1. INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN POLITICS Dr Simona Guerra simona.guerra@nottingham.ac.uk

2. IS THERE A EU DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT?  Yes, there is a democratic deficit/No, there is no democratic deficit (EU as ‘regulatory model’, catchword, trials and errors, lack of salient issue content) – EP elections  Comparing the EU?  Referendums (Maastricht 1992, Nice 2001, Constitutional Treaty 2005, Lisbon 2008) = Euroscepticism?  EU 2010, EU 2020 and beyond

3. DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT?  As the only elected body of the EU, the EP: is likely to be too weak; it gives evidence of the distance between citizens the EU institutions (too complex policies); policy drift; vs. other institutions http://no2eu.com

4. EP ELECTIONS  EP elections look as neither European nor national parliamentary elections.  Defined as ‘second-order’ - where no actual executive power was, and is, at stake (vs. national) European elections: Are likely to be less salient to citizens – ie. turnout will be lower; Motivations can be different from national elections – ie. larger parties are likely to lose, smaller to gain; Citizens can feel free to express their own judgement on the incumbent – ie. Incumbent government parties will lose votes. Electoral cycles can further affect the outcome of the EP elections

5. EU REFERENDUMS  Up to Maastricht: ‘permissive consensus’  Danish Referendums (1992, 1993)  Nice Treaty and Ireland (2001, 2002)  Constitutional Treaty: Spain, Luxembourg, France and the Netherlands (2005)  Lisbon Treaty: Ireland (2008)  Eurosceptic public opinion?

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7. EUROSCEPTICISM  Euroscepticism 'expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration‘ (Taggart 1998: 366)  ‘Hard Euroscepticism implies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU’  Soft Euroscepticism involves contingent or qualified opposition to European integration and can, in turn be further sub-divided into 'policy' Euroscepticism and 'national interest‘ Euroscepticism’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001)

8. DEMOCRACY IN THE EU http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb69/eb69_part2_en.pdf (p. 31/320 democracy) (p. 53/320 trust)  If EP elections (and referendums) are debated at the domestic level;  If citizens are distant from EU politics;  If there is a EU lack of salience;  If the EU does not have a term of comparison; In Schmitter’s (2000) words – Why bother?

9. EU 2010, EU 2020 and beyond  EU 2010: Lisbon Strategy, economic, social, environmental pillars (towards a competitive, dynamic, knowledge-based economy)  EU 2020: future enlargements and wider Europe (ENP), demographics, immigration, energy & environment, new threats: terrorism and weapons proliferation  ‘Constraining dissensus’; the ‘Monnet method’, spillovers between functionally related issue arenas to advance the level and scope of integrative institutions, has exhausted its potential’ (Schmitter 2000: 117)

10. REFERENCES  Follesdal, A. and Hix, S. (2006) ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 533-562 (DD)  Kroh, M., van der Brug, W. and van der Eijk, C. (2007) ‘Prospects for Electoral Change’ in van der Brug, W. and van der Eijk, C. (eds) European Elections and Domestic Politics: Lessons from the Past and Scenarios for the Future, forthcoming, ch. 11 (SOE).  Marsh, M. and Franklin, M. N. (1996) ‘The Foundations: Unanswered Questions from the Study of European Elections, 1979 –1994, in van der Ejik, C. and Franklin, M. N. (eds) Choosing Europe: The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of the Union, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, ch. 2 (SOE).  Meny, Y. (2002) ‘De la démocratie en Europe: Old Concepts and New Challenges’, Jornal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 41, No 2, pp. 1-13 (DD).

11. REFERENCES  Koepke, J. R. and Ringe, N. (2006) ‘The second-order Election Model in an Enlarged Europe’, European Union Politics, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 321-346 (SOE).  Majone, G. (1998) ‘Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit: The question of Standards’, Europe Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 5-28 (DD).  Majone, G. (2006) ‘The common sense of European integration’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 5, pp. 607-626 (DD).  Marsh, M. (1998) ‘Testing the Second-order Election Model after Four European Elections’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, pp. 591-607 (SOE).  Moravcsik, A. (2006) ‘What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?’, Politische Viertrljahresschrift, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 219-241 (DD).  Reif, K. and Schmitt, H. (1980) ‘Nine Second-Order National Elections. A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Elections Results’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 3-44 (SOE).  Schmitt, H. (2005) ‘The European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second-Order?’, West European Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 650-679 (SOE).  Schmitter, P. C. (2000) How to Democratize the European Union…And Why Bother?’, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield (DD).  Zweifel, T. D. (2002) ‘…Who is without sin cast the first stone: the EU’s democratic deficit in comparison’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 5, pp. 812-840 (DD).