1. Hypnosis and higher order thoughts Zoltán Dienes University of Sussex

2. 1.A hierarchy of ways in which knowledge can be explicit 2.Highest level of explicitness conscious awareness 3.Explicitness and control 4.Cold control theory of hypnosis

3. What is implicit or explicit knowledge? Dienes & Perner, 1999: One can explicitly represent just parts of, or all of, what it is to know a fact. Consider the knowledge: I see that it is a fact that the word in front of me has the meaning butter

4. There is a hierarchy of making this knowledge explicit. One might just explicitly represent: i) the property "butter” ii) the predication of the property to an individual "The word in front of me has the meaning butter“

5. iii) Whether the proposition is a fact of the real world or just possible. e.g. not just representing p but also rejecting the possible match of not-p with reality. Active representations that are not fact explicit are simply taken to be true. Wondering that X, pretending that X, hypothesizing that X require having active representations of X not taken to be true. Reasoning with hypotheticals, mental models, problem spaces require fact explicitness.

6. iv) the mental attitude of knowing, seeing, etc “I see that [it is a fact that] p“ Step (iv) is fully explicit knowledge; in previous steps the knowledge is to some degree implicit.

7. Relation between explicit knowledge and conscious knowledge? Higher order thought theory of Rosenthal: a mental state is conscious if we are conscious of being in that mental state; we are conscious of being in a mental state when we have a thought that we are in that mental state; in sum, a mental state is a conscious mental state in virtue of the person having a higher order thought that they are in that mental state. Fully explicit knowledge conscious knowledge

8. A second order thought (e.g. “I see that the cat is black”) makes one aware of the first order thought (“the cat is black”) and hence makes the first order thought a conscious thought. The second order thought itself is not a conscious thought until one becomes conscious of it – by a third order thought (e.g. “I know that I am seeing that the cat is black”). It is the third order thought that makes one consciously aware (introspectively aware) that it is *me seeing*.

9. Norman & Shallice (1986): Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) (attention demanding, conscious control) contention scheduling: selects according to level of activation, which is determined by trigger conditions of the schema and lateral inhibition/excitation between schemata.

10. SAS can bias activation values and is needed for 1) planning or decision making 2) Troubleshooting 3) learning new actions 4) technically difficult actions 5) overcoming strong pre-existing response

11. Imperative representations: action schema: When “A” isactive, A is to be immediately performed When “C” is active, C is to be taken as true Intention in the SAS: e.g. “If C, then do A” Active representation of C: but C is not necessarily to be taken as true Active representation of A: but A is not necessarily to be immediately performed

12. Contention scheduling or predication-implicit control: Action schema comes to control behaviour because of degree of activation of predication-implicit representations Executive or fact-explicit control: Fact-explicit representation ("if condition C then do action A" ) determines which schema comes to control behaviour (the schema with the conditions and action described by this representation).

13. The fact-explicit control system (a) can trigger the lower system; (b) and monitor its successful performance Either or both of the above can lead to the representation "I am intending this action". Sense of agency and intention comes from the higher order thought “I am intending this action” and also the third order thought “I know that I am intending to perform this action”

14. Hierarchy of voluntary action: - Non-intentional: the lower system produces an action not set by the higher system. -Intentional: higher system sets up the lower system; when appropriate conditions are met, the schema executes the appropriate action. - absent-minded intentional action: lower system runs unmonitored, producing actions appropriate to plan. - fully executive-controlled intentional action: Higher system triggers and continuously monitors execution of action schema, over-riding when necessary.

15. fully executive-controlled intentional action -without HOT: unconscious performance of executive function tasks?? -fully voluntary action, i.e. performed with HOT ("I intend to perform this action") (and typically with 3 rd order thought, making you aware of your intention "I know I am intending to perform this action").

16. Cold control theory of hypnosis: Successful response to hypnotic suggestions can be achieved by forming an intention (fact-explicit imperative representation in the SAS) to perform the action or cognitive activity required, without forming the higher order thoughts about intending that action that would normally accompany the reflective performance of the action.

17. Can hypnotic suggestions involve executive function tasks? a) Suggestion to forget the number "four": "1,2,3,5,6,.." - must be content control, but person claims ignorance of doing anything strange => no second order thought. b) Spanos, Radtke, and Dubreuil (1982): highs suggested to forget certain words in any type of task given to them produced those words at a below baseline level in a word association test. Content control, because the existing associations that would be produced by vehicle control must be suppressed.

18. In general, virtually any arbitrary behaviour can be hypnotically suggested despite the fact that such behaviour might be novel to the person, and many hypnotic suggestions require the person ignore some salient aspect of the situation (e.g. amnesia or analgesia suggestion) => many hypnotic responses are under executive control. Highs are especially good at dissociating HOTS from fact explicit representations? Consider Wegner’s task of NOT thinking about white bears for two minutes.

19. Form intention (fact-explicit imperative representation): “Do not produce representations of white bears!” If fact-explicit representations automatically trigger HOTs, one has: “I am intending not to produce representations of white bears!” Making the concept of white bears part of a conscious mental state. To not think about the concept of white bears consciously, one needs to be able to avoid second order thoughts. Bowers and Woody (1996): (after hypnosis) highs could NOT think of their favourite car for 2 minutes more effectively than lows

20. How is the normal ascent from fact-explicitness to attitude explicitness prevented? According to HOT theory, HOTS are just thoughts and so their occurrence will be sensitive to the same influences as other thoughts (Rosenthal, 2001). That is, consistent with the socio-cognitive approach, a HOT about intention might not occur because of Beliefs and expectations: the expectation that the act will occur involuntarily prevents HOTS of intending from occurring.

21. Speculation: dissociation between HOTs and first order states is brought about by expectations. Consistently: Kirsch (1985, 1991): Hypnotic experiences are the outcome of expectations. Or is there some other mechanism by which or state in which HOTs are avoided? Are there individual differences in the mechanism/extent to which expectations can determine HOTs independently of first order content?

22. Evidence: 1)General responsiveness of hypnotic subjects to demand characteristics 2) For suggestions given with no induction, correlation between expectation of response and response = 0.53 (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999) 3) Post-induction, expectation of number of suggestions that will be experienced correlates highly with number of hypnotic suggestions experienced, r =.64 (Council et al, 1986). 4) Subjects pass more suggestions after an induction rather than without an induction only to the extent that they expect to (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999).

23. Problem with expectation being sole explanation: We can 100% expect to see our keys where we left them, but in clear viewing conditions that does not mean we see them there if they are not there. Solution: expectations need only affect higher order thoughts of intending and not first order states. Will only see keys if have the intention to imagine them, and that intention will only happen if it fits in with other intentions, plans and strategies. => Hypnotic hallucinations etc will in general be contextually appropriate

24. Order of difficulty of hypnotic suggestions: 1)Simple motor suggestions (80% of people pass) 2)Challenge suggestions (50%) 3)Cognitive suggestions (20%) Cold control theory provides two types of explanation

25. Assume: Third order HOTs (TOTs “I know I am intending to do X”) are easier to suppress than second order HOTs (SOTs “I am intending to do X”). Maybe very highly hypnotizable subjects can suppress SOTs – so can do “forget 4” task. Mediums can only suppress TOTs. The second order thought is still there making them aware of content of fact-explicit control (“do not say 4”), making them aware of 4. So couldn’t do forget 4 task – or analgesia, amnesia, etc. But could do other tasks e.g. arm levitation (would not be introspectively aware of intending the arm to rise, so would appear involuntary.) => Cognitive suggestions harder than motor suggestions

26. Harder to suppress HOTs of intending for tasks which involve most effort in performing. Contrast effort in involved in: 1)Lifting arm (simple motor suggestion) 2)Trying to lift arm and failing (challenge suggestion) => Motor suggestions easier than challenge suggestions

27. Individual differences in hypnotisability. 1)Main skill is dissociating HOTs of intending from intentions: Highs should be able to produce nonvolriional actions in many contexts. Best correlate of hypnotisability is “waking suggestiblity” (NB not social conformity) r =.84.

28. 2) Executive control is presumably easier with relevant HOTs to support it, they can add to and support the controlling activation. Therefore, to engage in executive control without HOTs, it would help to be good at executive control. Prediction: On average, highs should be better than lows at executive control. Is this true? YES – on a range of different type of cognitive tasks

29. 1)Graham & Evans (1977): Highs better than lows at random number generation 2)Naish (1983): Highs can bias perceptual schemata more strongly than lows. 3) Dienes (1987): When hearing simultaneous lists of words, highs can select on the basis of representational content (semantic category) to a greater degree than lows. 4) Dixon & Laurence (1992): Highs have greater strategic control over reversing the Stroop effect than lows.

30. Cold control theory gives us a handle on:  How hypnotic responses can be executive tasks  How expectations seem to have much larger effects in hypnotic rather than typical non-hypnotic contexts  Order of difficulty of hypnotic suggestions  Individual differences in hypnotisability

31. Why does hypnotic behaviour exist? It is prevalent cross-culturally Largely associated with religious rituals and spirit possession/divine influence If you performed actions, saw images etc that you didn’t produce => spirit must have caused them 1)Evolved to support religious beliefs? Note the need for self deception – you must cause a behaviour/cognition but not know that you did so, so that it can be attributed to divine/spiritual intervention

32. 2) Sociological functions: You can perform behaviours for which you are not responsible Lewis (1971, 2003): Spirit possession serves important functions in the possessed. E.g. Socially marginalised people can acquire the gifts necessary for the spirit to be exorcised (e.g. wife demanding more resources from husband). A person can acquire the authority of the spirit and rise to positions of political power. Very common cross culturally. Cold control would be the ideal way of fulfilling these functions as it ensures the contextual appropriateness of the relevant “involuntary” behaviours and experiences

33. Conclusions 1.Executive function requires less explicit representation than conscious awareness (fact explicit vs attitude explicit) 2.Hypnotic responding often requires executive control, but subjects do not have relevant higher order thoughts (attitude explicit representations) to make the executive control conscious