1. Gift Giving

2. Your last gift. What was the last gift you received (money counts)? Who gave it to you (parent, grandparent, friend)? What would you estimate the price the person paid to buy it? What is the amount of cash such that you are indifferent between the gift and the cash, not counting the sentimental value of the gift? Why do you value or not value this gift?

3. Todd’s Worst Gift (received) Wedding Gift from his friend Marc. A large, heavy crystal eagle from Tiffany’s. Was given to me in NJ when I lived in overseas. (High transportation costs.) It wasn’t particularly elegant. Luckily, I was able to trade it in for silver spoons. Problem is that Marc still bugs me about trading it in.

4. Waldfogel 1993 asked a similar question. The % yield of a gift is (value/price)*100. Price range% yieldStandard error N $0-$2585.85.6102 $26-$5074.43.482 $51-$10089.84.247 Over $10088.54.247 Overall83.92.8246 Average yield of non-cash gifts.

5. Welfare loss Waldfogel concluded that Dead weight loss between $4 billion and $13 billion for 1993 xmas gifts. Americans spent $137 billion on non-cash gifts to non-household members alone in 2006. This is 2.4% of total consumer expenditures, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey.

6. Deadweight loss. Initial endowment After gift For same price could have had. Loss

7. Three questions Types of givers: –Aunts/uncles, parents, friends, grandparents, siblings, significant others. Who gave the most (or least) expensive gifts? Who gave the highest (or lowest) yield? Who was most (or least) likely to give cash?

8. Who gave what. Who gavePrice paidYield% cash Parent$135.6087%10% Grandparent$75.9063%42% Aunt/Uncle$64.6064%14% Sibling$28.3086%6% Friend$25.3099%6% Significant Other$25.4092%0%

9. Why is there gift giving? Take a minute to discuss with you neighbor as to why people give gifts. Reasons:

10. Why? Psychological reasons and economic reasons. Why is there a psychological value? Shouldn’t “evolution” get rid of it? There is an economic loss to gift giving. Could it ever make economic sense? Could it ever make sense to give a gift rather than money?

11. Reasons for valuing the gift. Reason# /155 The gift showed a lot of thought50 Wanted but felt shouldn’t buy it for self50 Wanted but never remembered to buy22 Wouldn’t have wanted to shop for it.20 Wouldn’t have bought but may grow to appreciate it. 19 Giver has better taste than oneself.18 Item is not readily available13 You didn’t know this item was available6

12. Some economic reasons Insurance: weddings, hunter-gatherers. Intergenerational loan. Paternalistic. Is this economic? Search: –Giver has better taste than oneself. –Item is not readily available –You didn’t know this item was available –Wouldn’t have wanted to shop for it. –Wanted but never remembered to buy

13. Todd Kaplan and Bradley Ruffle (2008) "In search of welfare-improving gifts". Motivation claim that gift giving is welfare reducing rests on several assumptions: 1)the giver does not perfectly know the recipient’s preferences. 2)gifts cannot be costlessly refunded. 3)gift recipients possess full information as to whereabouts of goods they desire 4)gift recipients are able to obtain such goods costlessly Kaplan and Ruffle (KR) break with this literature by relaxing assumptions 3 & 4 1) they add uncertainty about the existence & location of goods and 2) search costs to resolve this uncertainty importance of search-cost savings in modern gift giving can be heard in common expressions of gratitude upon receipt of a gift: "where did you find it? I've looked all over for this item."

14. Simplified Model There is a giver and a receiver. The giver is at a store and has to decide whether or not to buy a gift for the receiver. The receiver would have to spend c to visit the store. The gift costs p to purchase. There is an α chance of the good having value v (>p) to the receiver (otherwise it is worth 0).

15. Two ways of getting the good Shopping: the receiver travels to the store and buys the good, the social benefit is α (v-p)-c Gift Giving: the giver gives the good to the receiver, the social benefit is α v-p When is gift giving better than shopping? α v-p> α (v-p)-c Or c>(1- α )p Thus, we have gift giving if c>(1- α )p and α v>p Gift giving is better than shopping Giving is not waste of money

16. Interpretation of requirements Gifts when c>(1- α )p and α v>p Grandmother effect: when α is low, give cash since α v<p. When α is high, gifts are better option than buying it oneself: best friends. When c is high, gifts are better. v doesn’t affect which method is superior. Examples: what is the social value of gift giving, α v-p, and shopping, α (v-p)-c, when (c,v,p,α)=(1,2,1,.6), (1,3,1,.6),(1,6,2,.3),(1,8,2,.3) gg>0>shop, gg>shop>0, shop>0>gg, shop>gg>0

17. Why not trade instead of give? Can’t the giver simply make a profit buying from the store and selling to the receiver? In such a case, the receiver would only buy the good if it is worth v (with probability α). The receiver would bargain to purchase the good for a price less than v (buying at v would leave him indifferent). Go back to (c,v,p,α)=(1,2,1,.6). If the giver spends 1, and sales it to the buyer for 1.9 (<v=2), he would on average receive 1.14 for a profit of.14. How much must the giver get from the receiver in order to make a profit?

18. Why not trade? We can interpret our model as an information acquisition model. The giver knows more than the about the good. The giver knows this is something the receiver potential wants (with prob α ). The giver may at other times see other products with lower α. The cost c is what it costs for the receiver to learn whether it is something he wants. Trade would not solve this basic problem, since the receiver would still have to spend c and without doing so the giver would have incentive to push unwanted products. (The stereo/car/fashion salesman.)

19. Need to go to lab

20. Signalling in the Lab: Treatment 1 Payoffs: Proposer, Responder FleeFight Beer (Strong)$2.00, $1.25$1.20, $0.75 Quiche (Strong)$1.00, $1.25$0.20, $0.75 Beer (Weak)$1.00, $0.75$0.20, $1.25 Quiche (Weak)$2.00, $0.75$1.20, $1.25 For a strong proposer, (Beer, flee)> (Beer, fight)>(Quiche, flee)>(Quiche, fight). For a weak proposer, (Quiche, flee)>(Quiche, fight)>(Beer, flee)>(Beer, fight). Strong chooses Beer and Weak chooses Quiche

21. Signalling in the Lab: Treatment 1 Payoffs: Proposer, Responder FleeFight Beer (Strong)$2.00, $1.25$1.20, $0.75 Quiche (Strong)$1.00, $1.25$0.20, $0.75 Beer (Weak)$1.00, $0.75$0.20, $1.25 Quiche (Weak)$2.00, $0.75$1.20, $1.25 Responder now knows that Beer is the choice of the strong type and Quiche is the choice of the weak type. For Beer he flees, for Quiche he fights.

22. Signalling in the Lab: Treatment 1 Payoffs: Proposer, Responder FleeFight Beer (Strong)$2.00, $1.25$1.20, $0.75 Quiche (Strong)$1.00, $1.25$0.20, $0.75 Beer (Weak)$1.00, $0.75$0.20, $1.25 Quiche (Weak)$2.00, $0.75$1.20, $1.25 So the equilibrium is For strong, (Beer, Flee) For weak, (Quiche, Fight) This is called a separating equilibrium. Any incentive to deviate?

23. Signalling in the Lab: Treatment 1 Payoffs: Proposer, Responder FleeFight Beer (Strong)$2.00, $1.25$1.20, $0.75 Quiche (Strong)$1.00, $1.25$0.20, $0.75 Beer (Weak)$1.00, $0.75$0.20, $1.25 Quiche (Weak)$2.00, $0.75$1.20, $1.25 What did you do? In the last 5 rounds, there were 32 Strong and 13 Weak proposers 13 32

24. Treatment 2. Payoffs: Proposer, Responder FleeFight Beer (Strong)$1.40, $1.25$0.60, $0.75 Quiche (Strong)$1.00, $1.25$0.20, $0.75 Beer (Weak)$1.00, $0.75$0.20, $1.25 Quiche (Weak)$1.40, $0.75$0.60, $1.25 Can we have a separating equilibrium here?. If the proposer is weak, he can choose Beer and get $1.00 instead of $0.60.

25. Treatment 2. Payoffs: Proposer, Responder FleeFight Beer (Strong)$1.40, $1.25$0.60, $0.75 Quiche (Strong)$1.00, $1.25$0.20, $0.75 Beer (Weak)$1.00, $0.75$0.20, $1.25 Quiche (Weak)$1.40, $0.75$0.60, $1.25 Can we have a separating equilibrium here?. If the proposer is weak, he can choose Beer and get $1.00 instead of $0.60.

26. Treatment 2. Payoffs: Proposer, Responder FleeFight Beer (Strong)$1.40, $1.25$0.60, $0.75 Quiche (Strong)$1.00, $1.25$0.20, $0.75 Beer (Weak)$1.00, $0.75$0.20, $1.25 Quiche (Weak)$1.40, $0.75$0.60, $1.25 Can choosing Beer independent of being strong or weak be an equilibrium? Yes! The responder knows there is a 2/3 chance of being strong, thus flees. This is called a pooling equilibrium.

27. Treatment 2. Payoffs: Proposer, Responder FleeFight Beer (Strong)$1.40, $1.25$0.60, $0.75 Quiche (Strong)$1.00, $1.25$0.20, $0.75 Beer (Weak)$1.00, $0.75$0.20, $1.25 Quiche (Weak)$1.40, $0.75$0.60, $1.25 Did we have a pooling equilibrium? In the last 5 rounds there were 34 strong proposers and 11 weak proposers. Do you think there is somewhat to help the pooling equilibrium to form? 30 4 8 3

28. Treatment 2. Payoffs: Proposer, Responder FleeFight Beer (Strong)$1.40, $1.25$0.60, $0.75 Quiche (Strong)$1.00, $1.25$0.20, $0.75 Beer (Weak)$1.00, $0.75$0.20, $1.25 Quiche (Weak)$1.40, $0.75$0.60, $1.25 At Texas A&M, the aggregate numbers were shown. In the last 5 periods, 23 proposers were strong and 17 weak. 23 3 14

29. Signalling game Spence got the Nobel prize in 2001 for this. There are two players: A and B. Player A is either strong or weak. –Player B will chose one action (flee) if he knows player A is strong –and another action (fight) if he knows player A is weak. Player A can send a costly signal to Player B (in this case it was to drink beer).

30. Signal For signalling to have meaning, –we must have either cost of the signal higher for the weak type. –Or the gain from the action higher for the strong type.

31. Types of equilibria Separating. –Strong signal –Weak don’t signal. Pooling. –Strong and weak both send the signal.

32. Types of equilibria The types of player A are s and w. Let us normalize the value to fleeing as 0. The values are Vs and Vw. The cost to signalling (drinking beer) are Cs and Cw. We get a separating equilibria if Vs-Cs>0 and Vw-Cw<0. We get a pooling equilibria if Vs-Cs<0 and Vw- Cw<0 (no one signals). We may also get a pooling equilibria if Vs-Cs>0 and Vw-Cw>0 and there are enough s types.

33. How does this relate to gift giving? Basically, you get someone a gift to signal your intent. American Indian tribes, a ceremony to initiate relations with another tribe included the burning of the tribe’s most valuable possession,

34. Courtship gifts. Dating Advice. Advice 1: never take such advice from an economist. Advice 2.: –Say that there is someone that is a perfect match for you. You know this, they just haven’t figured it out yet. –Offer to take them to a really expensive place. –It would only make sense for you to do this, if you knew that you would get a relationship out of it. –That person should then agree to go.

35. Valentine’s Day Who bought a card, chocolate, etc? We are forced to spend in order to signal that we “really” care. Say that you are either serious or not serious about your relationship. If your partner knew you were not serious, he or she would break up with you. A card is pretty inexpensive, so both types buy it to keep the relationship going. Your partner keeps the relationship since there is a real chance you are serious. No real information is gained, but if you didn’t buy the card, your partner would assume that you are not serious and break up with you.

36. Higher value and/or Lower Cost Higher value You buy someone a gift to signal that you care. Sending a costly signal means that they mean a lot to you. For someone that doesn’t mean so much, you wouldn’t buy them such a gift. Lower cost The person knows you well. Shopping for you costs them less. They signal that they know you well.

37. Other types of signalling in the world University Education. Showing up to class. Praying. Mobile phone for Orthodox Jews Poker: Raising stakes (partial). Peacock tails. Limit pricing.