1. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE USC CSci599 Trusted Computing Lecture Five – Key Management February 9, 2007 Dr. Clifford Neuman University of Southern California Information Sciences Institute

2. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Announcements Assignment due today. Those that didn’t get TVSA paper last week see me. Mid-term in two weeks For the most relevant of the assignments turned in I will be contacting you about presenting to the class.

3. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Cryptography in Use Provides foundation for security services –Provides confidentiality –Validates integrity –Provides data origin authentication –If we know the key Where does the key come from –Straightforward plan ▪One side generates key ▪Transmits key to other side ▪But how? How is the key protected –This is a key problem in security

4. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Key Management Key management is where much security weakness lies –Choosing keys –Storing keys –Communicating keys

5. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE What to do with keys Practical issues –How to carry them ▪Passwords vs. disks vs. smartcards, vs. hardware. –Where do they stay, where do they go –How many do you have –How do you get them to begin with. –When can you use them.

6. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Key Management and Trusted Computing Protecting the keys needed for trusted computing. –This is the role of the TPM –We will discuss how this is done. Using trusted computing to protect the keys needed for other applications. –This can be a role for trusted computing in general. –The TPM plays a role, but the rest of the system must extend this protection through the application stack.

7. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE What it means to protect a key Prevent disclosure –A manageable problem in some situations. Prevent use of the key for unauthorized purposes. –A much harder problem How do we preserve or transport keys?

8. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Key Distribution Conventional cryptography –Single key shared by both parties Public Key cryptography –Public key published to the world –Private key known only by owner Third party certifies or distributes keys –Certification infrastructure –Authentication

9. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE KDC Based Key Distribution User sends request to KDC: {s} KDC generates a random key: K c,s –Encrypted twice: {K c,s }K c, {K c,s }K s –{K c,s }K c called ticket –Ticket plus K c,s called credentials –Ticket is opaque and forwarded with application request No keys ever traverse net in the clear

10. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Public Key Distribution Public key can be public! –How does either side know who and what the key is for? Private agreement? (Not scalable.) Does this solve key distribution problem? –No – while confidentiality is not required, integrity is. Still need trusted third party

11. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Recovery from exposed keys Revocation lists (CRL’s) –Long lists –Hard to propogate Lifetime / Expiration –Short life allows assurance of validitiy at time of issue. Realtime validation –Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) What about existing messages?

12. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Key Management Overview Who needs strong secrets anyway –Users? –Servers? –The Security System? –Software? –End Systems? Secret vs. Public

13. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Group Key Management Group key vs. Individual key –Identifies member of groups vs. which member of group –PK slower but allows multiple verification of individuals

14. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Trust models for certification X.509 Hierarchical –Single root (original plan) –Multi-root (better accepted) –SET has banks as CA’s and common SET root PGP Model –“Friends and Family approach” - S. Kent Other representations for certifications No certificates at all –Out of band key distribution –SSH

15. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Certification Infrastructures Public keys represented by certificates Certificates signed by other certificates –User delegates trust to trusted certificates –Certificate chains transfer trust up several links

16. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Key in Trusted Computing Slide by Arun Viswanathan

17. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Endorsement Key Every TPM has unique Endorsement key –Semi-root of trust for system ▪Real root is CA that signs public key associated with Endorsement key –Generated and installed during manufacture

18. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Storage Root Key Root of Key Hierarchy for managing keys related to TPM (except EK) –Root key never leaves TPM –Can be changed to reinitialize ownership.

19. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Storage Keys Can protect data Can protect other keys Some storage keys may be migrated.

20. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Binding Key Private key to decrypt data perhaps encrypted by others using a public key

21. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Using Encryption LoadKey –Generated or imported Sign –Signs Data Presented to TPM Unbind –Decrypt data from elsewhere in a public key

22. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Using Encryption Seal/Unseal –Encrypt and subsequent decrypt –This TPM Only –PCRs must be correct Quote –Sign current value of PCR

23. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Using Encryption CreateWrapKey –Creates and encrypts for transfer a new RSA key MakeIdentity –Creates an Attestation Identity key for a user TakeOwnership –Reinitialize TPM, and erases old keys

24. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Applications Authentication Login checking Digital Signatures on document Email Disk Encryption Electronic commerce Financial transactions Broadcast access control (e.g. Satellite TV)

25. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Authentication User key may be needed from multiple machines. –Either user enters it (vulnerable) –Stored and used in smartcard (better) Transferred between and stored in TPMs. –But how to validate presence of user

26. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Encryption Based Authentication Proving knowledge of encryption key –Nonce = Non repeating value {Nonce or timestamp}K CS CS But where does K c come from?

27. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Login Checking Traditional crypto-based login checking is to obtain user key and use it to authenticate to the TCB. –But if the user key is in the TPM, or in a smartcard, it reduces to some kind of secret based authentication (e.g. password), or alternatively a biometric.

28. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Digital Signatures Key used to “sign” document must be carried and stored where used. –Can be stored in TPM, or protected so that it can only be accessed by TPM –TPM applies signature, or yields key used to apply signature in other software. –Must address issue of when key may be used, and to whom it may be given.

29. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Email Digital signature for sending Authentication for retrieval Unsealing based on binding key for received encrypted email.

30. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Disk Encryption Covered in earlier lecture Full Disk Encryption –Key in register in disk –Or key in TPM and data encrypted/decrypted by TPM Seagate Drive uses register in Disk –Key must be loaded –User prompt at BIOS –Or managed by TPM ▪But OS image maybe on disk, how to get

31. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Ecommerce and Financial Transactions Some keys and assets may need to be protected against user –Stored value cards Others are protected for the user –Keys that authenticate requests by user, such as checks or credit card documents.

32. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Satellite TV Captured Content For Channel 1 Video Tape Recorder (VTR) Video Encoder Captured Content For Channel n Video Tape Recorder (VTR) Video Encoder Scrambler Conditional Access System Modulator Uplink to Satellite Multiplexer Slide from Nilesh Maheshwari

33. Copyright © 1995-2006 Clifford Neuman - UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA - INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE Satellite TV Slide from Nilesh Maheshwari Paid Channels from Content Provider A Set-top Box of Content Provider A Video Encoder Paid Channels from Content Provider B Set-top Box of Content Provider B Video Encoder Scrambler Conditional Access System Modulator To Subscribers or End-user’s STB Multiplexer Downlink from satellite Unpaid Channels from Various Content Providers QPSK TS Converter Video on Demand System