1. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Peter E. Farrell
Honors Seminar: Energy, Society & Climate Change
Advanced Presentation

2. A Brief History of the Events Leading to the Kyoto Protocol
COP 1, in March of 1995, saw the passage of the Berlin Mandate, which called for new negotiations on more detailed commitments for industrialized countries under the UNFCCC.
On December 11, 1997 the Kyoto Protocol was officially adopted at COP 3 in Kyoto Japan.
In 1998 a new round of negotiations on Kyoto were launched at COP 4 in Buenos Aires.
1995: Just to recap, the COP is the ultimate governing body of the UNFCCC and is charged with implementing the Convention’s main objective of “stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of of greenhouse gases at levels that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. However, the reality is the Framework Convention did not incorporate the kinds of specific commitments necessary to actually bring this objective to fruition and thus, seriously tackle the climate change problem.
Given this, the Berlin Mandate, which called for such specific commitments, can be seen as the first step taken by the COP to pick up where the Framework Convention left off.
Ultimately, the Berlin Mandate began a two and half year negotiation process with the end result being the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol.
1997: Although the adoption of the Protocol was a major step towards realizing the ultimate objective set forth in the Framework Convention it was nonetheless a unfinished product. Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol that was adopted on December 11, 1997 sketched out the fundamental features of its mechanisms, policies, and compliance system but, it lacked the necessary rules to guide the operation of these features. In short, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol left much unfinished business to be decided upon in the coming COP meetings.
1998: Based on these negotiations the Buenos Aires Plan of Action was formed, which attempted to link together negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol’s rulebook with talks on implementation issues under the Convention. Ultimately, the divergent political and economic interests of the Parties proved to great and resulted in a breakdown of negotiations on further defining the rules that would govern the implementation of the Protocol.

3. History (cont.)
Negotiations on the rules of implementing the Kyoto Protocol resumed during COP 6 in Bonn, Germany, July 2001.
Building on the Bonn Agreements negotiators at COP 7 (Marrakech, Morocco, October 2001) adopted a comprehensive package of decisions known as the Marrakech Accords.
2001: Fortunately, the Parties were able to strike a deal known as the Bonn Agreements which settled, in large measure, the most political divisive issues considered under the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. (Such as Compliance procedures)
2001: Oct: The Marrakech Accords contained the finalized rulebook for the Kyoto Protocol as well as the long overdue rulebook for the Framework Convention. Once the Kyoto rulebook was adopted many, once reluctant countries decided to ratify the treaty.

4. What is the Kyoto Protocol?
In general, a protocol is an international agreement that stands on its own but is linked to an existing treaty.
More specifically, the Kyoto Protocol can be seen as an agreement, which supplements and strengthens the Framework Convention. Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol reaffirms the concerns and principles set out in the Convention and then builds on these by adding tougher, more specific commitments.
Note:2: In addition to sharing the Convention’s ultimate objective and principles the Kyoto Protocol also uses the same grouping of countries known as Annex I, Annex II, and non-Annex I Parties.

5. What is the Kyoto Protocol: 4 Main Elements
The Kyoto Protocol and its rulebook, set out in the Marrakech Accords, consist of five main elements:
1. Commitments
A. Specific emissions commitments
B. General commitments
2. Implementation
A. Domestic policies and measures
B. Land use, land-use change and forestry sector
C. Joint implementation
D. Clean development mechanism
E. Emissions trading

6. What is the Kyoto Protocol: 4 Main Elements
3. Compliance
A. Facilitative Branch
B. Enforcement Branch
4. Minimizing impacts on developing countries
A. Adaptation Fund

7. Commitments: General
All Parties to the Protocol are subject to a set of general commitments that mirror those of the Framework Convention.
These include:
Taking steps to improve the quality of emissions data.
Promoting environmentally-friendly technology transfer.
Supporting climate change education, training and public awareness.
Cooperating on international climate observation.
Note: This is not an exhaustive list of the Protocol’s general commitments as many of them we have already discussed in terms of the Framework Convention.

8. 1. Commitments: Specific
At the real heart of the Kyoto Protocol lies its set of legally-binding emissions targets for industrialized countries. These emissions targets amount to a total cut, among all Annex I Parties, of at least 5% from 1990 levels by
Note:1: Basically, the real difference between the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol is that the Convention encouraged these countries to stabilize their emissions levels whereas, the Protocol will commit them to reducing their collective emissions by at least 5% below 1990 levels. Moreover, unlike the Convention’s non-binding aim for stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions, the Protocol’s commitments are in fact, legally-binding, which implies consequences for non-compliance.

9. Commitments: Specific
The collective 5% reduction is shared out so that each Annex I Party has its own individual emissions target.
However, all individual emissions targets must be achieved by the same commitment period of
*All individual targets are listed in Annex B of the Protocol.
Note:2: IOW, countries can be said to have achieved their individual emissions reduction requirement if their emissions, as an average of the these five years, are equal to, or less than, their target emissions level as stipulated in Annex B. This 5-year commitment period was chosen, rather than a single target year, in order to better account for annual fluctuations in emissions due to uncontrollable factors, such as the weather or economic cycles.
However, in order to encourage early action, Parties must have already made “demonstrable progress” in meeting their emissions reductions commitments by 2005, and must submit a report, by January 1, 2006, providing evidence of that progress.

10. 1. Commitments: Annex B Country Target – 1990* EU-15 -8% US** -7%
Canada
-6%
Japan
Russian Federation
Norway
+1%
Australia
+8%
Iceland
+10%
Note: These are just some of the countries listed in Annex B of the Protocol and they illustrate the wide range of targets meted out to the different Parties. I’d like to say that these targets are the result of a precise equation, which takes into account all the relevant factors, such as, how much GHG emissions each country contributes to global atmospheric concentrations of GHGs; however, this is not the case. Instead, these targets were largely decided upon through intense, closed-door negotiations, which revolved around the differing political and economic interests of the involved Parties.
Note: EU: Also, its important to note that the EU is taking advantage of a scheme known as the “bubble”, found in the Articles of the Protocol, which allows the EU to redistribute its collective –8% reduction target among its 15 member states. In turn, the EU’s bubble scheme can be seen as a microcosm of the Protocol’s overall redistribution of the collective –5% reduction target for all Annex I countries.
*Some EITs have baseline year other than 1990.
**US does not intend to ratify the Protocol.

11. Commitments: 6 Main GHGs
The Protocol’s emissions targets cover the six main greenhouse gases:
1. Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
2. Methane (CH4)
3. Nitrous Oxide (N20)
4. Hydroflourocarbons (HFCs)
5. Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) &
6. Sulphur hexaflouride (SF6)
Note: All six greenhouse gases, including emissions and removals from carbon sinks, are lumped together in the same “basket” according to their respective global warming potentials.

12. Commitments: GWPs
Global warming potential (GWPs), as defined by the IPCC, are “a measure of the relative effect of a substance in warming the atmosphere over a given time period compared against a value of one for carbon dioxide”.1
Note: The time period used in the Kyoto Protocol is 100 years but this could be 20 years or 500 years.

13. Commitments: GWPs Chart
Note: GWPs are used to convert emissions of non-CO2 gases into their CO2 warming equivalents. More specifically, the CO2 warming equivalent of a non-C02 gas is calculated by multiplying the mass of emissions of the non-CO2 gas by its GWP.
For example: Emitting 100 tons of SF6 would be considered to result in the same cumulative warming over the next 100 years as emitting 2,390,000 tons of CO2 into the atmosphere.
Note: Also, its important to note that the first three GHGs shown in this table are emitted into the atmosphere by both natural and anthropogenic sources, while the last four, which have the highest GWPs, occur only as a result of industrial processes. More to the point, the use of these man-made gases; namely, HFCs and PFCs threatens to rise dramatically in part because they are being adopted as ozone safe replacements for CFCs, which were effectively phased out under the 1987 Montreal Protocol. Thus, although global concentrations of these particular gases are relatively low compared to carbon dioxide or methane they are nonetheless extremely potent GHGs that could pose serious problems in the future if left unchecked.

14. Commitments: Specific
If a Party achieves more substantial cuts in its emissions than is required by its target it may carry over the difference to the next commitment period
In addition, Parties may offset their emissions by increasing the amount of greenhouse gases removed from the atmosphere by carbon sinks in the Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry sector (LULUCF).
Note:1: Kind of like roll over cell phone minutes.
Note:2: Basically, the LULUCF sector is the part of the Kyoto Protocol that addresses the use of carbon sinks as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In terms of the Protocol’s commitments its important to note that, only certain activities in the LULUCF sector, that remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, are considered legitimate emissions reductions measures, which Parties can get credit for. Moreover, emissions reductions resulting from increased removals by sinks are not transferable from one commitment period to another.

15. Commitments: Conclusion
Ultimately, the Kyoto Protocol’s targets may appear relatively modest. However, given the fact that the emissions of many industrialized countries – except for EITs – have continued to rise since 1990 the task of achieving the Protocol’s collective 5% reduction target becomes much more difficult than it sounds.
Indeed, for some Annex II countries, reducing their emissions below 1990 levels would in fact represent a reduction of over 20% compared to their predicted emissions in the last year of the commitment period, 2012.

16. Commitments: United States
Note: Although America’s individual emissions reduction commitment under the Protocol is 7% below its 1990 levels (which would be around 5400 million tons) in reality, given the steady rise of US emissions levels since 1990 and their projected level of 7200 million tons in 2010, the US would have to reduce its emissions by over 24% in order to meet its Kyoto target.
Ultimately, the US is but one example of many Annex II or OECD-member countries that have failed to bring their emissions back down to 1990 levels, as is stipulated in the Framework Convention.
In turn, we can begin to see how the Protocol’s collective 5% reduction target is in fact, a very ambitious undertaking and if it is met, this will mark a historic turnaround in the otherwise persistent upward trend in the emissions of many industrialized countries since the start of the industrial revolution.
Although it will certainly be an uphill battle for most industrialized countries to meet their respective Kyoto targets, in practice, the job is made much easier by the Protocol’s numerous policies and mechanisms for implementation.

17. Implementation: Policies and Measures
To achieve the Protocol’s targets, Annex I Parties will need to implement domestic climate change policies and measures.
Possible policies/measures include:
1. Enhancing energy efficiency
2. Protecting/enhancing GHG sinks
3. Promoting sustainable agriculture
4. Promoting renewable energy and environmentally friendly technologies
5. Tackling transport sector emissions
Note: However, the Protocol does not require national governments to implement any particular policy. Instead, the Protocol gives an indicative list of policies and measures that might help mitigate climate change as well as sustainable developing; its up to the individual parties to choose the policies/measures most congruent with their own national historical, economic and political circumstances.

18. Implementation: LULUCF Sector
The LULUCF sector can provide national governments with relatively low cost opportunities to combat climate change, either by:
1. Increasing the removal of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere through carbon sinks, or by
2. Reducing emissions from the LULUCF sector itself.
Note:1: For example, governments might sponsor a national tree planting campaign.
Note:2: IOW, curbing the rapid deforestation of the forestry sector, which would in turn result in reduced carbon dioxide emissions. This is a particularly appealing option, at least from an environmental perspective, in that, deforestation is the second largest source of carbon dioxide emissions in developed countries. Thus, any attempts by the Parties to curb deforestation within their own borders would be a definite step in the right direction.
However, there are disadvantages to pursuing emission reductions via the LULUCF sector; namely, that countries might take credit for GHG removals that would have occurred naturally regardless of any governmental actions. On the other hand, countries could be held accountable for unintended GHG emissions in the LULUCF sector. For example an unplanned forest fire has the potential to release immense amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and in so doing, significantly skew a nation’s CO2 emission level.

19. Implementation: Mechanisms
The Kyoto Protocol broke new ground with its three innovative mechanisms: joint implementation, the clean development mechanism (CDM) and emissions trading.
All three mechanisms aim to “maximize the cost-effectiveness of climate change mitigation by allowing Parties to pursue opportunities to cut emissions, or enhance carbon sinks, more cheaply abroad than at home”.2
Note:2: These mechanisms reflect the fact that the cost of curbing emissions varies considerably from region to region due to differences in regional energy sources, energy efficiency, and waste management, just to name a few. Therefore, it makes economic sense to cut emissions, or increase removals by sinks, wherever it is cheapest to do so, given that the impact on the environment is the same.

20. Implementation: Mechanisms
All three mechanisms operate on the basis of accounting units.
Joint implementation projects result in emission reduction units (ERUs)
CDM projects generate certified emission reductions (CERs) and,
Under emissions trading, Annex I Parties may exchange assigned amount units (AAUs).
Note: These units are all equal to one metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (calculated using GWPs) and will have their own unique serial number so that they can tracked and recorded through national registries to be established and maintained by Annex I Parties.

21. Implementation: Mechanisms: Joint Implementation
Joint implementation (JI) allows Annex I Parties to implement projects that reduce emissions, or increase removals by sinks, in the territories of other Annex I Parties.
ERUs generated by JI projects can then be used by the investing Annex I Parties to help meet their own emissions targets.
Note: For example, a JI project might involve replacing an old, coal-fired power plant with a more efficient power plant, or reforesting land in the host country.
Note: There are two main conditions for JI projects; namely, the projects must have the approval of all Parties involved, and must lead to emission reduction or removals that are additional to any that would have occurred without the project.
Note: The Protocol also states that Annex I Parties are to refrain from using ERUs generated from nuclear energy to meet their targets. This seemed strange to me and I haven’t been able to find a good reason why this would be the case. Any thoughts?

22. Implementation: Mechanisms: Clean Development Mechanism
The CDM allows Annex I Parties to implement projects that reduce emissions in territories of non-Annex I Parties.
Like ERUs, CERs generated by CDM projects can also be used by Annex I Parties to help meet their emissions targets.
Furthermore, CDM projects also help the non-Annex I host Parties to achieve sustainable development as well as contribute to the fulfillment of the ultimate objective of the Framework Convention.
Note: A CDM project might involve a rural electrification project using solar panels, or the reforestation of degraded land.
Note: The hope is that the CDM will generate increased investment in developing countries as well as promote the transfer of environmentally sound technologies in that direction.
Again, CDM projects must have the approval of all Parties involved and must lead to “real, measurable and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change”.
Also, its important to note that private sector organizations, known under the Protocol as operation entities, are also allowed to engage in CDM projects. All operational entities must first be accredited by a 10-member CDM executive board operating under the authority of the COP/MOP.

23. Implementation: Mechanisms: Clean Development Mechanism
Finally, the CERs generated by CDM projects will be subject to a levy, termed the “share of the proceeds”. More specifically, two percent of the CERs of each project will be paid into a newly created Adaptation Fund.
The fund will help particularly vulnerable developing countries adapt to the adverse effects of climate change
Note:* What good giving a developing country two percent of a CER, which is equal to 1 metric ton of CO2, is supposed to achieve…Any thoughts?

24. Implementation: Mechanisms: Emissions Trading
Through emissions trading, Annex I Parties may acquire assigned amount units (AAUs) from other Annex I Parties that find it easier to meet their emissions targets.
An assigned amount refers to the “total emissions that an Annex I Party may emit over the commitment period and still meet its emissions target”.3
Every Party has its own individual assigned amount based on their 1990 emissions levels in relation to their respective targets under Annex B.
Note: So basically, if a given Annex I country actually achieves more cuts in its emissions than is required by its target then that country could sell a portion of its assigned amount in the form of AAUs to any Annex I country willing to buy them.

25. Implementation: Mechanisms: Emissions Trading
In addition, the emissions trading mechanism allows Annex I Parties to acquire CERs (from CDM projects), ERUs (from JI projects), or RMUs (from sink activities) from other Annex I Parties.
Note:1: So, to summarize, investing Annex I countries are given numerous opportunities to reduce emissions, or increase removals, in both Annex I and non-Annex I host Parties. More to the point, in return for these reductions abroad the investing country receives emission reduction units, each equal to 1 metric ton of carbon dioxide, that can then be used to help meet its own emissions target. Furthermore, once acquired these various emission reduction units can be traded back and forth between any number of Annex I Parties.
Needless to say, the negotiators of the Protocol were concerned that some Parties would be enticed to “over-sell” and then be unable to meet their own targets. Given this very conceivable possibility, each Annex I Party is required to hold a minimum level AAUs, CERs, ERUs, and/or RMUs.

26. Implementation: Mechanisms: Emissions Trading
This minimum level is known as the commitment period reserve and cannot be traded.
This level is calculated as “90% of the Party’s assigned amount, or as the amount of emissions reported in the Party’s most recent emission inventory (multiplied by 5, for the 5 years of the commitment period), whichever is the lower figure”.3
Note: Professor Somalwar tried to explain this calculation to me for a good 10 minutes, I thought I had but then I got home and lost it. However, I think its saying that in order for a given country to be eligible to sell-off its stock of emission reduction units it must first achieve 90% of its target emission level. IOW, Annex I countries can only sell emission reduction units amounting to no more than 10% of their individual targets.
Note: If an Annex I Party goes below its commitment period reserve, it is given 30 days to restore the reserve to its required level or face the compliance committee. Speaking of compliance…
[if any asks, the issuance, transfer, and acquisition of all emission reduction units are recorded in a transaction log maintained by the UNFCCC Secretariat.]

27. Compliance:
The compliance regime for the Kyoto Protocol consists of a Compliance Committee made up of two branches: a facilitative branch and an enforcement branch.
Note: Both branches are composed of 10 members.

28. Compliance: Facilitative Branch
The facilitative branch aims to “provide advice and assistance to Parties in order to promote compliance”.4
The facilitative branch provides “early-warning” of cases cases where a Party is in danger of non-compliance with its emission targets.
Furthermore, the facilitative branch can mobilize financial and technical resources to help Parties comply.

29. Compliance: Enforcement Branch
The enforcement branch has the power to apply certain consequences on Parties not meeting their commitments.
In cases of non-compliance with emission targets, Annex I Parties are granted 100 days after the current commitment period to make up any shortfall in compliance (e.g. by acquiring AAUs, CERs, ERUs, etc.).
Note: If, after the end of this 100 day grace period, a Party still falls short of its required emission target, it must make up the difference in the next commitment period, plus a Penalty of 30%. In addition, the offending Party must develop a compliance action plan detailing the action it will take to make sure that its target is met in the coming commitment period.
Ultimately, these are the only substantive punitive measures for non-compliance that could be agreed upon during the negotiations that lead to the creation of the Kyoto Protocol. Out of necessity, the negotiators put the emphasis on facilitation rather than enforcement, which is probably for the best anyway

30. Minimizing the impacts on developing countries:
The Protocol commits Annex I Parties to strive to implement their emissions targets through policies that will minimize adverse impacts on developing countries.
Furthermore, the Marrakech Accords require Annex I Parties to report (on an annual basis) on the actions they are taking to meet this commitment.

31. Minimizing the impacts on developing countries:
Lastly, the aforementioned Adaptation Fund is to funded not only by the adaptation levy on CDM projects, but also by additional contributions from Annex I Parties.
The Adaptation Fund will finance concrete adaptation projects and programs in developing countries; especially least developed countries (LCDs).
Note:1: The Fund will be managed by the GEF, which serves as both the Framework Convention’s and the Protocol’s financial mechanism.

32. Kyoto Ratification
Under Article 25 it states, “This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I, which accounted in total for at least 55 percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification”.5
Note:1: Basically, this excruciatingly long sentence is saying that the Kyoto Protocol would become legally binding 90 days after it is ratified by at least 55 countries, including countries accounting for 55% of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions in 1990.

33. Kyoto Protocol Thermometer
Note: Basically, this graphic shows that with 96 ratifications the first condition for the Protocol’s entry into force has been met.
However, as you can see the combined C02 emissions of the current 96 Parties only amount to 37.4% of the total C02 emissions in In turn, the Kyoto Protocol is 18.6% short or the percentage criterion and thus has yet to enter into force.
With that said, the question becomes, what Parties, or group of Parties, yet to ratify the treaty could bring the thermometer up to 55%?

34. Kyoto Protocol?
Ratification by Russia (17.4% of emissions), as well as Poland (3%) or Canada (3.3%) would bring the Protocol into force.
Both Russia and Poland have pledged to ratify the Protocol.
Poland said it would ratify the Protocol at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (September 2002). However, that date has since passed and Poland has still not ratified the treaty.
Note: On the other hand, Russia has refused to even set a vague time frame for its ratification of the Protocol and there are no signs that it will do so in the very near future.

35. U.S. Response to the Kyoto Protocol
The U.S. is the world’s single-largest source of CO2 emissions, accounting for 36% in 1990.
As such, U.S. ratification would clearly push the Kyoto thermometer above the 55% threshold and thus, bring the Protocol into force.
However, in March of 2001 President George W. Bush steadfastly rejected the Kyoto Protocol citing the “fact” that, “[T]he Kyoto treaty would severely damage the United States’ economy…”6
Note: Bush’s rejection of the Protocol presents somewhat of a conflict in that, the EPA’s 2002 Climate Action Report recognized that human activities, in particular the use of fossil fuel, contribute to global warming and could have serious consequences for the U.S.
So, basically his administration has recognized, at least in some limited sense, that global warming is in fact, a serious problem and yet at the same time they refuse to ratify the only substantive treaty designed to address this problem.
However, in place of the Protocol, the Bush administration offered its own national climate change plan.

36. U.S. Response: Clear Skies Initiative
On February 14th, 2002 President Bush held a press conference in which he laid out his Clear Skies Initiative.
The main thrust of the initiative is a seemingly impressive 18% reduction in the United States’ “greenhouse gas intensity” over the next 10 years.
Note:2: On the face of it, one could see how the “average Joe on the street” might see an 18% reduction in GHG intensity as even more substantial than the 7% reduction of GHGs called for under the Protocol.
However, what most people don’t know ( myself included) is that GHG intensity refers to the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to economic output

37. U.S. Response: Clear Skies Initiative
“Greenhouse gas intensity” is really the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to economic output.
The specific goal of the Clear Skies Initiative is to lower the rate of GHG emissions from an estimated 183 mt per million dollars of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) in 2002 to 151 mt in 2012.
Note:2: In other words, emissions would continue to increase as the economy grows, but at a slightly slower rate than would be the case without the Clear Skies Initiative.
In short, the Bush administration is doing next to nothing in terms of climate change mitigation unless one considers leaving the problem for future generations, doing something.

38. COP 8 I New Delhi, India: Statement of Eileen Claussen
“Regrettably, one of the major impediments to productive dialogue on next steps [in the climate change process] is the United States…At this critical juncture, it is imperative that developed countries – including the United States – move forward with concrete measures to reduce their emissions…”7
Note: When Claussen referred to the U.S. as a “major impediment” she was making reference to fact that Bush administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol in part, because it did not include commitments for developing countries; however, in New Delhi the administration did a 180 and argued forcefully against any consideration of developing country commitments.
In short, the Bush administration is delivering one message at home and the opposite message abroad, which only serves to impede progress on both fronts.

39. The End