1. Towards Privacy in Public Databases Shuchi Chawla, Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, Adam Smith, Larry Stockmeyer, Hoeteck Wee Work Done at Microsoft Research

2. 2 Database Privacy  Think “Census” Individuals provide information Census Bureau publishes sanitized records Privacy is legally mandated; what utility can we achieve?  Inherent Privacy vs Utility tension One extreme – complete privacy; no information Other extreme – complete information; no privacy  Goals: Find a middle path preserve macroscopic properties “disguise” individual identifying information Change the nature of discourse Establish framework for meaningful comparison of techniques

3. 3 Outline  Definitions privacy, defined in the breach sanitization requirements utility goals  Example: Recursive Histogram Sanitizations description of technique a robust proof of privacy  Example: “Round” Sanitizations nice learning properties privacy via cross-training  Setting the Real World Context dealing with auxiliary information

4. 4 Outline  Definitions privacy, defined in the breach sanitization requirements utility goals  Example: Recursive Histogram Sanitizations description of technique a robust proof of privacy  Example: “Round” Sanitizations nice learning properties privacy via cross-training  Setting the Real World Context dealing with auxiliary information

5. 5 What do WE mean by privacy?  [Ruth Gavison] Protection from being brought to the attention of others inherently valuable attention invites further privacy loss  Privacy is assured to the extent that one blends in with the crowd  Appealing definition; can be converted into a precise mathematical statement…

6. 6 A geometric view  Abstraction: Database consists of points in high dimensional space R d Points are unlabeled you are your collection of attributes Distance is everything points are more similar if and only if they are closer  Real Database (RDB), private n unlabeled points in d-dimensional space think of d as number of sensitive attributes  Sanitized Database (SDB), public n’ new points, possibly in a different space

7. 7 The adversary or Isolator - Intuition  On input SDB and auxiliary information, adversary outputs a point q  R d  q “isolates” a real DB point x, if it is much closer to x than to x’s near neighbors q fails to isolate x if q looks roughly as much like everyone in x’s neighborhood as it looks like x itself Tightly clustered points have a smaller radius of isolation RDB

8. 8 (c,T)-Isolation – the definition  I(SDB,aux) = q  x is (c,T)-isolated if B(q,c  ) contains fewer than T other points from RDB c – privacy parameter; eg, 4 q x  cc p

9. 9 Requirements for the sanitizer  No way of obtaining privacy if AUX already reveals too much!  Sanitization procedure compromises privacy if giving the adversary access to the SDB considerably increases its probability of success  Definition of “considerably” can be forgiving  Formally, quantify over distributions, adversaries, choice of database, auxiliary information:  D  I  I’ w.h.p. D  aux  x |Pr[I(SDB,aux) isolates x] – Pr[I’(aux) isolates x]| is small probabilities over choices made by sanitizer and I, I’ Provides a framework for describing the power of a sanitization method, and hence for comparisons Aux is going to cause trouble. Ignore it for now.

10. 10 Utility Goals  Pointwise proofs of specific utilities averages, medians, clusters, regressions,…  Prove there is a large class of interesting utilities for which there are good approximation procedures using sanitized data

11. 11 Outline  Definitions privacy, defined in the breach sanitization requirements utility goals  Example: Recursive Histogram Sanitizations description of technique a robust proof of privacy  Example: “Round” Sanitizations nice learning properties privacy via cross-training  Setting the Real World Context dealing with auxiliary information

12. 12 Recursive Histogram Sanitization  U = d-dim cube, side = 2  Cut into 2 d subcubes split along each axis subcube has side = 1  For each subcube if number of RDB points > 2T then recurse  Output: list of cells and counts

13. 13 Recursive Histogram Sanitization  Theorem: 9 c s.t. if n points are drawn uniformly from U, then recursive histogram sanitizations are safe with respect to c-isolation: Pr[I(SDB) succeeds] · exp(-d).

14. 14 Safety of Recursive Histogram Sanitization  Rough Intuition Expected distance ||q-x|| is ≈ diameter of cell. Distances tightly concentrated around mean. Multiplying radius by c captures almost all the parent cell - contains at least 2T points.

15. 15 For Very Large Values of n  Wlog can switch to ball adversaries: (q,r) I wins if B(q,r) contains at least one RDB point and B(q,cr) contains fewer than T RDB points  Define a probability density f(x) that captures adversary’s view of the RDB To win with probability , I needs: Pr f [B(q,r)] ¸  /n Pr f [B(q,cr)] · (2T + O(log  -1 ))/n Pr f [B(q,r)]/Pr f [B(q,cr)] ¸  /(2T + O(log  -1 ))  Bound  by bounding ratio, · 2 -  d,  < 1

16. 16 Pr f [B(q,r)]/Pr f [B(q,cr)]  f(x) = (n C /n) (1 / Vol(C)) fraction of RDB points landing in cell C, spread uniformly within C  If r is sufficiently small, the bigger ball captures exp(d) more mass in each subcube than does the smaller ball yields  < 2 -  (d)

17. 17 Pr f [B(q,r)]/Pr f [B(q,cr)]  f(x) = (n C /n) (1 / Vol(C)) fraction of RDB points landing in cell C, spread uniformly within C  If r is sufficiently small, the bigger ball captures exp(d) more mass in each subcube than does the smaller ball  If r is large, the small ball captures nothing or the bigger ball captures parent cube  Either way isolation cannot occur (c = 16)

18. 18 Proof is Very Robust  Extends to many interesting cases non-uniform but bounded-ratio density fns isolator knows constant fraction of attribute vals isolator knows lots of RDB points isolation in few attributes very weak bounds  Can be adapted to “round” distributions balls, spheres, mixtures of Gaussians, with effort; [work in progress w/ K. Talwar]  More General Distributions “good” islands in a sea of zero probability

19. 19 Outline  Definitions privacy, defined in the breach sanitization requirements utility goals  Example: Recursive Histogram Sanitizations description of technique a robust proof of privacy  Example: “Round” Sanitizations nice learning properties privacy via cross-training  Setting the Real World Context dealing with auxiliary information

20. 20 Round Sanitizations  The privacy of x is linked to its T-radius  Randomly perturb it in proportion to its T-radius  x’ = San(x)  R B(x,T-rad(x)) alternatively: S(x, T-rad(x)) or d-dim Gaussian  Intuition: We are blending x in with its crowd We are adding to x random noise with mean zero, so several macroscopic properties should be preserved.

21. 21 Nice Learning Properties  Known algorithm for learning mixtures of Gaussians works for clustering sanitized Gaussian data Original distribution (mixture of Gaussians) is recovered Technical issue: added noise is a function of the data Subject of another talk  Diameter increases by at most x3 when finding k clusters minimizing the largest diameter

22. 22 Privacy for n Sanitized Points?  Given n-1 points in the clear, the probability of isolating the nth is O(exp(-d))  Intuition for extension to n points is wrong! Privacy of x n given x n ’ and all the other points in the clear does not imply privacy of x n given x n ’ and sanitizations of others! Sanitization of other points reveals information about x n Worry is for safety of the reference point (the neighbor defining the T-radius), not the principal

23. 23 Combining the Two Sanitizations  Partition RDB into two sets A and B  Cross-training Compute histogram sanitization for B v 2 A:  v = f(side length of C containing v) Output GSan(v,  v )

24. 24 Cross-Training Privacy  Privacy for B: only histogram information about B is used  Privacy for A: enough variance for enough coordinates of v, even given C containing v and sanitization v’ of v. current proof works only for |A| = 2 o(d)

25. 25 Additional Results *  Impossibility Results 9 interesting utilities that have no sanitization protecting against isolation (cf. SFE) Impossibility of all-purpose sanitizers There is always a choice of aux that defeats a certain natural version of privacy Contrived, but places a limit on what can be proved Poly-time bounded adversary? Connection to obfuscation.  Utility Exploit literature on power of randomized histograms for algorithms for data streams (eg, Indyk) * with assorted collaborators, eg, N, N, S, T

26. 26 Outline  Definitions privacy, defined in the breach sanitization requirements utility goals  Example: Recursive Histogram Sanitizations description of technique a robust proof of privacy  Example: “Round” Sanitizations nice learning properties privacy via cross-training  Setting the Real World Context dealing with auxiliary information

27. 27 A Standard Technique: Cell Suppression  Gestalt: Tabular Data (many, possibly linked, tables) entries are cells frequency (count) data magnitude data (income, sales, etc.)  Disclosure = small counts Provides key for population unique, or almost-unique Can be used as a key into a different database  Enormous literature on suppressing “safely” 1685231 1520329 171325560

28. 28 Connection to Our Definitions  Protection against isolation yields protection against learning a key for a population unique isolation on a subspace does not imply isolation in the full-dimensional space … … but aux may contain other DBs that can be queried to learn remaining attributes definition mandates protection against all possible aux satisfy def ) can’t learn key

29. 29 Connection to Our Definitions  Seems very hard to provide good sanitization in the presence of arbitrary aux Provably impossible in general Anyway, can probably already isolate people based solely on aux Suggests we need to control aux  How should we redesign the world?

30. 30 Two Tools  Secure Function Evaluation [Yao, GMW] Technique permitting Alice, Bob, Carol, and their friends to collaboratively compute a function f of their private inputs  =f(a,b,c,…). eg,  = sum(a,b,c, …) Each player learns only what can be deduced from  and her own input to f  SuLQ databases [Dwork, Nissim] Provably preserves privacy of attributes when the rows of the database are mutually independent Powerful [DwNi; Blum, Dwork, McSherry, Nissim]

31. 31 Statistical Database Query (S, f) S  [n] f : {0,1} d  {0,1} Exact Answer  r  S f(row r) n persons d attributes Database DB f f f f  00110 10100 11011 00101 11001 00010 Row distribution D (D 1,D 2,…,D n )

32. 32 Sub-Linear Query (SuLQ) Databases n persons d attributes f f f f 00110 10100 11011 00101 11001 00010  + noise If the number of queries is << n, then privacy can be protected with little noise (per query): E(noise) = 0; standard dev << √n Much less than sampling error!

33. 33 Our Data, Ourselves

34. 34 Our Data, Ourselves  Individuals maintain their own data records join a DB by setting an appropriate attribute  Statistical queries via a SFE(SuLQ) privacy of SuLQ query ) this SFE is “safe”  Individuals ensure data take part in sufficiently few queries sufficient random noise is added 0463…10…

35. 35 Summary  Definitions defined isolation and sanitization  Recursive Histogram Sanitizations described approach and sketched a robust proof of privacy for a special distribution proof exploits high dimensionality (# columns)  Sanitization via perturbations utility and privacy via cross-training  Setting the Real World Context discussed a radical view of how data might be organized to prevent a powerful class of attacks based on auxiliary data SuLQ tool exploits large membership (# rows)

36. 36 Larry Joseph Stockmeyer November 13, 1948 - July 31, 2004

37. 37 Larry Stockmeyer Commemoration May 21-22, 2005 Baltimore, Maryland (in conjunction with STOC 2005) May 21:, Tutorial by Nick Pippenger (Princeton) on some of Stockmeyer's fundamental results in complexity theory Lectures by Miki Ajtai (IBM), Anne Condon (UBC), Cynthia Dwork (Microsoft), Richard Karp (UC Berkeley), Albert Meyer (MIT), and Chris Umans (CalTech). Some time will be reserved for personal remarks. Contact Cynthia Dwork if you want to participate in this part of the commemoration. May 22: Lance Fortnow gives first keynote address to STOC.

38. 38 Larry Stockmeyer Larry Stockmeyer, theoretical computer scientist and a founder of the field of complexity theory -- that part of computer science exploring the inherent difficulty of solving computational problems -- died Saturday, July 31, 2004, of pancreatic cancer. Born in Evansville, Indiana, in 1948, Stockmeyer was educated at MIT, where he received a bachelor's of science in mathematics and a master's of science in electrical engineering in 1972, followed by a doctorate in computer science in 1974. Stockmeyer is famous for his groundbreaking work proving the extreme difficulty of solving naturally occurring computational problems. His pioneering contributions were soon incorporated into textbooks on computational complexity. Stockmeyer joined IBM Research in 1974, working first at the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights, New York. A founding member of the Theory Group at the IBM Almaden Research Center in the early 1980s, Stockmeyer was elevated to Fellow of the Association of Computing Machinery in 1996. He remained at Almaden until he took a bridge to retirement from IBM in November 2002. After this, Stockmeyer enjoyed a brief affiliation with the University of California at Santa Cruz until his death, at age 55. Stockmeyer is survived by his father Robert Stockmeyer, his sister Mary Karen Walker, and his former wife, dear friend, and colleague Cynthia Dwork.

39. 39 Larry Joseph Stockmeyer November 13, 1948 - July 31, 2004