Nuclear Weapons Today A presentation prepared by the Medical Association for Prevention of War.

Nuclear Weapons Today A presentation prepared by the Medical Association for Prevention of War

MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006
Nuclear Weapons Today The Weapons The Effects The Locations The International Response For over sixty years now, the world has lived with the threat of nuclear destruction. Nuclear weapons are essentially instruments of terror. They threaten indiscriminate violence on the most extreme scale. No other weapon matches their ability to devastate and destroy. Therefore the Medical Association for Prevention of War considers the threat posed by nuclear weapons as a public health issue of the utmost priority. This presentation will examine exactly what nuclear weapons are, what the effects of these weapons are, who possesses these weapons and what could or should be done as a response to nuclear weapons. Photos courtesy of Nuclear Weapon Archive ( and World Security Network ( MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

The Basics

Nuclear Weapon Cores Fission weapons require “fissile isotopes” Most important - plutonium-239 (Pu-239) and uranium-235 (U-235) Some weapons are made from both isotopes Basic nuclear weapons rely on nuclear fission chain reaction to produce large amount of energy in a very short time Isotopes are variant forms of the same element. They have the same number of protons in their nucleus, therefore the same chemical properties, but differ in the numbers of neutrons and therefore have different weights and half-lives. “Isotopes able to sustain a fission chain reaction when they capture neutrons are called fissile isotopes. The most important fissile isotope of plutonium is plutonium-239 (Pu-239); the most important fissile isotope of uranium is uranium-235 (U-235). The nuclei of isotopes U-235 and Pu-239 undergo fission when they absorb (capture) any neutron, even one moving very slowly. In contrast, the nuclei of other isotopes of uranium and plutonium, such as U-238 and Pu-241, undergo fission only when they capture a neutron which has a velocity above a certain value. A chain reaction is, therefore, more possible using fissile isotopes like U-235 or Pu A basic nuclear weapon relies entirely on a nuclear fission chain reaction to produce a large amount of energy in a very short time - less than a millionth of a second - and, therefore, a very powerful explosion. A nuclear weapon can be fabricated from either Pu-239 or U-235 and some nuclear weapons use both. Uranium-233 is also a fissile isotope, but it has not so far been used to a significant extent in nuclear weapons” (IPPNW, 1996). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Nuclear Explosions Explosive power measured by the mass equivalent of TNT: A 1 kiloton bomb has an explosive yield equivalent to 1000 tons of TNT A 1 megaton bomb has an explosive yield equivalent to 1,000,000 tons of TNT The TNT equivalent is the unit most often used to measure the energy released in nuclear explosions. A 1 kiloton bomb has an explosive yield equivalent to 1000 tons of TNT. A 1 megaton bomb has an explosive yield equivalent to 1,000,000 tons of TNT. For those familiar with the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima, this had the equivalent explosive effect of 12.5 thousand tons of TNT. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Plutonium Weapons grade - produced in military plutonium-production reactors specifically for nuclear weapons use Reactor grade - produced in all nuclear-power reactors For electricity production, but can be used to make weapons Virtually all plutonium is man-made. Minute quantities, however, have been produced naturally in uranium deposits when uranium-238 nuclei have captured neutrons. There are various grades of plutonium, having different isotopic compositions, according to the way in which the plutonium is produced. Plutonium may also be chemically extracted from MOX, or mixed oxide, reactor fuel, which contains a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides. Plutonium produced in commercial nuclear-power reactors, which are operated for the production of electricity, is called reactor-grade plutonium. Plutonium produced in military plutonium-production reactors, specifically for use in nuclear weapons, is called weapons-grade plutonium. For the purposes of constructing a usable nuclear weapon, the distinction between "reactor-grade" and "weapons-grade" plutonium is somewhat artificial. In fact, reactor-grade plutonium can be used to fabricate nuclear weapons, and the United States exploded such a weapon in The critical mass of reactor-grade plutonium is a little greater than that of weapons-grade plutonium. But the difference is not large - thirteen kilograms for a bare metal sphere of reactor-grade plutonium compared with 11 kg for weapons-grade plutonium. Nuclear-weapon designers, however, prefer weapons-grade plutonium. Reactor-grade plutonium contains a greater proportion of Pu-240, which makes it less suitable for weapons applications.” Pu-240 undergoes a higher the number of spontaneous fissions, giving it a greater the probability that the weapon will pre-detonate and explode with an unpredictable explosive yield. It also generates more heat generated by absorption of the alpha particles produced by the radioactive decay, so measures must be taken to dissipate this excess heat if the material is used to fabricate a nuclear weapon (IPPNW, 1996). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Plutonium Powerful nuclear explosive Highly radioactive and toxic The half-life of plutonium is 24,500 years Remains hazardous for 250,000 years Plutonium is a man-made element. It is an inevitable by-product of any nuclear reactor fuelled with uranium. During operation, some of the uranium atoms are transmuted into plutonium atoms. Once separated chemically from the rest of the irradiated fuel, plutonium is a powerful nuclear explosive. Plutonium is highly radioactive and toxic. If absorbed into the body, the high-energy alpha radiation can damage cells and cause cell mutations that can lead to cancer. Photo courtesy of Deutsche Welle ( MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Uranium Naturally occurring uranium contains 0.7% U-235 Weapons use highly-enriched uranium (HEU) - proportion of U-235 increased Weapons grade - usually enriched to greater than 90%, but lower percentages still useable High concentrations of U-235 are needed for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Naturally occurring uranium contains 0.7% U-235. Nuclear weapons use highly-enriched uranium, in which this proportion has been increased. Weapons-grade highly-enriched uranium is normally regarded as uranium enriched to more than 90% in U-235. But uranium enriched to significantly lower percentages is still weapons-usable (IPPNW, 1996). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Separated Plutonium Stocks
Country Military plutonium Civil plutonium Russia 95 tonnes 88 tonnes US 47 tonnes 45 tonnes UK 3.2 tonnes 96.2 tonnes France 5 tonnes 78.6 tonnes China 4.8 tonnes - Israel 0.6 tonnes India 0.4 tonnes 1.5 tonnes Japan 5.4 tonnes Germany 12.5 tonnes This table shows the most recent figures relating to world’s stocks of separated plutonium with Russia and the United States holding the vast majority. SOURCES: David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, “Fissile Materials of Special Concern In-Country Stocks of Separated Plutonium and Total Stocks of HEU”, Institute for Science and International Security Estimates – June 24, 2005, testimony to US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, accessed: < MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Military highly-enriched uranium
Estimated HEU stocks Country Military highly-enriched uranium Russia 1070 tonnes US 575 tonnes UK 21.9 tonnes France 29 tonnes China 20 tonnes Pakistan 1.1 tonnes This table shows the amounts of highly-enriched uranium stockpiled around the world, again with Russia and the United States holding the vast majority. SOURCES: David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, “Fissile Materials of Special Concern In-Country Stocks of Separated Plutonium and Total Stocks of HEU”, Institute for Science and International Security Estimates – June 24, 2005, testimony to US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, accessed: < MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Core requirements A 20 kt nuclear bomb requires: 4-5 kg of weapons grade plutonium OR 10-15 kg of weapons grade uranium A 1kt nuclear weapon could be made with: 1 kg of weapons-grade plutonium OR 2.5 kg of weapons-grade uranium The actual amount of weapons-grade plutonium or uranium used in a nuclear-fission weapon varies considerably, according to the explosive yield required and the technology used: A designer with access to high technology could design a modern fission weapon with a 20 kt explosive yield using as little as 3 kg of weapons grade plutonium, but typically 4-5 kg, or kg of weapons grade uranium. With access to low technology 6 kg of weapons grade plutonium or 16 kg of weapons-grade uranium is required. With access to high technology a 1kt explosive yield weapon could be made with as little as 1 kg of weapons-grade plutonium or 2.5 kg of weapons-grade uranium. With only low technology available 3 kg of weapons-grade plutonium or 8 kg of weapons-grade uranium would be needed (IPPNW, 1996). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

The fission process Nucleus of U-235 or Pu-329 captures a neutron - U-236, Pu-240 nucleus formed. U-236, Pu-240 very unstable, rapidly split into two (fission) Neutrons and a large burst of energy are emitted Complete fissioning of 1 gram of U-235 releases 23,000 kilowatt-hours of heat “When a nucleus of U-235 captures a neutron, a nucleus of the isotope U-236 is formed. The U-236 nucleus is very unstable and rapidly splits (undergoes fission) into two fragments (the fission fragments), which are nuclei of elements of lower atomic number. Similarly, if a Pu-239 nucleus captures a neutron, Pu-240 will be formed - this is also very unstable and rapidly undergoes fission. In both of these fission processes, neutrons (on average between two and three) and a burst of energy are emitted, as well as the fission products. Energy is released because the total sum of the masses of the fission products and neutrons is less than the mass of the "parent nucleus." The energy accompanying fission is equal to this mass difference multiplied by the square of the velocity of light (E=mc2) . Although the mass difference is very small, the square of the velocity of light is a huge number and, therefore, the amount of energy given off is very large. In fact, the complete fissioning of one gram of U-235 would release about 23,000 kilowatt-hours of heat“ (IPPNW, 1996). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

The fission process MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Critical mass Each nucleus undergoing fission must produce a neutron that splits another nucleus Critical mass - the minimum mass of fissile material that can sustain a nuclear fission chain reaction Sphere is optimum shape “The minimum condition for maintaining a fission chain reaction is that, for each nucleus undergoing fission, at least one product neutron causes the fission of another nucleus. In a nuclear weapon, a fission chain reaction is produced and maintained for a long enough time to produce an explosion with the required explosive yield. The minimum mass of a fissile material that can sustain a nuclear fission chain reaction is called the critical mass. Factors influencing critical mass include the nuclear properties of the fissile material, shape of the material (sphere is the optimum shape), density of the fissile material (higher density is best), purity of the fissile material and physical surrounding of the material used for fission” (IPPNW, 1996). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Nuclear explosions Nuclear explosions occur at super-critical masses Basic weapons contain fissile material less than critical mass. Within half a millionth of a second: Temperatures - hundreds of millions degrees centigrade, and pressures - millions of atmospheres, build up If the critical mass of material is exceeded, more neutrons are produced, and hence considerably more fissions occur, in each successive generation of fission. A nuclear explosion takes place when the number of neutrons within the fissile material increases rapidly and uncontrollably After a short time so many generations of fission take place that the fissile material becomes sub-critical, stopping the chain reaction. A basic nuclear-fission weapon contains fissile material weighing less than the critical mass, so that the weapon does not explode prematurely. During detonation, its density is increased such that the critical mass is exceeded (a process called assembly), thus producing a nuclear explosion (IPPNW, 1996). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Fusion Isotopes of hydrogen - deuterium and tritium Extremely high temperatures required for reaction to occur Require a fission bomb to provide energy to initiate reaction Used mainly to ‘boost’ fission bombs - increase fission rate by providing more high energy neutrons Both fusion and fission are based on the release of energy from transformations of the atomic nucleus. Fusion weapons are referred to as hydrogen bombs because isotopes of hydrogen- deuterium and tritium - are the principle components of the reaction. They are also called thermonuclear weapons because extremely high temperatures are required for the reaction to occur. All weapons that use fusion require a fission bomb to provide energy to initiate the fusion reaction. Fusion is used in “boosted fission weapons” - a few grams of deuterium/tritium (D-T) isotopes are included in the fissile core. The bomb undergoes enough fission to be hot enough to ignite the D-T fusion reaction, which produces intense burst of high energy neutrons that cause a correspondingly intense burst of fissions in the core. These accelerate the fission rate in the core allowing a much higher percentage of fissile material to undergo fission before it blows apart, thereby significantly increasing the efficiency of the weapon (Sublette, 2001). . Thermonuclear weapons are much more complex than fission. They could not be deployed secretly or made without access to sophisticated materials, computers and testing programs. There is also a lot less information available in open literature (IPPNW, 1996). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Main Components Of Nuclear Weapons
High quality, high purity conventional high explosives and reliable detonators Electronic circuits A tamper and neutron reflector A core of fissile material A neutron source IPPNW, 1996: page 17. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Detonation techniques
Gun technique Only used with HEU Mass of sub-critical HEU fired at another - sum of two masses supercritical Simple technique Long assembly time Hiroshima bomb The gun technique is used for assembly in nuclear weapons using enriched uranium (HEU). "In this design, a mass of uranium less than the critical mass is fired into another less-than-critical mass of uranium. The sum of the two masses is greater than critical. In the Hiroshima bomb, for example, one mass of highly enriched uranium was fired down the barrel of a naval gun into the second mass placed at the muzzle. The gun design is much simpler than the implosion design and is only used with highly-enriched uranium. This is because spontaneous fissions occur far more frequently in weapons-grade plutonium and may cause premature detonation during assembly. The high explosive charge drives the highly-enriched uranium Mass A at the top of the cylinder down into the lower highly-enriched uranium Mass B. Mass A + Mass B is super-critical, whereas Mass A and Mass B are each less than critical. When A and B come together, a nuclear explosion occurs” (IPPNW, 1996). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Implosion technique 1/10 the assembly time of the gun technique HEU or plutonium can be used Fissile core surrounded by conventional high explosives "The implosion technique has an assembly time less than a tenth of that of the gun technique, so it can be used to assemble a super-critical mass of either highly-enriched uranium or plutonium. In a nuclear weapon using the implosion design, a sphere of fissile material (called the core of the weapon is surrounded by conventional high explosives, such as TATB (triaminotrinitro-benzene) or HMX (cvclotetramethvlenetetranitramine) (IPPNW, 1996). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Implosion technique Explosives detonate and uniformly compress the core and increase its density, making it super-critical Neutrons also fired into fissile material to encourage fission chain reaction “When detonated, the high explosive uniformly compresses the sphere of fissile material and increases its density. The originally less-than-critical mass of fissile material will, after compression, become super-critical, a fission chain reaction will take place, and a nuclear explosion will follow. At the instant of maximum super-criticality, neutrons are fired into the fissile material from a "neutron gun” to encourage the fission chain reaction. The fissile material in the core of the weapon is surrounded by a spherical shell of a material such as beryllium that reflects back into the fissile material some of the neutrons which escaped through its surface without causing fission. The use of a neutron reflector significantly reduces the amount of fissile material needed for a critical mass. The beryllium shell is surrounded, in turn, with a shell of a heavy material, such as natural or depleted uranium, which acts as a tamper. The tamper is surrounded by the conventional high explosives. When the high explosives around the tamper are detonated, the shock wave produced causes the tamper to collapse inwards. The tamper converts the divergent detonation wave into a convergent shock wave. Its inertia helps to hold the fissile material together during the explosion, to prevent its premature disintegration, and thereby to obtain a larger explosion. The same material, such as beryllium or uranium, can be used for both the tamper and the reflector. For example, a bare sphere of weapons-grade plutonium in the alpha-phase has a critical mass of II kg; the radius of a sphere of this weight is about 5 cm - about the size of a small grapefruit. If the plutonium sphere is surrounded by a natural uranium reflector, about 10 cm thick, the critical mass is reduced to about 4.4 kg, giving a sphere of radius about 3.6 cm - about the size of an orange" (IPPNW, 1996). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Delivery Systems: Gravity Bombs Ballistic Missile Warheads Cruise Missile Warheads Other Forms: Anti-ballistic Missiles Anti-submarine Warfare There are a number of different ways that a nuclear bomb can be delivered which may effect the outcome of its use. Gravity bombs are designed to be dropped from planes, which require that the weapon can withstand vibrations and changes in air temperature and pressure during the course of a flight. Various air-dropping techniques exist, including toss bombing, parachute-retarded delivery, and lay down modes, intended to give the dropping aircraft time to escape the ensuing blast. A ballistic missile is a guided rocket that is powered during the initial part of its flight and then coasts un-powered at hypersonic speeds mostly above the atmosphere along a ‘ballistic path’ to its target. Once it has burned its fuel in the initial take off, a ballistic missile cannot be recalled nor can its path be altered. There are four different ranges of ballistic missiles: Short-range (<1,000km), Medium-range (1, km), Intermediate-range (3,000km-5,500km) and Intercontinental (<5,500km). A cruise missile is a jet engine or rocket-propelled missile that flies at low altitude using an automated guidance system (usually inertial navigation, sometimes supplemented by either GPS or mid-course updates from command and control centres) to make them harder to detect or intercept. Cruise missiles have shorter range and smaller payloads than ballistic missiles, so their warheads are smaller and less powerful. Cruise missiles may be launched from mobile launchers on the ground, from naval ships, or from aircraft. Other forms of delivery include: Anti-ballistic missiles aimed at intercepting incoming ballistic missiles (Both the US and Russia have attempted to build nuclear-armed anti-ballistic missiles at various times, the current US proposed missile defence system does not include such weapons but the currently deployed anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow are nuclear tipped interceptors – their reliability is very questionable). Nuclear depth charges and torpedoes have also been developed to varying degrees by some states (primarily the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War) for use in anti-submarine warfare. Atomic artillery shells, mines and mortar have also been in various stages of development at different times but none have been of any major significance. Photo courtesy of United States Navy ( MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Tactical vs. Strategic Nuclear Weapons
US and Russian definition - less than 500 km range Strategic: Intended to be detonated in other countries, i.e. intercontinental delivery There is no universally agreed upon definition of a tactical nuclear weapon (TNW). The US and Russia have agreed that tactical weapons are those that can only be delivered distances less than 500 km and that weapons than can be delivered over a distance greater than 500 km are known as strategic. Also Tactical nuclear weapons are, in general, low-yield compared to strategic nuclear weapons and are intended for battlefield use in a theatres of war. Strategic weapons are targeted based on a strategic plan and generally include nuclear missile forces and cities. (In war, however, ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’ targets often overlap.) Tactical nuclear weapons are not subject to formal arms control agreements. In September 1991, President George H.W. Bush announced unilateral U.S. reductions in TNW. On October 5, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev reciprocated. At the time these parallel unilateral cutbacks accounted for the largest single reduction in nuclear warheads in the arms control regime. However, reciprocal unilateral actions are not legally binding in the same sense as a treaty and there was no formal verification mechanism included to ensure transparency and compliance. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Launch on Warning (LoW)
Retaliation with nuclear weapons to a perceived nuclear attack by another state Response to a warning (by radar or satellite sensors) of attacking missiles Decision must be made in minutes The term "Launch on Warning" (LoW) is used in reference to retaliation with nuclear weapons to a perceived nuclear attack in response to a warning (by radar or satellite sensors) of attacking missiles, before any incoming warhead had arrived and detonated. In the U.S. military dictionary the term "Launch under Attack" (LUA) has the equivalent definition. LoW permits a decision, within the few minutes available between the warning and the predicted time of first impact, on whether or not to launch a response before impact. A recent report by the RAND corporation reported that the 4,000 U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads on hair-trigger alert could be launched in a few minutes notice destroying both countries in an hour. Taking nuclear weapons systems off hair-trigger alert has been called for repeatedly by the European Parliament, the UN General Assembly, and was a key recommendation of the Canberra Commission in 1996, and of the Atlanta Consultation, chaired by President Carter in January of Nobel Laureates and 237 organizations and parliamentarians from around the world have signed a Statement of Endorsement that calls for removing all strategic nuclear weapons from "hair-trigger alert and "Launch on Warning" status. A total of 53 parliamentarians have signed the Statement from the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Russia, Belgium, Germany, Brazil, U.S.A., and Italy. SOURCES: RAND report: Statement of Endorsement: MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

August 6, 1945 US detonated a 15 kiloton bomb over Hiroshima, Japan Deaths – 66,000 Injuries - 69,000 August 6, The bomb exploded at 580 m above the heart of Hiroshima. It utilized uranium-235 (Yokoro & Kamada, 2000). Damage According to an official report published in 1971 by the Hiroshima City Authority, the total number of people who died within one year after the bombing was 118,661. Number of deaths during the ‘acute phase’ (August 6 to December 31, 1945) was estimated to be about 114,000 and about 4,000 people exposed died between January and August, 1946 due to severe injuries. The number of seriously wounded people was about 30,000 (exposed in a range of 1.0 to 2.5 km), slightly wounded - 48,000 (exposed in a range of km) (Yokoro & Kamada, 2000). These data do not included the casualties among military personnel and Korean people in Hiroshima. The above number also does not include the people who died in the following years from the effects of radioactive poisoning (Nuclear Files, 2001). Pictures: Kome & Crean, 1986: page 84 & 87. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

August 9, 1945 US detonated a 21 kiloton bomb over Nagasaki, Japan Deaths - 73,884 Injuries - 74,909 6.7 million square metres leveled August 9, The bomb exploded 500 m above the northeast part of Nagasaki. It utilized plutonium-239 (Yokoro & Kamada, 2000). Damage Leveled Area: 6.7 million square meters Damaged Houses: 18,409 Casualties Killed ,884 Injured ,909 Total ,793 Not including the people who died in the following years from the effects of radioactive poisoning (Nuclear Files, 2001). Picture: Kome & Crean, 1986; page . MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Hiroshima and Nagasaki
Ground temperatures reached about 7,000 degrees “Black rain” containing radioactive fallout poured down for hours after the explosions The temperature on the ground beneath the exploding Hiroshima bomb reached about 7000 degrees (Nuclear Files, 2001). Black rain containing radioactive fallout poured down over large area from north of hypocenter in Hiroshima to the west for about 7 hours., starting 45 minutes after the explosion.. In Nagasaki, it poured down intermittently in the Nishiyama District, 2.0 to 2.5 km southeast of the hypocenter and shielded by a mountain starting about 20 minutes after the explosion until night The black rain in this district may have contained more radioactive substances than the black rain in Hiroshima (Yokoro & Kamada, 2000). Pictures: Hiroshima (buildings): MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

One-Megaton Bomb Detonated In The Air
Flash Intense flash of light, a thousand times brighter than lightning Pulse of heat radiation - sets fire to combustible material 14 km away Pulse of X-rays, lethal within 3 km The following is based on the main targeting strategy of the Cold War - a single bomb detonated at 2,500 metres above a city, to cause maximum blast effects. Flash The first effect of a nuclear explosion in the air is an intense flash of light, as quick as a lightning flash but a thousand times as bright. It is accompanied by a powerful pulse of heat radiation, sufficient to set fire to light combustible material out to a distance of fourteen km., and to paint or wood at half that distance. There is also an intense pulse of X-rays, sufficient to be lethal at a distance of three km (these would actually be a rather small factor, since people that close would all or nearly all be killed by the blast that follows) (Phillips, 2000). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Fireball Forms after the ‘flash’ and rises in the air Can permanently blind people up to 80 km away All exposed body parts burned deeply within 10 km Superficial burns within fifteen km Fireball "Immediately after the flash, a "fireball" forms in the air and rises for several seconds, blindingly bright and radiating a huge amount of heat. On a clear day or night, people up to eighty km away who happened to be facing that way, or who turned their eyes to look where the flash came from, would be temporarily or permanently blinded. Within ten km. of "ground zero" (the point directly under the explosion) all parts of the body exposed to the flash would be burned deeply into the flesh. Superficial burns would be caused at greater distances - out to fifteen km at least. Clothing that caught fire would cause many more burns. The prevailing weather conditions and the time of day the bomb exploded would both influence the degree of damage. For example, the radii for skin burns and blindness would depend on the weather - mist or fog reduces the range of the heat and light rays, but on the other hand, darkness dilates the pupils of the eyes increasing the probability of severe eye damage from the flash" (Phillips, 2000). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Blast Powerful blast wave - starts immediately, but travels slower than the flash and fireball Destroys everything within 2 km 100% fatalities within 3 km 50% of people killed within 8 km Major damage to buildings within 14 km, windows broken out to km Blast Starting at the same instant, but travelling more slowly (like the sound of thunder following a lightning flash) is an enormously powerful blast wave. It would destroy even reinforced concrete buildings for a radius of two km, and ordinary brick or timber frame houses out to eight km. Major damage to houses would extend out to fourteen km., and windows would be broken at twenty or thirty km. People at a distance, if they realized what had happened when they saw the flash, would have a few seconds to lie down, or even to dive into a ditch or hollow, before the blast hit. Within three km almost everyone would be killed, either directly by the blast or by collapsing or flying masonry. At eight km, it is estimated that about fifty per cent of people would be killed by the effects of the blast" (Phillips, 2000). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Blast Hurricane force winds, first outwards, then inwards Tornado force winds (six hundred km/hr), within four km - can drive glass splinters into people People picked up and hurled into any object strong enough to be still standing Blast "Immediately following the blast wave would be hurricane force winds, first outwards from the explosion, and many seconds later inwards to replace the air that went out. Within four km., the wind would be of tornado force - six hundred km./hr, sufficient to drive straws into wooden utility poles or glass splinters into people, but of course over a much wider area than a tornado. People in the open would be picked up and hurled into any object strong enough to be still standing " (Phillips, 2000). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Firestorm Fires started by the first flash coalesce Cause sufficient updraft to form their own wind, which blows inwards from all sides - increasing the intensity of the fire Fire uses all available oxygen “People caught in the open would melt, those in shelters would probably be baked” Firestorm "Many fires would have been started by the first flash. Burst fuel tanks, gas mains and collapsed building would provide more fuel and it is likely that confluent fires would cause a firestorm. This is when coalescent fires cause sufficient updraft to form their own wind, blowing inwards from all sides and thereby increasing the intensity of the fire. The temperature even in basements and bomb shelters rises above lethal levels, and all available oxygen is used by the fire. The wind blowing inwards is of gale force, so that even strong uninjured people would have difficulty walking or trying to run outwards away from the fire" (Phillips, 2000). Temperatures over 1000 degrees C. “Conflagration of most combustible materials giving rise to large fires likely to combine into a firestorm; people caught in the open would melt; those in shelters would probably be baked” (Kome & Crean, 1986). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Acute Radiation Exposure Central nervous system dysfunction Gastrointestinal damage Uncontrolled internal bleeding Bleeding from gums or within the skin Massive infections Death The lethal radiation zone is 1300 sq. kilometres for a 150 kiloton hydrogen bomb (Penelope Simons, personal communication, October 2000). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Delayed Radiation Everything in vicinity of explosion radioactive Hiroshima - radioactive rainstorms 1/3 of original fissile material not destroyed Widespread contamination Increased risk of developing cancer for survivors Delayed Radiation "A nuclear explosion, as well as giving off a great pulse of radiation at the time, leaves everything in the vicinity radioactive. In the case of an “air-burst” as just described, most of the radioactive products would be gaseous, or completely vaporized, and would rise with the fireball and come down slowly, if at all. There might be a rainstorm containing radioactivity, as there was at Hiroshima, and the rubble within a kilometre or two of the ground zero would be radioactive. This might hamper later rescue efforts, and affect the very few survivors from the central area, but would not be a major factor. In any nuclear bomb explosion, a large fraction (a minimum of one-third) of the original fissile material (plutonium or U-235) does not get destroyed. This would result in widespread contamination, increasing the late risk of cancer for those who survived ten to twenty years. (These amounts of plutonium and uranium would have no immediate toxic effects)" (Phillips, 2000). The health and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons production and testing include deaths, cancers, illnesses and ever-accumulating toxic and radioactive waste. The long-term effects of radiation on individuals, future generations, or the planet are not fully understood (IPPNW, 2001). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

In case of a nuclear bomb - don’t bother to call your doctor No significant medical response possible Hospitals destroyed, most health care providers killed Rescue Problems "If the bomb exploded squarely over the centre of a city, no rescue services within the area of major structural damage would be able to function. All downtown hospitals would be destroyed” (Phillips, 2000). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Medical response barriers No electricity, water or telephone service No drugs, sterile IV solutions, bandages Impassable roads, inaccessible areas Overloading of emergency/ hospital services in surrounding areas Rescuers risk radiation exposure Rescue Problems "If the bomb exploded squarely over the centre of a city there would be no electricity, water, or telephone communication in the area served by city utilities. Rescue services from outside would be hampered by impassable roads and the central area of severe damage would be inaccessible. The number of injured in the peripheral area would be so great that emergency services of surrounding cites would be completely overloaded as would be any surviving suburban hospitals and all the hospital of neighbouring cities. The destroyed city would be radioactive. Decisions to attempt rescue work would depend first on a survey of the area by a specialist team with appropriate protection, and then on a policy decision as to how much radiation the rescue teams should be permitted. Willingness of the team members and their unions to accept the risk would be a final factor" (Phillips, 2000) . MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Medical problems: one city of 1-2 million Fifty times more severe burns than burn beds in North America A year’s supply of blood for transfusions needed immediately Bottlenecks and delays due to the need for radioactivity assays Most of injured die, even from easily treated injuries Medical Problems "Estimates for a city of one million or two million struck by a single one-megaton bomb - around one third of the inhabitants would be killed instantly or fatally injured, one third seriously injured, and the rest uninjured or only slightly injured. That number of injured, if they could be distributed throughout the hospitals of North America, would occupy something like a third of the total number of beds; no hospital can deal adequately with such an influx of urgent cases within a few days. There might be fifty times as many severe burn cases as there are burn beds in the whole of North America. A whole year’s supply of blood for transfusion would be needed immediately and of course is not available in storage nor could it be collected from volunteers in a few days. For the safety of the staff, the injured who reached hospitals would have to be assayed for radioactivity, a process which would cause a serious bottleneck and delay in most hospitals. The result of this huge overload of cases is that most of the injured would die, even though prompt treatment might have saved them. Relatively few would even get reached by rescue teams before they were moribund or dead; the majority would probably die in hours or days without any analgesic, and without food, water or any assistance" (Phillips, 2000). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

One-Megaton Bomb Detonated At Ground-Level
Enormous crater metres wide and 70 metres deep Major fallout of radioactive particulates, potentially lethal hundreds of kilometres downwind Area of blast damage and immediate deaths about one half of air detonation scenario More deaths days to weeks after bomb due to radiation sickness from fallout Phillips, 2000. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Effect Of Nuclear War Many nuclear bombs exploded Radioactive contamination of whole continents Permanent large scale damage to environment Nuclear winter The major effects of a nuclear exchange are described here including: Many nuclear bombs exploded amplifying the effects of a single bomb described earlier. Radioactive contamination of whole continents. Permanent large scale damage to environment. The onset of what has been described as a “nuclear winter.” MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Nuclear Winter Airborne contaminants absorb and reflect the sun’s rays Results in an extended period of semi-darkness and freezing temperatures Potentially generated from less than 100 detonations There are also adverse health consequences to populations located far away from areas hit by nuclear bombs including radiation injuries from fallout of radionuclides and the effects from nuclear winter. Nuclear winter is the cooling of the earth’s surface due to the absorption and reflection of the sun’s rays by clouds of soot and debris, collected in the atmosphere from the fires and explosions caused by nuclear bombs. That such clouds would reduce surface temperatures on the ground beneath them is well accepted; even relatively small forest fires cause such cooling (Levy & Sidel, 2000). The atmospheric debris would absorb both sunlight and heat. At ground level, sunlight would be reduced to a few percent of normal, bringing semi-darkness and freezing temperatures. It would spread rapidly to all areas of the world because of the disturbance in global air circulation patterns. Photosynthesis in plants would be disturbed, thereby affecting the entire food chain. When dust and soot finally cleared, the world would be exposed to dangerously increased levels of UV radiation. The ozone layer would be further destroyed due to high levels of nitrogen oxides formed in nuclear mushroom clouds (IPPNW, Engineers for Social Responsibility, Scientists Against Nuclear Arms, & White, R, 1984). The industrial, urban and petroleum targets are characterized by combustible materials highly concentrated at relatively few sites- therefore global nuclear winter may be generated with only a few hundred detonations or less (Sagan & Turco, 1990). MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Nuclear Winter The view of the Earth from Apollo 10 (18 May 1969)
An Apollo 10 view of Earth (May 18, 1969) from 26,000 nautical miles photographed from the spacecraft during its journey toward the Moon. You can see Mexico and Baja California in the center of the image. Above that, clouds cover most of the US, producing needed rainfall for the crops that are growing that year. Photo courtesy of NASA (AS ). The view of the Earth from Apollo 10 (18 May 1969) from 26,000 nautical miles on its journey to the Moon MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Nuclear Winter This is what the world would look like, however, after a large-scale nuclear holocaust. Thick clouds of smoke from the resulting fires would initially cover the Northern Hemisphere, making it cold and dark at the Earth’s surface. Image used by permission of the National Resources Defense Council. This is what the world would look like after a large-scale nuclear holocaust MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Nuclear Winter Nuclear winter could occur with detonation of 100 nuclear warheads over major cities 30,000 weapons currently, deployed – 90% reduction of deployed weapons could still cause nuclear winter This puts nuclear weapons are in a league of their own It is estimated that a ‘nuclear winter’ could occur with detonation of 100 nuclear warheads over major cities. Currently, around 30,000 weapons are deployed – this is why at current levels of ‘overkill’ even removing 90% of deployed weapons would not make us decisively safer Nuclear weapons are in a league of their own, the only thing subject to human control which has ever been able to end human civilization, much life on earth and the planet’s suitability for habitation in the course of a couple of hours MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Nuclear Weapons Testing

Nuclear Testing 2,058 nuclear test explosions by 8 countries: United States – 1,030 Russia (USSR) - 715 France - 210 United Kingdom - 45 China - 45 India - 7 Pakistan - 6 The United States has conducted more tests than any other nation. The US has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but it has not yet been ratified by the Senate. Russia was the second nation in the world to conduct nuclear tests. It should also be noted that the Soviet Union conducted about 100 hydronuclear tests, which use plutonium or highly enriched uranium. The energy released from the fissile material generally is less than that of the high explosive, normally well under 100 kilograms. These are not included in the 715 total. Britain tested its first nuclear weapon on Monte Bello Islands off the coast of Western Australia in Atmospheric tests were carried out there as well as at Emu Field and Maralinga in South Australia until 1956. France began its nuclear testing program in France conducted six controversial tests as recently as China conducted its first nuclear explosion in Since then it has conducted 45 tests all carried out at Lop Nur in the North-West of the Country. In 1966, India declared it could produce nuclear weapons within 18 months. Eight years later, India tested a device of up to 15 kilotons and called the test a "peaceful nuclear explosion." In May 1998, India stunned the world when it conducted six underground nuclear tests in Pokharan, Rajasthan, and declared itself a nuclear state. India has long been a vocal opponent of any international legal restraints on its nuclear tests. In 1972, following its third war with India, Pakistan secretly decided to start a nuclear weapons program to match India's developing capability. Pakistan responded to India's nuclear tests in 1998 by carrying out six underground explosions in the Chagai region. SORCES: Atomic Archive Website, “Nuclear Testing Chronology”, accessed < Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, “Soviet nuclear testing, August 29, 1949-October 24, 1990” in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 54, no. 03, May/June 1998, pp Australian Government, National Archives of Australia, “British nuclear tests at Maralinga”, Fact Sheet 129, accessed: < Photo courtesy of Atomic Archive ( MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Effects of Nuclear Testing
2.4 million people estimated to die from cancer as a result of nuclear testing Tests sites around the world contaminated 1991 IPPNW study estimates that the radiation and radioactive materials from atmospheric testing taken in by people up until the year 2000 will cause 430,000 cancer deaths, some of which have already occurred. This study estimates that eventually 2.4 million people will die from cancer as a result of atmospheric testing. The 423 above ground tests are estimated to have put between million curies of strontium-90, between million curies of cesium-137, 10 million curies of carbon-14 and 225,000 curies of plutonium into the environment. The US Government’s National Cancer Institute released a report in 1997 revealing that following fallout from nuclear tests carried out both inside and outside the United States, iodine-131 from nuclear testing was found in every single county of the United States. At the Nevada Test Site in the US, radioactive material from at least one test shaft used for underground testing has seeped into ground water. Two underground test sites in Russia are contaminated with large amounts of plutonium-239 (which has a half-life of 24,400 years) and other radionuclides. This contamination is dispersed at more than 50 sites rather than being concentrated at one, thus increasing the risk of exposure. In Novaya Zemlya, authorities now admit an increase in cancer among the indigenous Chukchi population. According to Moscow News, these people contract liver cancer at a rate 10 times the national average, and the death rate there from cancer of the esophagus is "the highest in the world." The number of cases of leukemia and stomach cancer has doubled. An ongoing legacy is evident in the Pacific region where hundreds of test were conducted by the British, Americans and French between A 2005 report by the National Cancer Institute in the US found that 50 years after the US conducted nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands the number of cancers caused by the hydrogen bomb tests is set to double from 500 to over 1000. SOURCES: Reaching Critical Will, “Health Effects and the Nuclear Age: Making the Connections”, accessed: < Arjun Makhijani, Howard Hu, Katherine Yih, editors. Nuclear Wastelands: a Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and Its Health and Environmental Effects, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1995. National Cancer Institute, Radioactive I-131 FROM Fallout, 1997, accessed: < International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, The Medical and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Use, Production, and Testing, February 2001, accessed < National Cancer Institute, Development of Baseline Cancer and Radiation-Related Illness Rates Relating to Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Marshall Islands, 2005, accessed < Photo courtesy of National Geographic ( MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Nuclear Terrorism Until now, the nuclear threat has rested solely in the hands of governments who, despite their reliance on nuclear weapons, seem to have at least partially understood the consequences of their use. In the hands of non-state actors, who may disregard any consequences that would prevent them from pressing their agenda, the “security” of current government controls and restraint disappears. In 1996 (five years before the September 11 attacks and announcement of the “War on Terror”), an IPPNW report stated that, “Fissile material leakage and a nuclear black market may have already enabled terrorist groups to acquire enough material to manufacture a crude weapon.” (

Nuclear Terrorism Only 20kg of HEU and 10kg of Plutonium needed Possibilities: -primitive nuclear explosive -attacking a nuclear-power reactor -nuclear weapon -transport attack -“dirty bomb” A determined group can fabricate a simple, crude or primitive but highly lethal nuclear device if it can acquire around 20 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or much smaller quantities of plutonium or plutonium oxide (about 10 kg). The world’s militaries have approximately 1,700 tonnes of highly enriched uranium and 250 tonnes of plutonium, the vast majority of this, around 95%, is owned by the USA and Russia. There are number of nuclear terrorist activities that a non-state actor may become involved in. Among them are: · stealing or otherwise acquiring fissile material and fabricating and detonating a primitive nuclear explosive; · attacking a nuclear-power reactor to spread radioactivity far and wide; · stealing or otherwise acquiring a nuclear weapon from the arsenal of a nuclear-weapon power and detonating it; · attacking, sabotaging or hijacking a transporter of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials; and · making and detonating a radiological weapon, commonly called a “dirty bomb”, to spread radioactive material. Apart from a dirty bomb, all of these types of nuclear terrorism have the potential to cause large, or quite large, numbers of deaths. A dirty bomb would consist of a conventional high explosive (for example, semtex, dynamite or TNT), some incendiary material (like thermite) surrounding the conventional explosive, and a quantity of a radioisotope, probably placed at the centre of the explosive. When the conventional high explosive is detonated the radioactive material would be vaporised. The fire ignited by the incendiary material would carry the radioactivity up into the atmosphere. It would then be blown downwind, spreading radioactivity. A dirty bomb is not the same as a nuclear weapon in the normal sense of the phrase– it does not involve a nuclear explosion. The detonation of a dirty bomb is likely to result in some deaths but would not result in the hundreds of thousands of fatalities that could be caused by the explosion in a city of a crude nuclear weapon. The radioactive material in the bomb would be dispersed into the air but would be soon diluted to relatively low concentrations. If the bomb is exploded in a city, as it almost certainly would be, some people are likely to be exposed to a dose of radiation. But the dose is in most cases likely to be relatively small. A low-level exposure to radiation would slightly increase the long-term risk of cancer. The main potential impact of a dirty bomb is psychological – it would cause considerable fear, panic and social disruption, exactly the effects terrorists wish to achieve. Information from: Frank Barnaby, How to Build a Nuclear Bomb and other Weapons of Mass Destruction, London, Granta, 2004 and Frank Barnaby, Dirty Bombs and Primitive Nuclear Weapons, Oxford Research Group Report, June 2005, available at: Photo courtesy of Center for Non-Proliferation Studies ( MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Nuclear Material Availability
Fissile materials are not controlled or accounted for effectively At least 40 kg of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium has been stolen Only 1/3 of an estimated 600 tonnes of weapons-usable material in the former USSR has been secured Fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) needed to produce and maintain nuclear weapons are not being controlled or accounted for effectively, and efforts to cut off the production of fissile materials via a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty have been stalled for some time. The Stanford Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO) has documented 700 illicit trafficking incidents for the period 1991 to This accounts for at least 40kg of weapons usable material. According to a spokesperson from Stanford University, this figure of 700 cases could be up to 10 times higher given the lack of documentation and accounting of nuclear arsenals worldwide. She also said in 2002 that “only 1/3 of an estimated 600 tonnes of weapons-usable material in the former Soviet Union has been locked up”. In September 2005, Countries reported 121 incidents to the IAEA of illicit trafficking and other unauthorised activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials in 2004. Sources: Lyudmila Zaitseva & Kevin Hand, “Nuclear Smuggling Chains: Suppliers, Intermediaries, and End-Users”, in American Behavioural Scientist, Vol. 46, No. 6, February, 2003, pp Accessed at: BBC News, “Fears Over Missing Nuclear Material”, Thursday 7 March 2002, accessed: IAEA Press Release 2005/15, “Nuclear Trafficking Latest Statistics Released”, accessed: MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Terrorism And Nuclear Energy
The International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed that current nuclear power plants are structurally vulnerable against the Sept. 11 attack scenario Over 120 documented cases of nuclear sabotage Credible threats reported by security agencies According to a report prepared for the United States Congress, “Nuclear power plants were designed to withstand hurricanes, earthquakes, and other extreme events, but attacks by large airliners loaded with fuel, such as those that crashed into the World Trade Center and Pentagon, were not contemplated when design requirements were determined.”[1] The International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed that the current nuclear power plants are structurally vulnerable against the Sept. 11 attack scenario. “Nuclear reactors have the most robust engineering of any buildings in the civil sector…They are also built to withstand impacts, but not that of a wide-bodied passenger jet full of fuel. A deliberate hit of that sort is something that was never in any scenario at the design stage.” The Union of Concerned Scientists has documented over 120 acts of sabotage at US nuclear plants;[2] most were perpetrated by disgruntled workers at every level of employment. Yet the threat of nuclear plant sabotage posed by terrorist organisations has been warned of as credible in the United States as far back as 1995 when evidence emerged that terrorists had included nuclear power plants among their potential targets, based on testimony in the investigation of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Sources: David Lochbaum, Three Mile Island's Puzzling Legacy, Union of Concern Scientists, Washington, DC, March 1999. Peter Behr, "Nuclear Plants' Vulnerability Raised Attack Concerns," Washington Post, October 24, 2001, accessed: [1] Carl Behrens and Mark Holt, Nuclear Power Plants: Vulnerability to Terrorist Attack, report prepared for the Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, accessed: [2] David Lochbaum, Three Mile Island's Puzzling Legacy, Union of Concern Scientists, Washington, DC, March 1999. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

States Possessing Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear Weapons -Declared States
Strategic Tactical Reserve Total USA 4530 780 5000 10,310 Russia 3800 3400 11000 18,200 France 290 60 350 China 400 150 550 Britain 185 15 200 These figures refer to nuclear warheads (not missiles or other forms of delivery) and are based on estimates by the Washington-based Arms Control Association and The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as well as studies by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. ACA: Carnegie: Bulletin: MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Nuclear Weapons - De Facto States
Israel – India – 40-50 Pakistan – 25-50 Nth Korea - ? Three states stand outside of the multilateral legal system in relation to nuclear weapons. This makes it hard to acquire exact figures on their nuclear arsenals but experts can provide reasonably close estimates. It is Israeli policy to neither confirm nor deny that it possesses nuclear weapons, although it is generally accepted by analysts that Israel has had nuclear weapons for several decades. Its declaratory policy states: "Israel will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East," but its actual deployment and employment policies are secret. Estimates put the current stockpile between India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons and declared themselves nuclear weapon states in May 1998; both countries have continued to develop and test missile delivery systems. India and Pakistan's arsenals are believed to stand at between 40 and 50 and 25 and 50 respectively. On February , North Korea announced for the first time that it possesses nuclear weapons. This claim however is difficult to substantiate. In the early 1990s, the CIA concluded that North Korea had effectively joined the nuclear club by building one or possibly two weapons from plutonium it produced before Yet North Korea has never conducted a nuclear test, and although it has extracted weapon-grade plutonium, it has never conclusively demonstrated that it possesses operational nuclear warheads. These figures refer to nuclear warheads (not missiles or other forms of delivery) and are based on estimates by the Washington-based Arms Control Association and The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as well as studies by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. ACA: Carnegie: Bulletin: MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

This is a visual representation of the geographic locations of the world’s nuclear arsenals based on a map created by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Numbers by Region Global nuclear arsenals currently stand at around 30,000 spread across four regions. US = USA Europe = Russia, France, Britain Middle East = Israel Asia = China, India, Pakistan MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Arms Control and Disarmament

International Law and Nuclear Weapons
Multilateral (3 or more states) Bilateral (2 states) Unilateral (1 state) In existence: proliferation, testing, geographic limitations Not in existence: complete disarmament, fissile material control Ever since they were first used in 1945 the international community has attempted to both limit and abolish nuclear weapons by imposing the restraints of law. The evolving nuclear arms control and disarmament architecture includes both multilateral initiatives (generally undertaken within the United Nations system) and bilateral initiatives (mainly between the two largest nuclear weapons states Russia and the United States) and even some unilateral initiatives (such as Sth Africa’s decision to dismantle its nuclear arsenal in 1991). As it stands today there is no treaty that explicitly calls for complete nuclear disarmament or the production of weapons-grade materials. Yet there are elaborate treaties and agreements relating to nuclear weapons proliferation, nuclear testing and the placing of nuclear weapons in certain locations like outer space, the sea bed, Antarctica and particular regions such as Latin America and the South Pacific. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Key Terms Disarmament Decrease in number ‘General and Complete’ Weapon Specific Abolition Arms Control Limitations ‘General and Complete’ Weapon Specific Non-Proliferation Even though the terms arms control and disarmament are often used in conjunction with one another they do have distinct meanings. Disarmament always implies a decrease in the number of weapons or even abolishing certain categories of weapons whereas arms control refers to limitations imposed on the numbers, type and location of particular weapons. In other words, disarmament limits what you have presently while arms control limits what you could have in the future. The terms disarmament and arms control can be used in relation to different weapons. For example the early years of the UN saw much talk about ‘general and complete disarmament’ which refers to weapons and weapon systems from large-scale nuclear weapons to small-scale handguns, these days discussion of disarmament issues tends to relate to weapon-specific issues such as ‘nuclear disarmament’, referring specifically to nuclear weapons. Similarly arms control can refer to anything from the banning of weapons in space to domestic laws relating to small arms – often referred to in the media as ‘gun control.’ One of the key concepts in relation to nuclear arms control and disarmament is the difference between abolition and non-proliferation. Nuclear abolition refers to efforts to disarm all nuclear weapons regardless of their size, location or who owns them. Nuclear non-proliferation refers to preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation can be divided into two sub-categories: vertical proliferation and horizontal proliferation. Vertical proliferation describes states who already posses nuclear weapons building more and horizontal proliferation describes states who have not had nuclear weapons in the past acquiring them now or in the future. Yet this distinction is often glossed over. When those who have nuclear weapons talk of ‘non-proliferation’ efforts they are generally referring to stopping new states acquiring nuclear weapons. Vertical Horizontal MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

United Nations Main roles: Forum Facilitating Verification & Enforcement Education UN Treaties: Antarctica Treaty, PTBT, Outer Space Treaty, NPT, Sea-Bed Treaty, NWFZs, CTBT The main multilateral arena for negotiating rules, agreements and norms on any issue including in relation to nuclear weapons is the United Nations. Ever since its inception in 1945, the UN has played a central role in facilitating the negotiation, signing and ratification, verification and enforcement of certain treaties in relation to nuclear weapons. The UN also plays a wider role in education and the dissemination of information, research and hosting initiatives and forums such as the General Assembly’s Special Sessions on Disarmament in 1978, 1982 and 1988 as well as declaring two “Disarmament Decades” in the 1970s and 1980s. The major treaties limiting nuclear weapons and their supporting elements such as nuclear testing that fall within the UN system are the 1959 Antarctica Treaty, the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 1971 Sea-Bed Treaty, the 1995 South-East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, the 1996 African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

IAEA Established by UN in 1957 Nuclear non-proliferation Nuclear Science and Technology in Sustainable Development Nuclear Safety and Security In 1946, the United Nations created the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), and discussion began on the methods for nuclear disarmament and international enforcement. In 1953, following disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union surrounding international safeguards, President Eisenhower proposed the creation of "a new international nuclear agency to take custody of nuclear material, ensure its safe keeping, and use it for peaceful purposes." In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created. The IAEA has subsequently become responsible for a safeguards system to verify compliance with the NPT by conducting regular inspections of signatories to the NPT. The IAEA‘s three main areas of wok cover nuclear non-proliferation, fostering the role of nuclear science and technology in sustainable development and nuclear safety and security. The IAEA is based in Vienna and has Operational liaison and regional offices in 7 other major cities around the world. The IAEA has over 135 member states and is an autonomous organisation within the UN system. Photo courtesy of Nuclear Threat Initiative ( MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Conference on Disarmament
UN Body Established in 1979 66 countries are members Agreement by Consensus Based in Geneva, Switzerland The Conference on Disarmament (CD), established in 1979 is the only multilateral body dedicated solely to disarmament negotiation within the United Nations system. It succeeded other Geneva-based negotiating fora, which include the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament ( ), and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament ( ). As originally constituted, the CD had 40 members. Subsequently its membership was expanded to 66 countries. The CD has a special relationship with the United Nations; it adopts its own Rules of Procedure and its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations of the General Assembly and the proposals of its Members. It reports to the General Assembly annually, or more frequently, as appropriate. One of the most important elements of the CD is that it conducts its work by consensus. Currently the CD primarily focuses its attention on the following issues: cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; prevention of an arms race in outer space; effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons including radiological weapons; comprehensive programme of disarmament and transparency in armaments. The CD and its predecessors have hosted the negotiation of the NPT, Sea Bed Treaty and the CTBT in relation to nuclear weapons and a range of other treaties not limited to the nuclear question. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Major Treaties (Bilateral & Multilateral)
INF START NPT CTBT Photos courtesy of the United Nations ( and World Peace Coin ( MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Intermediate-Range Forces (INF) Treaty
Missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 km World-first in disarmament talks: Nuclear arsenal reduction Category of weapon eliminated Extensive on-site verification Signed 8 December 1987 The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to completely eliminate all of their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 kilometres. The treaty marked a world-first in disarmament negotiations as it was the first time the superpowers had agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals and eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons. Furthermore it was the first instance of the US and the Soviet Union agreeing to extensive on-site inspections for verification of the treaty. The INF Treaty was signed on 8 December 1987, and the treaty entered into force on 1 June It was negotiated bilaterally (outside of the UN system) and resulted in the destruction of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by the treaty's implementation deadline of June 1, Neither Washington nor Moscow now deploys such systems in their current arsenals. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START)
START I - signed in 1991 US and Russia agreed to reduce ICBMs, SLBMs and warheads START II - signed in 1993 Reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals to 3,000-3,500 by 2007 START III – superceded by SORT SORT – not verified or reversible START I The Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limited the Intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles and warheads used on these missiles of both sides. START I was negotiated bilaterally and signed on 31 July Five months later, the Soviet Union dissolved, leaving four independent states in possession of strategic nuclear weapons: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. On 23 May 1992, the US and the four nuclear-capable successor states to the Soviet Union signed the "Lisbon Protocol," which makes all five nations party to the START I agreement. START I entered into force 5 December 1994, when the five treaty parties exchanged instruments of ratification in Budapest. All treaty parties met the agreement's 5 December 2001 implementation deadline. START II A follow up treaty known as START II was negotiated again bilaterally between the US and Russia to further reduce strategic nuclear warheads deployed on ballistic missiles and was signed on 3 January A 1997 extension protocol shifted the deadline for completion of START II reductions from January 1, 2003 to December 31, The US ratified the original START II agreement in January 1996, but never ratified the protocol extending the treaty's implementation deadline. On 4 May 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the resolution of ratification for START II and its extension protocol. START III During their March 1997 summit meeting in Helsinki, U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed on a framework for START III negotiations. At the Moscow Summit in September 1998, Clinton and Yeltsin reiterated their commitment to begin formal negotiations on START III as soon as Russia ratified START II. The original intention of a START III agreement was for by 31 December 2007, following START II reductions, the US and Russia would each deploy no more than 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers. Russian officials stated that they were willing to consider negotiated levels as low as 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads within the context of a START III agreement. With the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), it appears unlikely that a START III agreement will be negotiated. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed SORT on 24 May The treaty calls for each country to deploy no more than 1,700-2,200 strategic warheads, effectively matching the limits proposed for START III. SORT does not, however, address strategic nuclear warhead destruction or tactical nuclear weapons limits, both ground-breaking arms control measures that were suggested for inclusion in START III. The SORT treaty also lacked a strong verification method. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Opened for signature in 1968 More signatures than any other arms control treaty Two-part bargain between nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a landmark international treaty whose objectives are to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to achieve nuclear disarmament. The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970. The treaty identifies five nuclear weapons states (NWS) that had tested nuclear weapons before 1 January These five are sometimes referred to as the declared NWS – slide 63, other states who have nuclear weapons but are not recognized as NWS by the NPT are often referred to as de-facto NWS – slide 64. All other states outside of the five NWS who sign the treaty are prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons and are known as non-nuclear weapon states NNWS. Therefore the NPT is essentially a bargain between those nations with nuclear weapons, who undertake to get rid of them, and those without, who undertake never to acquire them in return for the exchange of nuclear-related information and technology between NWS and NNWS. The Treaty contains, in Article VI, the only existing legally binding and explicit commitment to nuclear disarmament on the part of the NWS. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

(NPT) Article VI cessation of the nuclear arms race
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

(NPT) Safeguards The International Atomic Energy Agency is responsible for a safeguards system to verify compliance with the NPT by conducting regular inspections of signatories to the Treaty To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the IAEA. Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The traditional measures of the Agency’s safeguards system consist of verification activities performed at facilities, and at locations outside facilities where States have declared the presence of nuclear material. These verification activities focus primarily on the “correctness” of the declarations made by a State, the aim being to verify that the nuclear material inventories and flows are as declared and, under certain types of safeguards agreement, that facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material placed under safeguards are not being used to further any military purpose. Over the past decade, IAEA safeguards have been strengthened in key areas. Measures aim to increase the likelihood of detecting a clandestine nuclear weapons programme and to build confidence that States are abiding by their international commitments. Photo courtesy of Nuclear Threat Initiative ( MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

(NPT) The Review Cycle Review Conference – (RevCon) every 5 years over 4 weeks meetings held at United Nations in New York 1995 – NPT indefinite extension 2000 – 13 Point Action Plan Every 5 years the Treaty has a Review Conference which runs over four weeks and to which all member states report on their progress towards the main goal of the NPT – nuclear disarmament. The 1995 Review Conference extended the NPT’s existence indefinitely from its original 25-year life span and the 2000 Review conference ended in the signing of a Final Document that contained a commitment by the states party to an “unequivocal undertaking by the Nuclear weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament ..." and a 13 Point Action Plan calling for the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, stopping nuclear weapons testing, abolishing nuclear weapons and military production of plutonium. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

NPT 2005 Review 2-27 May 2005 Disagreement over conference agenda: -Nth Korea, Iran, CTBT, disarmament, non-NPT states, past decisions/agreements No substantive text produced The most recent Review Conference of the NPT occurred from 2nd-27th of May At the preparatory meeting for the review conference in 2004 no agreement could be reached on the agenda for the review conference the following year. Many saw this as a very bad sign. In 2005, the first two weeks of the Review Conference was spent in disagreement over the agenda for the four-week conference. Major debates were held around issues such as Nth Korea, Iran, the US refusal to ratify the CTBT, the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament by the five NWS, how to deal with the three states who have never signed the treaty (India, Israel and Pakistan) and implementation of the decisions and agreements of 1995 and in particular the disarmament decisions and the Middle East resolution. The result of the diplomatic deadlock at the conference was that no substantive text could be produced and no progress was made on any of the work of previous review conferences. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Opened for signature 24 September 1996 Bans all nuclear tests All 44 “Annex II” must sign and ratify 3 “Annex II” states still to sign 11 “Annex II” states still to ratify CTBTO working from Vienna Arms control advocates have campaigned for the adoption of a treaty banning all nuclear explosions since the early 1950s, when public concern was aroused as a result of radioactive fall-out from atmospheric nuclear tests and the escalating arms race. After years of diplomatic negotiations and lobbying by non-government organisations such as MAPW, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature on 24 September 1996 at the UN General Assembly in New York. The CTBT bans all nuclear tests, anytime, anywhere and comprehensively. Whilst the CTBT does not prohibit research on nuclear weapons, including subcritical tests (that is, where high explosives are detonated next to samples of weapons-grade plutonium yet no critical mass is formed, so no self-sustaining nuclear fission chain reaction occurs as it does in a nuclear detonation), it is very difficult, if not impossible, to develop new nuclear weapons without nuclear test explosions. 176 countries including the 5 major nuclear weapons states and Israel have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. India and Pakistan have not yet signed. It has been ratified by 125 states. The treaty can only enter into force when the 44 countries (named in Annex 2 of the Treaty) with nuclear operations sign and ratify. Of these 44, to date 41 have signed and 33 have ratified the treaty. The 3 states that have not yet signed are India, Pakistan and Nth Korea. The 11 who have not yet ratified the treaty are: China, Colombia, Nth Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, United States and Vietnam. Also established in 1996 was the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). It is based in Vienna and carries out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the Treaty, and prepares for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty. The Commission’s main task is the establishment of the 337 facility International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre, and the development of operational manuals, including for on-site inspections. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT or “fissban”)
First suggested at the UN over 50 years ago Enthusiasm for a FMCT from early 1990s onwards Talks at Conference on Disarmament deadlocked Disagreement over: -Existing stocks -Scope of the treaty The concept of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) was first suggested in the 1946 American Baruch Plan proposing the international control of atomic energy submitted to the UN. Since then attempts have been made to start negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material in an attempt to limit the new production of nuclear weapons. Talks were largely sidelined for the entire duration of the Cold War but the early 1990s saw an upsurge in activity in this area. In a speech before the UN in 1993, US President Bill Clinton called for a multilateral FMCT which was followed by a UN General Assembly resolution calling for the negotiation of a “non-discriminatory, multilateral and international effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” In August 1998 the Conference on Disarmament agreed by consensus to establish a committee to begin negotiations for an FMCT. In 2003 Japan produced a draft text of what a FMCT could look like. So far talks at the CD in Geneva on this issue have been deadlocked and even after the United States reversed its original position from one of skepticism about the verification of such a treaty to one of support for negotiations in late 2004, for the 6th year in a row the CD has been unable to find consensus to begin treaty negotiations. One of the major points of disagreement has been the issue of "existing stocks." Many Non-Nuclear Weapon States wanted to negotiate a treaty that not only halted all future productions of fissile materials, but also put a cap on existing stockpiles, thereby requiring the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to irreversibly down blend existing stocks of weapons-grade fissile materials so that they can never be used for nuclear weapons again. Another contentious element to a FMCT is its scope. While a treaty would ban the production of most fissionable materials, it would not include tritium, an element used to amplify the explosive power of a nuclear weapon. Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that has a half-life of 12 years. Were it to be included in an FMCT, the decaying tritium in existing stocks could not be replaced, in effect limiting the weapon's destructive power. Other materials, such as depleted uranium, neptunium and natural uranium can be used in nuclear weapons but would not be covered in a FMCT. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Security Council Res 1540 28 April 2004 Threat from Non-state actors Calls on states to enact national legislation Member states must report to the 1540 Committee On April 28, 2004, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The resolution was intended to address the gaps in the current legal WMD regime, more specifically, to address the potential of WMD acquisition by non-state actors. Whilst the treaty defines a non-state actor as “an individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State” most states that signed the resolution were thinking specifically of the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organisations, that is, groups using violent means to achieve political ends. The resolution calls upon all Member States of the United Nations to enact national legislation criminalizing the development, acquisition, manufacturing, possession, transport or transfer of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery by a non-state actor. All Member States are obliged under this resolution to report to the Security Council subcommittee on 1540 ("the 1540 Committee") on their progress implementing this resolution. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

International Court of Justice
Advisory Opinion, July 8, 1996: “...the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.” After a prolonged campaign of lobbying, primarily driven by non- government organisations that be came known as “The World Court Project,” (led by three main groups one of which was IPPNW) on July 8, 1996, the International Court of Justice issued its advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Often known as the World Court, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the judicial branch of the United Nations, and the highest and most authoritative court in the world on questions of international law. The ICJ’s role is to settle in accordance with international law the legal disputes submitted to it by States, and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly authorized international organs and agencies. In delivering its advisory opinion the Court found that: the threat or use of nuclear weapons "would generally be contrary" to humanitarian and other international law regulating the conduct of warfare, and that under Article VI of the NPT, states are obligated to "pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control." MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

International Court of Justice - Implications
Supplements and reinforces the role of international laws (UN Charter, humanitarian law NPT etc) Nuclear weapons are now in effect illegal under international law Because it is advisory, the opinion is not directly binding on the United Nations or its member states. However, the ICJ has authoritatively interpreted law, which states acknowledge they must follow, including humanitarian law, the United Nations Charter, and Article VI of the NPT. While noting the opinion's advisory character, the nuclear weapon states have not sought to deny its authority. Most nuclear weapons states instead argue that they are not in fact in breach of any of the treaties that the advisory opinion relates to. The importance of the ICJ decision is that in any initiative to limit or abolish nuclear weapons whether by states, international organisations or non-government organisations, the legal argument is always with those in opposition-to not in support-of nuclear weapons. The case can now be made with the backing of the world’s highest legal authority that nuclear weapons are in fact illegal under international law. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Nuclear Free Zones (NWFZs)
Treaties completely banning nuclear explosive devices in territories: Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga) South East Asia (Treaty of Bangkok) Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba) Proposed zones for Central Asia, Central Europe and the Middle East A nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) is a specified region in which countries commit themselves not to manufacture, acquire, test, or possess nuclear weapons. Each treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone includes a protocol for the 5 nuclear-weapon states recognized under the NPT-China, France, Russia, UK, and the US-to sign and ratify. These protocols, which are legally binding, call upon the nuclear-weapon states to respect the status of the zones and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against treaty states-parties. The concept of nuclear weapon free zones dates back to when the Rapacki plan was submitted to the UN proposing a zone free of nuclear weapons in Europe. The idea of geographically limiting the space where nuclear weapons can be positioned, transported, tested and used was first successfully enshrined in the 1959 Antarctica Treaty. This was followed in 1968 by the Outer Space Treaty and later by the 1971 Sea Bed Treaty. In 1967 the world’s first nuclear weapon free zone was established in Latin America. Called the Treaty of Tlatelolco, this set the standard for all subsequent nuclear weapon free zones. In 1985 a zone was created in the South Pacific known as the Treaty of Rarotonga and ten years later another was created in South East Asia called the Treaty of Bangkok. The following year in 1996 the Treaty of Pelindaba created a nuclear weapon free zone in Africa. This has resulted in almost the entire Southern Hemisphere being covered by nuclear weapon free zone treaties. Nuclear weapon free zones in the Middle East, Central Asia and Central Europe are currently under discussion in respective regions and at the UN. The negotiations on the Central Asian treaty were completed in 2002 but the negotiating states are awaiting endorsement from the 5 NWS before signing. Mongolia declared itself a nuclear weapon free zone in 1992 and passed national legislation reflecting this in 2000. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Existing NWFZs 6 4 5 2 3 This map shows the existing nuclear weapon free zones. Any area not in either blue for the sea or grey for a land mass is covered by a treaty declaring it free of nuclear weapons. 1 1. Antarctic Treaty 2. Treaty of Tlatelolco 3.Treaty of Rarotonga 4.Treaty of Bangkok 5.Treaty of Pelindaba 6. Mongolia MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Status Of Key Treaties In 2006 NPT: Signed-188, Ratified-188 CTBT: Signed-175, Ratified-122 (“Annex 2”-33) FMCT: Treaty in draft form NWC: Treaty in draft form NPT: The Non-Proliferation Treaty currently has 188 states party to the treaty. Those outside of the treaty are Israel, India, Pakistan and Nth Korea announced its withdrawal in 2003 but has recently announced its intention to return. CTBT: 176 States have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and 125 have ratified it. For the treaty to come into force the 44 states listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty who have either nuclear research or nuclear power reactors must ratify the treaty. So far 33 Annex 2 states have done so. FMCT: In 2003, Japan produced a draft text of a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty to ban the production of most fissionable materials available for use in nuclear weapons. Negotiations at the UN Conference on Disarmament are yet to begin. NWC: Following the submission of a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) by Costa Rica to the United Nations as a discussion draft in November 1997, responses and developments since have led to the collaborative publication of a revised version of the Model NWC, together with comments and discussion on critical political, legal, and technical questions essential to complete nuclear disarmament. Resolutions have been passed in the UN General Assembly, a working paper was submitted to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, resolutions have been introduced into the UK House of Commons and the US House of Representatives and a citizens petition has received over 80 million signatures worldwide. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Status Of The Non-proliferation & Disarmament Regimes
The risk of nuclear war has not gone away and is in fact increasing The opportunity presented by the end of the cold war was squandered Multilateral disarmament deadlocked Far from disappearing with the end of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear war has remained with humanity and today may have increased due to the proliferation of weapons to new countries including India, Pakistan and Nth Korea. The impact of this was felt in February 2002 when the world came very close to a nuclear exchange in South Asia as relations deteriorated between the now nuclear armed Pakistan and India, primarily over the disputed region of Kashmir and allegations of state-sponsored terrorism. The United States continues to refuse to adopt a policy of no-first-use in relation to its nuclear arsenal and recent nuclear posture reviews have reinforced the role of nuclear weapons in US defence policies. The highly unstable regime in Nth Korea claims to be developing nuclear weapons and the revelation in 2004 of the black-market in nuclear technology run by Pakistan’s Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan has revealed that nuclear ‘know-how’ has spread very far indeed. The opportunity presented by the end of the Cold War and the subsequent breakthrough in the stalemate in arms control negotiations was squandered and the ‘window of opportunity’ provided by an absence of superpower competition appears to be closing in the age of the ‘war on terror.’ Against this backdrop the multilateral arms control and disarmament regime is almost completely deadlocked. The 2005 NPT review conference was an abject failure, the CTBT and FMCT are still being retarded by states intent on stalling their development and even major UN reform proposals are failing to address the issue of nuclear weapons. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

ICAN stands for International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapons
The ICAN Campaign ICAN stands for International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapons Following the disappointing outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, much discussion was had around finding a new solution to the threat posed by nuclear weapons. This lead to the beginnings of the international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons or ICAN Campaign.

ICAN ICAN to address the erosion of the global nuclear disarmament regime Nuclear Weapons Convention – Review, update, progress MAPW to take a leading role within IPPNW and the global peace movement in the ICAN Campaign Many concerned citizens and groups now feel that a coordinated effort across states and institutions, in the framework of voluntary governmental and non-governmental participation, is necessary if there is to be a reversal of the nuclear threat. One element of such coordination will be a multilateral agreement to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons ~ a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The major focus of the ICAN Campaign, which is beginning to gain momentum, is to review, update and then work on progressing the goal of a completing the work already done on a nuclear weapons convention. MAPW are set to take a leading role both in IPPNW’s contribution (which is to effectively spearhead the campaign) as well as in developing and promoting the goals and strategies of the campaign within the international peace movement as a whole. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC)
Draft text produced by NGOs Submitted to the UN by Costa Rica in 1997 NWC would prohibit: development testing production stockpiling transfer use and threat of use Article VI of the NPT contains the obligation on all signatories to “pursue negotiations in good faith…on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” The concept of general and complete disarmament may be too big an ask in the immediate future but the issue of a treaty on the specific question of nuclear disarmament may be another story. A consortium of lawyers, scientists, physicians, former-diplomats and disarmament specialists and activists began work on a model for a Nuclear Weapons Convention in the mid-1990s. The text, which was drafted by the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), was submitted by Costa Rica to the United Nations as a discussion document in 1997. The purposes of the model Nuclear Weapons Convention include demonstrating the feasibility of a clear legal approach to the elimination of nuclear weapons, and encouraging governments to enter into nuclear disarmament negotiations. Another purpose is to educate and engage the public in the progress towards nuclear disarmament. The Convention would prohibit the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. The model convention provided for a system of societal and technical verification that would make it possible for the nuclear weapons states to fulfil their obligation under international law for the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. There are different opinions as to where such a convention should be negotiated with some pushing for it to be on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament while others aware of the limitations of the consensus rule of the CD, including Malaysia in a UN General Assembly resolution, have suggested a subsidiary body to be established for this purpose by the CD as well as an international conference to facilitate the consolidation of a new agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world. After the disappointing results at both the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the UN World Summit, much attention is now turning to the possibilities of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

What ICAN Would Aim For IPPNW members feel that a coordinated effort across states and institutions, in the framework of voluntary governmental and non-governmental participation, is necessary if there is to be a reversal of the nuclear threat. One element of such coordination will be a multilateral agreement to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons ~ a Nuclear Weapons Convention. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

How To Work Towards A NWC
It is strongly felt that the campaign for a NWC would need to be based on an Ottawa style process that lead to the Landmines Treaty – a strong and effectively coordinated global coalition of NGO's and international organisations that drew in governments, starting with Canada, and achieved a treaty in the space of five years. NGO stands for Non-Government Organisation MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Phases for Elimination
All States possessing nuclear weapons will be required to destroy their arsenals according to a series of phases. Photo courtesy of NATO ( MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Step by Step… The Convention outlines a series of five phases for the elimination of nuclear weapons beginning with: taking nuclear weapons off alert removing weapons from deployment removing nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles disabling the warheads removing and disfiguring the "pits" and placing the fissile material under inter-national control. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Fissile Materials And Delivery Vehicles
The Convention also prohibits the production of weapons-usable fissile material and requires delivery vehicles to be destroyed or converted to make them non-nuclear capable. Photo courtesy of naval-technology.com ( MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Working Towards A Nuclear Weapons Free World
Today some of these issues may appear intractable, and there is no guarantee that they are soluble. However, a robust and open debate is the most likely - if not the only - way to generate creative solutions and engage the broad transnational and cross-industrial involvement necessary for a nuclear weapons free world. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Nuclear Weapons Knowledge
Nuclear weapons knowledge cannot be disinvented. However, a vast portion of the knowledge, design and maintenance information can and should be destroyed once it is no longer necessary for disarmament. Images courtesy of Videocosmos.com ( naval-technology.com ( and MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Our Responsibility Moreover, and precisely because we cannot return to a world innocent of nuclear weapons knowledge, the answer to the "genie out of the bottle" is to increase scientific responsibility and awareness of potential proliferation risks. MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Get Involved For further information about the NCW, please see: or contact the Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia) phone: (03) MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Medical Association for Prevention of War Australia (MAPW)
National Office: P.O. Box 1379, Carlton VIC 3053, Australia Ph: Fax: Australian affiliate of International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) MAPW (Australia) Nuclear Weapons 2006

Nuclear Weapons Today A presentation prepared by the Medical Association for Prevention of War.

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Nuclear Weapons Today A presentation prepared by the Medical Association for Prevention of War.

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