1. A Casualty of Political Transformation?: The Politics of Japanese Energy Efficiency Phillip Y. Lipscy Department of Political Science & Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University

2. Politics of Energy Efficiency: The General Puzzles Cross-National Variation in Energy Efficiency Policies and Outcomes –What Explains Cross-national Variation in Outcomes? –Why are Different Policies Adopted? –What Political Factors Affect the Effectiveness of Policies?

3. Why Japan? Strong Energy Efficiency Record Important component of foreign policy and foreign aid Not Clear Why Japan has Done So Well Role of Politics?

4. Cultural Explanations? Energy Policy Experts Often Claim: “Japan is Different” Unique Culture of Frugality?

5. The Political Context of Japanese Efficiency Policies Bureaucratic Initiative & Autonomy Interest Group Politics Efficiency Clientelism

6. Bureaucratic Initiative & Independence Stable Government Policy –Encourages private sector investment in efficiency –vs. US: Carter  Reagan; Clinton  Bush Public-Private Communication Depoliticized Policymaking –Top Runner Program –Explicitly designed to prevent perversion of policy through lobbying

9. Interest Group Politics –Absence of Strong Anti-Efficiency Interest Groups –Early establishment of industry leadership in efficient products –Virtuous Cycle: Specialization in efficient products  Political support for efficiency  Policy to support efficiency –e.g. Automobile Sector & Fuel Economy Standards Toyota; Honda strong lobby for stringent standards

10. Efficiency Clientelism Efficiency Clientelism: policies that served dual purpose: –Provision of Pork to LDP (Old Ruling Party) Constituencies –Energy Efficiency through Diffuse Costs Imposed on General Public Efficiency Clientelism matched up well with Japan’s post- World War II political arrangements –MMD-SNTV Electoral System; Rural Overrepresentation –LDP One-Party Dominance –Bureaucratic Initiative Contributed to Japan’s abnormal transport profile of high costs, low total distance traveled, high rail-share, and low automobile-share

14. Example: Kei-Cars ( 軽自動車 ) Subsidization of light-weight automobiles through tax incentives and relaxed requirements Began as part of motorization policy in 1950s In 1970s, coopted to serve dual purpose: –Energy Efficiency  fuel efficient vehicles for rural areas with limited public transportation –Subsidization of rural residents, small business

15. Subsidies for Kei-Cars Kei-CarsRegular Automobiles Automobile Acquisition Tax (Time of Purchase) 3%5% Automobile Weight Tax (Every 3 Years) 13,200 (~$160)56,700 (~$690) (Compact Car) Automobile Tax (Yearly) 7,200 (~$90)29,500 (~$360) Highway Discount (Per Use; Rural Areas Only) 20% Discountn/a Registration of Parking Space Not Necessary (Rural Areas Only) Required

17. Kei-Car Ownership by Prefecture PrefectureKei-Cars as % of Total Population Density (people/km 2 ) Kochi50.0%108 Nagasaki49.6%349 Okinawa49.0%609 Shimane48.8%107 Tottori48.3%169 ……… Osaka28.0%4,657 Aichi27.2%1,436 Chiba26.4%1,199 Saitama26.0%1,888 Hokkaido25.9%70 Kanagawa20.0%3,728 Tokyo16.2%5,937

18. Rural Transportation in US vs. Japan

19. Other Examples Highway Tolls Gasoline Tax Shinkansen Bullet Train Network Electricity Prices

20. The End of Efficiency Clientelism Political Changes Since the 1990s Undermine Efficiency Clientelism –Electoral Reform –Delegitimization of Bureaucracy –End of LDP Dominance  Peculiar Position of DPJ (New Ruling Party) –Public Endorsement of Significant CO 2 Reductions Hatoyama 25% Reduction Target from 1990 Levels –Policy Commitments that Run Counter to CO 2 Reduction

21. Conclusion Political Sources of Japan’s Efficiency Policies –Bureaucratic Initiative & Autonomy –Interest Group Politics –Efficiency Clientelism New Approach? –Distribution of revenues to efficiency- enhancing activities & R&D rather than pork –Challenge: difficult to implement pro-efficiency policies with diffuse costs without public backlash –Where will political support come from?