanders continuously assess the major operation and campaign objectives against measures of effectiveness and the strategic end state.
Center of Gravity. Centers of gravity are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Destruction or neutralization of the enemy center of gravity is the most direct path to victory. The enemy will recognize and shield his center of gravity. Therefore, a direct approach may be costly and sometimes futile. Commanders examine many approaches, direct and indirect, to the enemy center of gravity.
The center of gravity is a vital analytical tool in the design of major operations. Once identified, it becomes the focus of the commander's intent and operational design. Senior commanders describe the center of gravity in military terms, such as objectives and missions.
Commanders not only consider the enemy center of gravity, but also identify and protect their own center of gravity. During the Gulf War, for example, the coalition was identified as the friendly center of gravity. The combatant commander took measures to protect it, including deployment of missile defense systems.
Decisive Points and Objectives. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are keys to attacking or protecting them. Normally, a situation presents more decisive points than the force can control, destroy, or neutralize with available resources. Part of operational art consists of selecting the decisive points that will most quickly and efficiently overcome the enemy center of gravity. Decisive points shape operational design and allow commanders to select objectives that are clearly defined, decisive, and attainable.
Some decisive points are geographic, for example, a port facility, transportation network, or base of operations. Other physical decisive points include elements of an enemy force, such as units, command posts, fire support units or important communications sites. Events, such as commitment of the enemy operational reserve, may also be decisive points. Once identified and selected for action, decisive points become objectives.
Decisive points may have a different character in support missions and stability operations. During the flooding of the Jazan-Abha Escarpment, for example, the National Guard commander identified the limited clean up after rescuing the civilians in the canyons as a decisive point. This decisive point was physical in nature, but its real value was psychological. Cleaning up and the introduction of civil contractors to complete what the National Guard started meant to residents that they were on their way to recovery.
Lines of Operation. Lines of operation define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. In geographic terms, lines of operation connect a series of decisive points that lead to control of the objective or defeat of the enemy force.
An operation may have single or multiple lines of operation. A single line of operation concentrates forces and simplifies planning. Multiple lines of operation increase flexibility and create several opportunities for success. Multiple lines of operation make it difficult for an enemy to determine the friendly objectives and force him to disperse resources against several possible threats. Each potential option further complicates the enemy's situation and stresses his command and control system. The strategic responsiveness and tactical agility of National Guard units create opportunities for simultaneous operations along multiple lines of operation.
Lines of operation may be either interior or exterior (Figure 3-2). A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point. With interior lines, friendly forces are closer to separate enemy forces than the enemy forces are to each other. Interior lines allow a weaker force to mass combat power against a portion of the enemy force by shifting resources more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Operations on exterior lines offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile enemy; however, they require stronger or more mobile forces.
The relevance of interior and exterior lines depends on the relationship of time and distance between the opposing forces. An enemy force may have interior lines with respect to the friendly force; however, that advantage disappears if the friendly force is more agile and operates at a higher tempo. Conversely, if a smaller friendly force maneuvers to a position between larger but less agile enemy forces, the friendly force may defeat them in detail before they can react effectively.
When positional reference to an enemy or adversary has little relevance, commanders may visualize the operation along logical lines (Figure 3-3). This situation is common in stability operations and support operations. Commanders link multiple objectives and actions with the logic of purpose, cause, and effect. In a linkage between objectives and forces, only the logical linkage of lines of operation may be evident. Multiple and complementary lines of operation work through a series of objectives. Commanders synchronize activities along multiple lines of operation to achieve the desired end state. Logical lines of operation also help commanders visualize how military means can support nonmilitary instruments of national power.
Culminating Point. Culminating point has both operational and tactical relevance. In the offense, the culminating point is that point in time and space where the attacker's effective combat power no longer exceeds the defender's, or the attacker's momentum is no longer sustainable, or both. Beyond their culminating point, attackers risk counterattack and catastrophic defeat, and continue the offense only at great peril. Defending forces reach their culminating point when they can no longer defend successfully or counterattack to restore the cohesion of the defense. The defensive culminating point marks that instant at which the defender must withdraw to preserve the force. Commanders tailor their information requirements to anticipate culmination early enough to either avoid it or, if avoiding it is not possible, place the force in the strongest possible posture. In operations where stability or support predominate, culmination may result from the erosion of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or lapses in protection leading to excessive casualties. Operational culmination in a stability or support mission usually occurs when the force is spread too thinly to control the situation, from a lack of resources, or from the inability to supply resources when needed. Then small failures may cascade into larger defeats, shocks in the political arena, or inability to provide the necessary support.
Operational Reach, Approach, and Pauses. Good operational design balances operational reach, operational approach, and operational pauses to ensure the force achieves its objectives before it culminates. Commanders carefully assess the physical and psychological condition of friendly and enemy forces, anticipate culmination, and plan operational pauses if necessary. They commit the required forces and conduct operational risk assessments. Commanders aim to extend operational reach while avoiding culmination and operational pauses.
Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be employed decisively. Operational reach varies based on the situation. Combat power, sustainment capabilities, and the geography surrounding and separating friendly and enemy forces all influence it. National Guard units extend their operational reach by locating forces, reserves, bases, and support forward; by increasing the range of weapons systems; through supply discipline; and by improving lines of communication.
Operational approach is the manner in which a commander attacks the enemy center of gravity. The direct approach applies combat power directly against the enemy center of gravity or the enemy's principal strength. The indirect approach attacks the enemy center of gravity by applying combat power against a series of decisive points that avoid enemy strengths. When possible, commanders choose an indirect approach: they maneuver to avoid enemy strengths and degrade enemy capabilities; they refuse combat when the situation is unfavorable or the outcome does not significantly affect the operation. An effective operational approach, whether direct or indirect, focuses symmetric and asymmetric effects on the objective. By a shrewd operational approach, careful integration of joint capabilities, and agile battlefield operating system combinations, National Guard units bring enemies within their operational reach while protecting themselves.
An operational pause is a deliberate halt taken to extend operational reach or prevent culmination. An operational pause may occur because the force has culminated, because the character of the operation has changed (by the intervention of another enemy, for example), or through a combination of other factors. If the situation requires an operational pause, the commander should designate a new main effort. National Guard units coordinate operational pauses with other components so the joint force can maintain the initiative and momentum.
Simultaneous and Sequential Operations. The sequence of operations is closely related to the use of resources. Commanders synchronize subordinate unit actions in time, space, and effects to link the strategy and design of major operations to tactical execution. Without this linkage, major operations deteriorate into haphazard battles and engagements that waste resources without achieving decisive results.
When possible, the National Guard conducts simultaneous operations throughout the area of operations. They employ combat power against the entire enemy system. National Guard units must be able to concurrently engage as many decisive points as possible. Simultaneous operations exploit depth and agility to overwhelm enemy forces because they threaten opponents with immediate consequences throughout the area of operation. The presence of multiple threats overloads enemy command and control systems. Enemy commanders confront many decisions within a very short period. The chance of a serious mistake is high, and each mistake creates opportunities for friendly forces.
Simultaneous operations place a premium on information superiority and overwhelming combat power. In practical terms, the force size and force projection constraints may limit the ability of National Guard units to achieve simultaneous operations. Effective operational designs employ complementary and reinforcing service capabilities to achieve maximum simultaneous operations.
Sequential operations achieve the end state by phases. Commanders concentrate combat power at successive points over time, achieving the mission in a controlled series of steps. Often the scale and scope of the operation, together with the resiliency of the enemy, compel commanders to destroy and disrupt the enemy in stages, exposing the center of gravity step by step.
Nonlinear and Linear Operations. Nonlinear operations are now more common than ever. Stability operations and support operations are normally nonlinear. The last 36 hours of Operation Desert Storm featured large-scale nonlinear offensive operations. Ideally, a mobile defense transforms an enemy attack into a nonlinear operation that destroys him.
In nonlinear operations, maneuver units may operate in nonadjacent areas throughout the area of operations. Even when operating in adjacent areas of operations, maneuver forces may orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations typically focus on multiple decisive points. Simultaneous operations overwhelm opposing command and control and retain the initiative. Nonlinear operations proceed along multiple lines of operations geographic, logical, or both. Lines of communication often diverge from lines of operation, and sustaining operations may depend on combat service support moving with maneuver units.
Smaller, lighter, more mobile, and more lethal forces sustained by efficient, distribution-based combat service support systems lend themselves to simultaneous operations against multiple decisive points. Situational understanding, coupled with precision fires, frees commanders to maneuver against multiple objectives. Swift maneuver against several decisive points supported by precise, concentrated fire induces paralysis and shock among enemy troops and commanders.
In linear operations, maneuver units normally operate in nearby areas of operations. Each combined arms force directs and sustains combat power toward enemy forces in concert with adjacent units. The ratio of forces to space and the array of maneuver forces emphasize geographic position and tend to create a continuous forward line of own troops. This protects and simplifies lines of communication. Protected lines of communication, in turn, increase the endurance of National Guard units and ensure freedom of action for extended periods.
A linear battlefield organization may be best for some operations or certain phases of an operation. Conditions that favor linear operations include those where National Guard units lack the information needed to conduct nonlinear operations or are severely outnumbered. Linear operations are also appropriate against a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy force or when the threat to lines of communication reduces friendly force freedom of action. In these circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to concentrate and synchronize combat power more easily.
Nonlinear and linear operations are not restrictive. Depending upon perspective and level of command, operations often combine them. For example, a brigade may employ its forces in areas that are not adjacent, operating simultaneously against multiple decisive points. A battalion in the same brigade operating within an urban area may employ units in a linear array.
Tempo. Tempo is the rate of military action. Controlling or altering that rate is necessary to retain the initiative. National Guard units must adjust tempo to maximize friendly capabilities. Commanders consider the timing of the effects achieved rather than the chronological application of combat power or capabilities. Tempo has military significance only in relative terms. When the sustained friendly tempo exceeds the enemy's ability to react, friendly forces can maintain the initiative and have a marked advantage.
Commanders complement rapid tempo with three related concepts. First, operational design stresses simultaneous operations rather than a deliberate sequence of operations. Second, an operation may achieve rapid tempo by avoiding needless combat. This includes bypassing resistance that appears at times and places commanders do not consider decisive. Third, the design gives maximum latitude to independent action and initiative by subordinate commanders.
National Guard units generally pay a price for rapid tempo through greater fatigue and resource expenditure. Commanders judge the capacity of their forces to operate at high tempo based on resources and deteriorating friendly performance. They design the operation for various tempos that take into account the endurance of the force.

9. Describe
Commanders:
Describe their visualization in the form of their Cdr’s Intent and planning guidance and CCIR.
Use operational framework and elements of operational design to describe the relationship of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations in space and time.
Emphasize how the combination of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations relate to accomplishing the purpose of the overall operation.
Commander’s Intent: Is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and the desired end state. It consists of end state, key tasks, and if desired, expanded purpose of the operation.
Planning Guidance: Cdr develops from his visualization; initially focuses on COA development and on ISR operations; Cdr identifies expected decisive operation & how he sees shaping and sustaining operations contributing to it.
During the MDMP, commanders describe their commander’s visualization through the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).
They emphasize how the combination of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations relates to accomplishing the purpose of the overall operation.
Commander’s Intent. A clear, concise statement … (FM 3-0 Operations) describing the commander’s visualization that focuses effort throughout the operations process. The components of the commander’s intent include:
• End state.
• Key tasks.
• Expanded purpose (if desired).
Planning Guidance. Commanders develop planning guidance for the staff from his visualization. It may be broad or detailed depending upon situation. For example, the commander may outline to the staff particular decisive points and how he envisions concentrating combat power against those points.

10. Cdr’s Intent and COA Development
Key tasks are not tied to a specific COA; they identify requirements fundamental to success of the force as a whole. When significant opportunities arise or the concept of operations no longer applies, subordinates use key tasks to keep their efforts supporting the Commander’s intent.
End State
COA 1
COA 2
COA 3
Key Tasks
The commander’s intent does not state the method the force will use to achieve the end state. Method is included in the concept of operations.
Pyramids design depicts how the commander’s intent focuses planning. Planners incorporate key tasks into all COAs and ensure the COAs achieve the end state for the operation. KEY TASKS those tasks the force must perform as a whole or the conditions the force must meet to achieve the end state and stated purpose of the operation.
It is during planning, the commander’s intent drives the MDMP. The staff uses it to develop COAs that conform to how the commander wants to achieve the end state.
During execution, the commander’s intent enables subordinates’ initiative by permitting them to decide how to act when facing unforeseen opportunities and threats, and in situations where the concept of operations no longer applies.
The commander’s intent links the mission and concept of operations and must understood two echelons down.
It describes the end state and key tasks that, along with the mission, are the basis for subordinates’ initiative. Commanders may also use the commander’s intent to explain a broader purpose beyond that of the mission statement.

11. Information Requirements
Commander’s Critical
Information Requirements
(CCIR)
Supports the Commander’s battlefield visualization
Identifies information Cdr needs to make critical decisions
Assists in determining or validating COAs
Filter information available to the Commander
Focuses the efforts of subordinates and staff
Assists in the allocation of resources
Assists staff officers in making recommendations
Limit to 10 or less information items
Directly affects the success or failure of the mission
THIRD category of commanders visualization is CCIRs (CDRs critical info requirements)
CCIRs for example, help filter information, outlines what information is important to the commander (avoid clutter of facts unnecessary for decision making).

12. Information Requirements
Commander’s Critical
Information Requirements
(CCIR)
PIR – Priority Information Requirements are those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision-making.
FFIR – Friendly Forces Information Requirements are information the commander and staff need about the forces available for the operation.
What are the CCIR components?
Keep in mind the CCIR are dictated by the commander, not the staff. CCIR are not static. Commanders add, delete, adjust, and update them throughout an operation based on the information they need for decision making.
• Priority intelligence requirements - identify the
information the commander considers most important for decision
making. They concern both the enemy (including the time available to
the enemy) and the environment (terrain, weather, and some civil
considerations).
• Friendly forces information requirements - consist of information on the mission, troops and
support available, and time available for friendly forces.
Essential Elements Of Friendly Information. (FM 3-13). Although EEFI are not part of CCIR, they become a commander’s priorities when he states them. EEFI help commanders understand what enemy commanders want to know about friendly forces and why. They tell commanders what cannot be compromised.
For example, a commander may determine if the enemy discovers the movement of the reserve, the operation is at risk. In this case, the location and movement of the reserve become EEFI.

13. Information Requirements
Commander’s Critical
Information Requirements
(CCIR)
EEFI – Essential Elements of Friendly Information are the critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation, and therefore, must be protected from enemy detection.
In addition to nominating CCIR to the commander, the staff also
identifies and nominates essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). Although EEFI are not part of the CCIR, they are a commander’s priority.

14. Direct
Commanders direct throughout the operation by issuing plans and orders, and establishing control measures.
• Must strike a balance between necessary but minimum direction and overly detailed direction.
• Control measures help Commanders direct action by establishing responsibilities and limits to prevent units from impeding one another and to impose necessary coordination. They may be permissive or restrictive.
THIRD role of the commander is to Direct.
They direct throughout the operations process.
During planning, commander guide their staff during the MDMP, preparing mission orders, and establishing control measures, when they select a COA and communicate that decision to subordinates in a plan or order.

15. The Role of the Staff During
Planning
Helps the Commander make decisions
Develops effective plans and orders
Integrates information with sound doctrine and technical competence
Initially focused on Mission Analysis, to help the Commander understand the situation and the mission
During COA Development and COA Comparison, the staff provides sound recommendations to support the Commander in selecting a COA
After the Commander makes a decision, What role does the staff play they prepare the order, and coordinates all necessary details.

16. Critical Staff Tasks Develop and maintain their Staff Estimates
Identifying specified and implied tasks
Identifying constraints
Identifying key facts and assumptions
Performing IPB
Formulating the concept of operations and concept of support in line with Commander’s intent
Developing the scheme of maneuver to support the COA
Preparing, authenticating, and distributing plans, orders, annexes, estimates, appendixes, and supporting plans
What are the tasks expected of the staff ?
A staff estimate is an assessment of the situation and an analysis of those courses of action a commander is considering that best accomplishes the mission.
ID the specified task (assigned to unit by HQ) and Implied task must be performed to accomplish a specified task. (Requires analysis of HQ order, enemy Situation and COAs and the terrain).
Constraints – HQ restrictions, can take form of a requirement (i.e. maintain a reserve), also prohibit action (no recon. Forward of a phase line. Facts – known data concerning situation (enemy and friendly disposition)
Assumption – is it valid and necessary to confirm (i.e. weather, likely enemy COA) convert to facts as soon as possible,
Assumption Test: Is it logical, reasonable, essential for planning to continue, assume away enemy strengths, assume away friendly weakness.
Concept of operations describes how commanders see the actions of subordinate units fitting together to accomplish the mission. As a minimum, the description includes the scheme of maneuver and concept of fires.
Where the commander’s intent focuses on the end state, the concept of operations focuses on the method by which the operation uses and synchronizes the battlefield operating systems (BOS) to translate vision and end state into action. Commanders ensure that the concept of operations is consistent with both their intent and that of the next two higher commanders.

17. Subordinate Interaction
Commander, Staff, and
Subordinate Interaction
MDMP is designed to facilitate interaction between Cdr, Staff, Lateral, Higher and Subordinate HQs.
allows for coordinated, concurrent effort that maintains flexibility, efficiently uses time, and facilitates continuous information sharing.
provides a structure for the staff to work collectively to produce coordinated plan
staff interacts and shares with subordinate HQs. As decisions, information, and products become available, higher HQs send them to lower in WARNOs
What is the value of MDMP ?

18. The Role of the Commander and Staff in the MDMP
Visualize
Issue initial guidance
Describe
Approve Restated Mission
• Issue Initial Commander’s
Intent
• Issue Cdr’s Planning Guidance
• Approve Initial CCIR
•Refine planning guidance
Direct
Approve COA
• Refine Cdr’s Intent / CCIR
• Approve OPLAN / OPORD
Receipt of Mission
WARNO #1
Mission Analysis
Mission Analysis
Briefing
COA Briefing
Wargame Briefing
(Optional)
COA Decision
OPORD Briefing
WARNO #2
Course of Action Development
Staff Estimates
Course of Action Analysis
(War-Game)
Commander’s Visualization
Course of Action Comparison
This diagram shows what is expected of the Commander’s on the left column
Along the right column is a series of briefings the staff provides to the commander.
Course of Action Approval
WARNO #3
Orders Production

19. PARALLEL TRAINING FLOW CHART
Brigade Battalion Company
5 %
Receipt of the
Mission
Receipt of the Mission
Receive the Mission 1
Warning Order
Warning Order
10 %
Mission Analysis
Issue a Warning Order 2
Mission Analysis
Warning Order
Warning Order
20 %
COA Development
Make a Tentative Plan
COA Development
35 %
COA Analysis
COA Analysis
Initiate Movement
COA Comparison
COA Comparison
Conduct Recon
10 %
(One COA Comp
& App Brief)
COA Approval 3
COA Approval
Complete the Plan
Warning Order
Warning Order
Orders Production
Orders Production
20 %
Issue the Order
OPORD
OPORD
Generic Time Blocks
from overall time
Supervise and Refine

20. Questions 20