1. NCHU AI LAB Implications of Unlicensed Mobile Access for GSM security From ： Proceeding of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks, 2005 Author ： Sandro Grech, Pasi Eronen Presented by ： Ying Long Chen

2. page2Outline  Overview of UMA  Introduction  Background: GSM and GPRS security  UMA overview  Security Analysis  Protecting against the attack  Conclusion

3. page3Introduction  Why UMA  Indoor coverage issue for GSM  Bandwidth issue  The standardization work is continued by 3GPP

4. page4 GSM and GPRS Security  Authentication ： avoid fraudulent access by a cloned MS  Encryption ： avoid unauthorized listening  Parameters:  Ki ： used to achieve authentication(128 bit)  Ki is stored in AUC and SIM  Ki is not known to the subscriber  Rand ： 128-bit random number by the home system  SRES ： 32-bit generated by Algorithm A3  Kc ： generated by Algorithm A8 for the encryption  Frame number ： a TDMA frame number encoded in the data bits

5. page5 GSM and GPRS Security  Authentication algorithm ：  A3  Authentication function  Stored in AUC and SIM  Encryption algorithm ：  A8  To generated the encryption key  Stored in AUC and SIM  A5  An algorithm stored in the MS (handset hardware) and the visit system  Used for data ciphering and deciphering

6. page6 GSM and GPRS Security

7. page7 UMA overview UMA security mechanisms

8. page8 UMA overview 1. Unlicensed Interface Security ：  Outside the scope of UMA 2. Up Interface Security  Traffic between the phone and the UNC is protected by IPSec ESP tunnel, which is established and maintained using IKEv2 3. CN authentication, GPRS ciphering  The authentication between the phone and UNC does not replace the normal GSM authentication between the phone and MSC 4. Data application security  Outside the scope of UMA

9. page9 UMA Security Mechanisms  Authentication Mechanisms  UMA stage 2 states that mutual authentication between Mobile Station and UNC shall be accomplished using Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) protocol and the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)  Confidentiality Mechanisms  IPsec protect all signal and user traffic sent between MS and UNC-SGW over the Up interface.

10. page10 UMA Security Mechanisms  Integrity Mechanisms  As part of IPsec, messages could be integrity protected. IPsec use a hash with a secret key to provide integrity protection. This scheme is called an HMAC(Hashed Message Authentication Code)  User Credentials  All long-term security credentials used for subscriber and network authentication are stored on the SIM

11. page11 UMA overview

12. page12 UMA overview

13. page13 UMA Security Analysis  IKEv2  IMSI not protected enough  During the initial stage of the EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA procedures, when the Mobile Station sends IKE SA INIT, it will transfer its Network Access Identifier (NAI), containing the IMSI. This message is encrypted.  But an attacker intercepting traffic to the UNC-SGW could act as a false UNC-SGW and receive the NAI of the Mobile Station before it has to authenticate itself as a valid UNC. This information could be used to locate a mobile subscriber, hence violating the subscriber identity. This identity probing is a known issue caused by the IKEv2 protocol  Dos attack ：  Before the responder authenticate the initiator ， the responder will compute DH agreed key ( 指數運算 ) ， so the attacker can make a lot of request to build IKE SA.

14. page14 UMA Security Analysis  Open Platform  Unauthorized access and identity spoofing  By virus or Trojan horse  Exploitation of implementation weakness  Such as buffer overflow  Denial of service  Attack from WLAN 、 internet  Eavesdropping  Location spoofing

15. page15 Protecting against the attack  Protecting non-malicious users’ terminals  Technical prevention of unapproved terminals  Legal prevention of unapproved terminals  Detecting and disabling misbehaving terminals  Increasing core network resistance to attacks

16. page16 Conclusion & Future Work  Since the UMA specifications have been published only recently, it is possible that they contain problems with potential security implications.  Future work is also required to determine the security impact of UMA in roaming situations, to identify better countermeasures against denial-of-service attacks, and to investigate mechanisms for detecting misbehavior and fraud